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Shari’ah-based governance has grown in the last three decades to become a unique and exclusive 
system in Islamic financial institutions (IFIs). Although there has been growing research interest 
in the topic concerning the need to have an efficient and sound Shari’ah corporate governance 
(CG) system in IFIs, there are no insights into the role and function of governance bodies within 
this new framework. Specifically, there is a lack of academic studies that have focused on 
investigating the relationship between the board of directors (BODs) and Shari’ah supervisory 
boards (SSBs) in the IFIs in Saudi Arabia. The main objective of this research was to examine how 
the BODs and the SSBs exercise their roles in the Saudi Islamic banks. In order to address this 
objective, the thesis sought to provide answers to three questions. First, the research attempted 
to examine the nature of the relationship between the company directors and the SSBs in Saudi 
Arabia, focusing especially on the roles and tasks of these governance bodies. Second, the 
research was designed to identify the factors in the CG structure of IFIs in Saudi Arabia that either 
support or undermine the deployment of the SSBs. Third, it intended to explore potential areas 
of convergence or divergence which exist between the BODs and the SSBs. A qualitative research 
approach was used to collect relevant information from the study participants using interviews 
for the data collection process. Findings drawn from the interviews revealed that the nature of 
the current relationship between SSBs and the BODs is initiated and sustained by several factors. 
Some of the important factors which inform the relationship of these two boards include the 
growing focus and foundation in Saudi Arabia towards the important role that the boards play, 
including promoting the achievement of IFIs objectives and stakeholder interests. Results from 
the study also indicated that several factors have been reported to support or undermine the 
uptake of SSBs. Some of the important facilitators include increasing public and consumer 
support for the need to have SSBs, the growing consensus among stakeholders to ensure banks 
offer legitimate products in line with Shari’ah principles, changing perceptions in the Islamic 
financial sector towards CG, and the desire to achieve effective governance via compliance with 
Shari’ah and Islamic laws. Finally, data revealed that the roles which the boards play supplement 
each other towards achieving the same objective of financial growth and stakeholder interests. 
Fundamentally, the two boards engage in frequent communication and information exchange 
regarding banking practices, where the outcome includes improved policy and process 
formulation and practice for their companies. In conclusion, findings from this study show that 
the SSBs and the BODs need to be perceived as complementary units that supplement each other 









Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1. Background of the Study 
Since the early 1990s, the importance of corporate governance (CG) has increased exponentially 
in the wake of several corporate crises and scandals, prompting stakeholders to rethink their 
approach to CG (Azmat, Skully & Brown, 2015; Iqbal & Mirakhor 2004). For instance, an upsurge 
in fraud cases involving multibillion companies such as Enron prompted the United States 
Congress to enact the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOA) (Becht & Barca, 2001; Bassens, Derudder, & 
Witlox, 2011). Furthermore, weaknesses in the shareholder model of CG prompt the rise of the 
stakeholder model, which expands the scope of responsibility of companies towards society 
(Abdul-Rahman, 2010; Archer & Rifaat, 2006; Grassa & Matoussi, 2014). Based on these insights, 
it can be pointed out that CG is a delicate matter in the contemporary business environment, 
which continues to develop depending on the business environment, as well as society’s 
demands towards organisations (Becht & Barca, 2001; Mullah & Zaman, 2015).  
According to Faleh (2013), in Saudi Arabia, CG is just as important as in any other part of the 
world, as witnessed in the country’s financial industry. For years, the government developed CG 
laws that sought to underpin standard practice for all players in the financial sector (Al-Shamrani, 
2014). However, Faleh (2013) cautions that such measures are not enough as companies 
introduce additional safeguards to fortify their CG initiatives even further. The implications of 
this are evident in the emergence of SSBs as a mainstay component of the CG structure in Islamic 
financial institutions around the country (Khokhar & Bukhari, 2014), an aspect that gives CG as 
applied to the banking sector a unique model while underscoring the degree of commitment 
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towards the stakeholder model across the world (Abdul-Rahman, 2010; Khokhar & Bukhari, 
2014).  
Regarding the Saudi Islamic financial institutions, the literature points out that since the early 
1990s, the SSBs has played out an integral part in making sure that the organisation meets the 
social pressure that comes with the commitment to issue products tailored for the Muslim 
market (Becht & Barca, 2001; Khokhar & Bukhari, 2014). While financial practices around the 
world are often standard, cultural sensitivity in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, and 
especially in Saudi Arabia is such that Islamic financial institutions are required to offer products 
that are consistent with Islamic law (Farook, & Farooq, 2013; Garas & ElMassah, 2018). As a 
result, IFIs in Islamic countries need to adjust their governance to ensure adequate compliance 
with the Shari’ah laws (Farook & Farooq, 2013) since they face the threat of losing their legitimacy 
or failing to attain the desired levels of Islamic compliance (Farag, Mallin, & Ow-Yong, 2018). 
From this perspective, it can be noted that SSB is an integral component of the CG system in Saudi 
Arabia (Gözübüyük, Kock, & Ünal, 2018). However, one aspect that is not apparent is the way 
SSBs collaborates with the more traditional components of CG, especially those founded under 
the shareholder model (Hamza, 2013; Ullah, Harwood, & Jamali, 2018). Pollard and Samers 
(2013) pointed out that the shareholder model of CG develops leadership and corporate 
structures that are answerable to shareholders alone, while the Board of Directors (BODs) 
ensures that the shareholder rights and interests are adequately protected (Pollard & Samers, 
2007; Hassan & Aliyu, 2018).  
Obid and Naysary (2014) assert that the introduction of SSBs in Islamic financial institutions urges 
them to be conscious of interests from other stakeholder groups; hence, pushing the BODs to be 
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conscious of a wider scope of objectives, other than profit-making, or protecting shareholder 
interests. According to Narayan and Phan (2019), the value of this additional component of CG 
manifests in the way that it promotes the adoption of Islamic law in financial institutions. 
Nonetheless, Nawaz (2019) cautions that way SSBs coexist with the BODs within the same 
corporate space remains unclear. Considering these deliberations, this research attempted to 
explore more about the CG structure of IFIs to establish how the SSBs and BODs collaborate. 
Having presented the background to this study, the next section elaborates more about the 
specific research problem which will be investigated in this research. 
1.2. Problem Statement 
Research on CG has grown substantially in the past few decades, and especially since the 1990s 
(Haniffa & Hudaib, 2007; Williams & Zinkin, 2010; Farag, Mallin, & Ow-Yong, 2018). One reason 
for this, as mentioned earlier, has been high-profile corporate failures such as Islamic Bank of 
South Africa, Ihlas Finance House of in Turkey, and Islamic Investment Companies of Egypt 
(Azmat, Skully & Brown, 2015; Iqbal &Mirakhor 2004). As remarked by Hayat & Hassan (2017), it 
is also important to note the reality that the global business environment keeps on changing from 
time to time, thus necessitating the need to build business models that can meet the demands 
of the new milieu (Narayan & Phan, 2019). However, research in some areas of CG is under-
developed (Mohammed & Muhammed, 2017). Since the inception of the stakeholder model of 
CG, countries now have two- or three-tiered boards (Azmat, Skully & Brown, 2015). In other 
countries, there is mandatory employee representation championing for the rights and interests 
of other stakeholder groups apart from the shareholders (Farag, Mallin, & Ow-Yong, 2018). In 
Islamic countries where the financial sector is established on Islamic and Shari’ah regulations, the 
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SSB is an integral component of Islamic financial institutions such as Malaysia, Kuwait, Egypt, and 
Saudi Arabia (Mejia et al., 2014). Despite their significance to CG, SSBs are among the most 
understudied components of CG, especially in terms of how traditional structures of CG interact 
with them or support their presence in the CG framework (Azmat, Skully, & Brown, 2015; Azid, 
Asutay, &Burki, 2007; Gözübüyük, Kock, & Ünal, 2018; Platteau, 2008). As a result, there is a gap 
in knowledge in the existing literature regarding how one can objectively evaluate their 
effectiveness or commitment to structures that they put in place to promote financial 
performance, service delivery to stakeholders, and long-term sustainability.  
In the context of this study, the prevalent implementation of SSBs in Islamic financial institutions 
warrants research that informs practice by exploring different aspects of the use of SSBs to 
promote the stakeholder model. The need for this research is informed by the existing knowledge 
gap resulting from the paucity of research on CG (Gözübüyük, Kock, & Ünal, 2018), while existing 
theories have not appropriately explored the changes in the IFIs business environment (Garas, & 
ElMassah, 2018). One of the important aspects that this research would help identify is the way 
SSBs interact with the BODs within the IFIs, which is considered to be at the apex of organisations 
and tasked with control and monitoring of management in the traditional agency view of CG (Al-
Shamrani, 2014). Failure to explore this relationship shows that there is a considerable research 
gap that requires addressing. Taking this approach not only provides knowledge that 
stakeholders and researchers can rely on to understand the deployment of these boards better 
but also provides a foundation for subsequent research into the area. Recent studies by Farag, 
Mallin, and Ow-Yong (2018) and by Narayan and Phan (2019) have noted the important role that 
SSBs play in IFIs institutions. Moreover, Ullah, Harwood, and Jamali (2018) observed that SSBs 
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help in undertaking internal reviews and reporting across IFIs. On their part, a study by Garas and 
ElMassah (2018) revealed that in line with agency theory, SSBs facilitate corporate operations in 
line with promoting the interests of the public. However, based on the extant literature, there is 
still limited information in the mentioned literature which have compared how both the BODs 
and the SSBs interact within the IFIs, especially in Saudi Arabia, thereby prompting the need for 
this study. 
1.3. The rationale of the Study 
The rationale of undertaking this study was informed by the paucity of literature knowledge 
which has explored the relationship between SSBs and BODs, especially in Saudi Arabian IFIs. To 
begin with, the literature acknowledges that both the SSBs and BODs play a fundamental role in 
facilitating financial success and reducing potential risks to which IFIs are constantly exposed 
(Amanullah, 2015; Hafizah, Azizi, & Al Jaffri, 2016). Poor risk management can potentially dampen 
or enhance the profitability of IFIs. However, although the existing academic research is relatively 
succinct in addressing the impact of SSBs on IFIs, studies pertaining to how SSBs operate with 
regards to interfaces and tasks with other facets of IFIs are still lacking. For example, there is a 
paucity of literature insights on the relationship between SSBs and their influence on BODs. Abd 
et al. (2015) examined the efficiency of Islamic Banks in Malaysia and explored the role of SSBs 
in IFIs and the obligations of BODs in IFIs. However, the researchers recommended the need to 
explore the interplay between SSBs and BODs in terms of business operations. 
Underwriting the above considerations, the relationship between SSBs and BODs in the IFIs 
becomes critical to explore in terms of how SSBs influence top banking management and the 
BODs to improve service delivery to stakeholders. In most cases, the IFIs largely differ from the 
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conventional banking sector which exposes Islamic banks to higher risks. For example, in the 
Murabaha financing system, IFIs are exposed both to the credit risk and defaults related to 
counterparty risks among commodity traders who also serve as contracting parties in this 
financing model (Azmat, Skully, & Brown, 2015; May-Chiun, Mohamad, Ramayah, & Chai, 2015). 
Moreover, the IFIs financing principles are commonly based on loss and profit sharing (i.e. equity 
sharing unlike in conventional banks) such as Mudarabah and Musharaka in the event of business 
failure (Bassens, Derudder, & Witlox, 2011; Mediawati, 2016). Since the financing relationship 
between IFIs and investors is based on partnership, it becomes difficult to mitigate challenges 
such as business failure because they have a strong influence on project management and 
finance (Hafizah, Azizi, & Al Jaffri, 2016). Yet, there are still limited studies to establish how SSBs 
influence the performance of top IFIs management including the BODs decision-making activities 
(Hafizah, Azizi, & Al Jaffri, 2016; Norazlina & Rahim, 2015; Sani & Ram Al Jaffri, 2016; Suhaily, 
Maslinawati, Nurshazana, & Zubaidah, 2016).  
Yeh and Hsieh (2017) noted that SSBs are mainly responsible for ex-ante approval of financial 
services and products while monitoring ex-post the activities and operations of IFIs on behalf of 
stakeholders in efforts to enforce Shari’ah. Even so, limited studies on the topic have explored 
the relationship between SSBs and BODs, with existing studies examining how BODs implement 
decisions made by SSBs. In the process, SSBs have only been researched in the light of being an 
additional layer of CG in the IFIs meant to complement the oversight roles of the BODs (Abd et 
al., 2015). Zaemah and Norhafiza (2016) also examined the role of SSBs and BODs in IFIs and 
concluded that SSBs ensure that financial contracts align with Shari’ah. The researchers noted 
that there exists limited knowledge of the advisory relationship between SSBs and BODs.  
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In Saudi Arabia, this area of research has received even little attention to-date and there is no 
clear relationship between SSBs and BODs. Past literature publications on SSBs largely focused 
on studying the Shari’ah governance framework (Al Elsheikh & Tanega, 2011; Al-Shamrani, 2014; 
Farag, Mallin, & Ow-Yong, 2018), the impact of Shari’ah governance on IFIs (Gözübüyük, Kock, & 
Ünal, 2018) and effectiveness of Shari’ah supervision model (Grassa & Matoussi, 2014). However, 
there is little information as to how the structure of SSBs and the resources availed by its Shari’ah 
advisors contribute to the effectiveness of BODs and IFIs in meeting stakeholder outcomes. Thus, 
the rationale of this study was to fill the knowledge gap in the literature in terms of assessing the 
potential relationship between SSBs and BODs, and explore how BODs are influenced by SSBs in 
dispensing their financial obligations in the IFIs. 
1.4. Research Scope 
The focus of this study is limited to IFIs in Saudi Arabia with specific research scope limited to 
assessing the relationship between the BODs and the SSBs in Islamic banks. Over the years, has 
been growing research focus on SSBs within IFIs across various countries such as Egypt (Zuhaida, 
1990), Malaysia (Bazeley, 2009), Egypt, Kuwait (Pathan & Faff, 2013), and the UAE (Ayub, 2007). 
However, considering that the topic of CG is quite broad, the study takes steps to narrow it down 
and identify a context and parameters where a study can be practically conducted. Thus, the 
scope of this study was limited to Saudi IFIs with a specific focus on exploring the relationship 
between BODs and SSBs within the banking sector in Saudi Arabia. The specific focus on Saudi 
Arabia was selected considering the ease of conducting the research in this location in addition 
to the existing links with important contacts within the IFIs. Also, the research environment, 
board structures, and legal environment in Saudi Arabia are different from most of the countries 
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with SSBs such as Egypt and Malaysia considering the absolute monarchy nature of the Saudi 
Kingdom where all business must comply with Shari’ah law (Al-Shamrani, 2014; Khokhar & 
Bukhari, 2014). In terms of the context, the study takes place in Saudi Arabia and specifically 
focuses on IFIs.  
Further, focusing on Saudi Arabia helped narrow the research topic while focusing on 
fundamental gaps identified in the literature on the roles of SSBs and BODs in the CG of banks. 
The reason for conducting the study in this context is the prevalence of financial institutions in 
the country that offer the Islamic form of banking, as well as the significance of compliance with 
Islamic law in the region (Mollah, Hassan, Al Farooque, & Mobarek, 2016). Selecting this study 
context ensures that the study comes up with findings that are relevant and practical. In terms 
of data collection, participants for the research come exclusively from financial institutions in 
Saudi Arabia, a move that ensures the study engages with individuals that have the credibility to 
touch on the topic under investigation. As a result, focusing on banks offers important insights 
considering that the Quran and Shari’ah laws significantly discusses the issue of legitimate money 
transactions in this sector. As a result, focusing on banks provides an important benchmark to 
evaluate the extent to which these corporate adhere to pre-establish Shari’ah and Islamic 
guidelines in the Quran and the Sunnah (Garas, 2012). The next section presents a brief 
discussion on the existing knowledge gap in the literature which this study seeks to fill as relates 
to the relationship between SSBs and BODs in the IFIs. 
1.5. Literature Gap  
Forbes and Milliken (1999) examined CG and how BODs serve in strategy formulation. Their 
research generally focused on corporate group effectiveness when BODs operate to promote CG. 
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Nonetheless, they did not examine CG in the financial sector and failed to examine the role of 
SSBs in firms. In contrast, Garas (2012) examined the conflict of interest in SSBs but did not 
compare their studies with BODs. Besides, the research by Grass and Matoussi (2014) did not 
compare or contrast SSBs and BODs in the banking sector. Garcia-Torea et al. (2016) assessed the 
effectiveness of BODs in CG. The researchers explored the relevance of BODs in promoting 
stakeholder and shareholder interests in the corporate sector. However, the researchers did not 
investigate BODs within IFIs sectors, and their study also lacked reflection on SSBs within the 
financial industry. More recently, Haridan et al. (2018) examined CG in Islamic banks and 
examined the influence that SBs have in promoting efficient banking governance. However, the 
researchers did not investigate the role of BODs in the governance of banks, and neither did they 
compare operations between BODs and SSBs.  
Further, the extant literature on Shari’ah is largely limited in terms of examining the relationship 
between SSBs and BODs (Mollah & Zaman, 2015). Mollah, Skully, and Liljeblom (2017) pointed 
out that past studies focused on examining the relationship between SSB expertise, SSB 
education, SSB cross-membership, and SSB size with a limited approach to assessing the 
interaction between SSB and BODs. Further, past studies were limited in their variables when 
examining BODs in terms of gender composition, representation, and BOD composition (Ramly, 
Chan, Mustapha, & Sapiei, 2016). In response to past literature which has been limited in its 
research scope, this study focused on assessing new independent variables in the IFIs 
performance context, namely the relationship between SSBs and BODs. 
The literature argues that the main factors which influence BOD operations also affect SSBs since 
the role of SSBs, audit committees, and BODs are considered to be similar (Mollah & Zaman, 
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2015). Chan, Koh, and Kari (2016) added that the structure of CG and that of the conventional 
boards seem to be similar as earlier reported by Bhatti and Bhatti (2010). In line with these 
arguments, it can be noted that CG theories such as resource dependence theory (RDT), 
stewardship theory (STD), and agency theory (AGT) can be extended into the Saudi IFI sector to 
explain the potential impact and relationship between SSBs and BODs. Past studies such as the 
one undertaken by Fakhrunnas and Ramly (2017) and Oseni, Ahmad, and Hassan (2016) have 
used these theories to explain the effectiveness of SSBs in IFIs. Therefore, this study is different 
from past academic publications since it examines the interaction and resulting impact between 
SSBs and BODs in the IFIs across Saudi Arabia. 
Further, past studies have largely used single theories to explore the different operations by SSBs 
and BODs in the IFIs (Farook, & Farooq, 2013; Grassa & Matoussi, 2014). The current study uses 
agency theory to examine the monitoring aspects of agency theory, in addition to resource 
dependency theory to examine the impact that SSBs have on BOD’s decision-making approach in 
IFIs. Thus, the study will integrate the arguments of RDT and AGT to support the postulation that 
the objectives of CG can be achieved effectively by combining or interacting SSB and BOD 
governance mechanisms, as opposed to relying on a single research approach as done in past 
studies. Considering the shortcomings identified from past studies, undertaking this research is 
important because new knowledge will be created to fill the existing knowledge gap on how well 
primary doctrines that underpin the Saudi financial transactions in IFIs are implemented in the 
light of Islamic and Shari’ah laws.   
Therefore, one of the key significances of undertaking this study was to formulate a strong 
foundation for the adoption of Islamic law in financial institutions across the world, a 
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commitment which this study intends to aspire and make subsequent follow-ups on, in the future 
(Pathan & Faff, 2013). Another aspect that motivated the need for this study was the fact that 
there is very little academic evidence on the association between SSBs and the BODs. According 
to Iqbal and Mirakhor (2007), this is even though the adoption of a CG system that is sensitive to 
Shari’ah law is prevalent in Saudi Arabia. However, past financial literature in Saudi Arabia has 
not taken into consideration the need to review the commitment that the banking sector has had 
towards this system of CG in IFIs (Pathan & Faff, 2013). Through this research, therefore, there is 
optimism that this knowledge gap will be closed by examining how the SSB and the BODs operate 
together in the same financial organisation, an aspect that would help establish the amount of 
ground that they have covered when assessing the IFIs literature in Saudi Arabia. 
The motivation to undertake this study was also informed by the literature gap identified from 
other past publications on the topic. For example, Granot, Brashear, and Motta (2012) noted that 
CG is an essential component of the modern economic systems and specifically the banking 
industry and other financial institutions. Iqbal and Mirakhor (2007) elaborated that failures in CG 
have had detrimental effects on the lives of most shareholders and stakeholders in the banking 
sector across the world. As applies to the IFIs, the need for a reliable CG structure makes it 
imperative to engage in a constant discourse that will review current CG practices, identify 
strengths and weakness, and report on the same to be able to continue to improve fundamental 
CG codes between SSBs and BODs. Pathan and Faff (2013) hold the view that SSBs are essential 
to the sustainability of IFIs in Saudi Arabia. However, the literature expresses its reservations 
regarding the quality of service that IFIs deliver in terms of fulfilling Shari’ah requirements, or 
whether they have the capacity in terms of their BODs and SSBs to function effectively according 
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to with the Islamic laws (Farook, & Farooq, 2013). By assessing the relationship between SSBs 
and the BODs, this study will be able to attain an in-depth glimpse into one of the aspects that 
influence the banks’ integration to the CG framework of Saudi Arabia IFIs. In the process, the 
study will help identify whether improvements are necessary, or the way that IFIs deploy the 
agency theory contribute towards shareholder and the general public’s interests in the light of 
BODs and SSBs, respectively (Feng, Ghosh, & Sirmans, 2005; Farook, & Farooq, 2013; Pathan & 
Faff, 2013). 
Being able to understand the state of the relationship between SSBs and the BODs requires a 
glimpse into how the two interact with each other. This is attainable through the learning of the 
experiences of people who are part of these two bodies, and those that watch the work. 
Therefore, one would argue that it is an impossible task when one does not have access to people 
who experience these boards work. The fact that I could gain access to members of the SSBs and 
the BODs of IFIs in Saudi Arabia offers me a strong opportunity to see the study through, an 
aspect that drives me even further. Another resource-related factor that drives me to conduct 
this research is the availability of materials. While studies reviewing the placement of SSBs in the 
CG system of Saudi Islamic financial institutions are minimal, there is a strong body of literature 
on CG in general. This presents an interesting opportunity to leverage theory and the experience 
of experts in the field of CG in Saudi Arabia, which would yield invaluable knowledge to the 
study’s target group. 
Considering the above literature assessments and shortcomings, it can be pointed out that there 
is a paucity of information in terms of research when it comes to comparing the functions of SSBs 
and BODs in the IFIs. Specifically, there are limited insights when one considers how SSBs interact 
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with other corporate administrative agencies such as BODs and their role in CG within IFIs. 
Consequently, the main objective of the current dissertation was to explore how SSB and BOD 
associate with each other within the IFIs environment in Saudi Arabia. The thesis builds 
significantly on the fact that this knowledge gap exists, including the fact that the business 
environment and CG demands continue to evolve within the IFIs sector, emphasizing the need to 
advance the research on the relationship between SSBs and BODs to inform positive practice 
within this financial institution. Among the aspects that the research looks to include is how the 
BODs relate to the SSBs, and how this influences the ability of both bodies to discharge their 
mandate. The study will also go in to review how internal systems installed by the organisation 
aid, or undermine the deployment of a stakeholder-based corporate government model through 
the deployment of two boards. Another aspect that the study will be looking at is the role of SSB 
in Saudi Arabia IFIs, and areas where they converge with the BODs when discharging their 
mandate. As such, the research is limited to investigating the nature of the existing relationships 
between SSBs and BODs in Saudi IFIs, identify factors which support the uptake of SSBs, and 
examine areas of divergence of convergence between the two board as applies to the Saudi 
Arabian financial sector. 
1.6. Research Aim and Questions 
The central question which guides this study is based on exploring the nature of the relationship 
between BODs and SSBs in Islamic financial institutions in Saudi Arabia. Three research questions 
were developed to assess the formulated research aim which includes the following: 




RQ 2: What factors in the CG structure of IFIs in Saudi Arabia support or undermine the 
relationship and division of tasks between SSBs and BODs? 
RQ 3: What areas of convergence are there in the roles of the BODs and SSBs in IFIs in Saudi 
Arabia? 
In light of the above research questions, the specific research objectives of this study included: 
Objective 1: To examine the nature of the relationship between the SSBs and BODs in IFIs 
in Saudi Arabia. 
Objective 2: To identify corporate governance factors in the IFIs in Saudi Arabia that 
undermine the relationship and division of tasks between SSBs and BODs. 
Objective 3: To assess the existing areas of convergence in terms of BOD and SSB roles 
within the IFIs in Saudi Arabia? 
1.7. Contributions of the Study 
As noted previously, the relationship between SSBs and BODs is fundamental in the success of 
IFIs, especially when considering lending approvals and risk management processes. Most 
financial risks and poor liquidity performance have been attributed to inadequate monitoring of 
top management especially when lending approvals and made based on inadequate diligence. 
To avoid potential financial risks in IFIs, there is a need to establish a close relationship between 
SSBs and BODs to ensure IFIs’ practices align with Shari’ah laws and stakeholder needs. 




First, a major contribution which this study will make is identifying the nature of the relationship 
between the BODs and the SSBs in IFIs in Saudi Arabia. As noted in the literature, there are limited 
studies which have explored the relationship and interaction between SSBs and BODs. Instead, 
past studies have focused on limited research variables when researching on BODs and SSBs such 
as the composition of the boards, gender balance, education level, qualifications, experience, 
and exposure. On the contrary, however, there are hardly any insights in the literature to help 
explain the theoretical or empirical nature of the relationship between the BODs and the SSBs in 
IFIs. Specifically, the research on this topic as applies to Saudi Islamic banks is relatively new and 
scanty, with hardly any studies delving into this topic. Thus, one of the main contributions made 
by this study is establishing the theoretical relationship between SSBs and BODs as applies to the 
IFIs in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
Second, the study makes an important contribution to a knowledge gap in terms of assessing the 
specific factors in the CG structure of IFIs in Saudi Arabia that supports or undermines the 
deployment of SSBs in monitoring BOD activities. Insights from the Saudi IFIs literature fails to 
identify potential enabling CG factors which facilitate the role of SSBs in IFIs, especially when 
managing financial risks. Further, the existing studies have also failed to explore and identify 
hurdles which hinder effective SSB deployment in the IFIs sector. As such, undertaking this study 
makes a significant contribution in creating new knowledge concerning the enabling and 
hindering factors in the deployment of SSBs in the Saudi IFI sector. 
Third, in most literature publications, researchers and practitioners have largely treated the SSBs 
and BODs as separate and unique entities. That is, the two bodies within the IFIs are considered 
autonomous and the perception which continues to play in regard to this aspect is that the two 
16 
 
bodies are separate entities. In this study, the researcher attempted to explore potential areas 
of convergence that exists between SSBs and BODs in terms of their roles within the Saudi 
Arabian IFIs sector. In the process, the study seeks to identify potential areas of collaboration to 
enable the SSB and BODs function as a unit towards ensuring IFIs promote stakeholder interests 
of maximizing profits and minimizing financial losses and risks. In summation, the three 
contributions made from this study contributes to the satisfaction of the primary research aim of 
investigating the nature of the existing relationship between SSBs and BODs in the Islamic banks 
in Saudi Arabia.  
1.8. Research Significance 
The contribution of SSBs to the progression and success of Islamic financial institutions is 
unquestionable. An area that requires addressing is how this new component of CG fits into the 
governance structure of these institutions, given that they also have the BODs (Becht & Barca, 
2001). This research commits to dig deeper into the CG structure of Islamic financial institutions 
to address this issue by deconstructing the relationship between the BOD and the SSB in Saudi 
Arabia. Consequently, this study is significant in several areas. First, it provides an opportunity to 
provide new insights into the governance characteristics of this distinct form of dual board CG 
system. The purpose of adopting the stakeholder model in the place of the shareholder model 
by most organisations, especially in Europe (Becht & Barca, 2001), is to create institutions that 
are responsive to the needs of multiple stakeholder groups (Becht & Barca, 2001). Those in favour 
of this argument conceive that organisations have grown exponentially, and they have a greater 
impact on society. As a result, it is imperative to extend their scope of responsibility so that they 
can have a more desirable impact on society (Abdul-Rahman, 2010). By looking at the way that 
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the BODs interact with and relate to the SSBs, this research opens a door to understand board 
roles with this dual board framework. Another significance of this research is that it provides the 
opportunity to fortify theory by leveraging the knowledge and experience of those that have 
been part of organisations that use the stakeholder model. The inception of the stakeholder 
theory undermines the application of agency theory in modern organisations. Much of this is 
attributable to the fact that the former champion a more comprehensive and inclusive corporate 
response to those that have a claim on it (Iqbal and Mirakhor 2004). With the stakeholder model 
gaining much traction in recent years, one could see why the SSBs have become prevalent in 
Saudi Arabia’s Islamic financial institutions.  To establish if the provisions of the stakeholder 
model and theory hold, we need to have a more in-depth understanding of organisations that 
have employed this model, and look at how a focused sustainability component of CG is 
embraced within the entire governance system (Archer &Rifaat, 2006). By doing so, the study 
can identify areas where theory is supported by practice (Abdul-Rahman, 2010).  
The current research is also essential in understanding the value of SSBs in the Saudi IFIs. For a 
long time, CG has been anchored on promoting economic outcomes which are intended to make 
IFIs more sustainable. Individual companies continue to stretch the limit of their mandate to 
modify their CG systems to attain the highest level of sustainability. For example, the creation 
and implementation of SSB in countries with IFIs is a largely voluntary act by the Islamic financial 
institutions across Saudi Arabia. Such growth in the perception of sustainability is essential for 
creating a business culture that promotes more than just fiscal gains. However, is it genuine? This 
study is essential in the sense that it helps in examining how IFIs promote their legitimacy in line 
with Islamic law and Shari’ah regulations in Saudi Arabia, in addition to adopted efforts by looking 
18 
 
at how organisations treat institutional components that focus on promoting sustainability. In 
this case, SSBs, which focus on promoting Islamic financial institutions that meet the demands of 
Islamic law will be explored to examine their operations and how they coordinate with the BODs 
to execute their mandate in the IFIs in Saudi Arabia. Looking at these three issues, one can say 
that this study is essential to gaining a clear and elaborate understanding of modern CG in Islamic 
financial institutions. Today, Saudi Arabia is an integral component of the global financial system 
through its involvement in globalization and international economic activities. Studying the state 
of their CG structure in one of its key industries provides a strong opportunity to have a glimpse 
of where the world is headed in this regard. In addition, the fact that research in this area of CG 
is underdeveloped underscores why this study important. 
1.9. Research Methodology 
In efforts to assess these concerns, the preferred mode of data collection entailed using 
interviews, which the researcher found to be more effective in this study in comparison to 
alternative data collection methods in collecting expert knowledge on the topic. Using interviews 
was appropriate because the researcher was able to collect expert information from BOD and 
SSB members conversant with the research topic. The detailed insights made it possible for the 
researcher to identify opinions, views, and perceptions about the relations which exist between 
BODs and SSBs in the Islamic banks. The model proposed by Granot et al. (2012) regarding a 
three-stage interviewing process was used during the data collection process. As such, the 
interview, structure, plan, and execution were undertaken in a hermeneutic ethnographic 
version which is widely used to collect views and perceptions when undertaking business-to-
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business interview sessions. The interviews were semi-structured and took an approach that 
ensured each of the participants was able to express themselves fully.  
Another notable aspect of the methodology is the type of participants that take part in the 
interviews. The study selects individuals with experience in the Saudi Arabia corporate space 
when it comes to matters relating to CG, i.e., members of the BODs, CEOs and SSB members. All 
these stakeholder groups have a strong comprehension of the CG process in Islamic financial 
institutions (Ainley et al., 2007). Most importantly, they are part of the CG process, which gives 
them the credibility required to comment on the relationship between the BOD and SSBs. 
Electing to work with this respondent cohort underscores the rationale for choosing to work with 
interviews as the preferred data collection technique because it means that the researcher gets 
to interact with a wide pool of knowledge on the issue under investigation (Myers, 2013). Such 
flexibility in the data collection process ensured that all 14 participants have an opportunity to 
issue feedback that will carry weight in the final study results. The researcher also had to translate 
the data to English, considering that all interview sessions had been conducted in Arabic. In 
addition, most of the interviewees were not proficient in English.  
1.10. Research Structure 
Having presented the research background, aim and objectives, the succeeding chapters are 
arranged as follows: 
Chapter 2 presents and explores the literature related to CG, to locate the study within the 
theoretical and conceptual body of knowledge. The specific focus of the literature is anchored on 
conceptual definitions, CG systems, and codes, board functions, and characteristics, and the 
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importance of boards in CG. Chapter 3 discusses the CG from the Islamic perspective (different 
from chapter 2 which discusses general CG in the conventional banking sector) outlining the 
necessary conceptual framework and its role in Islamic financial institutions. The actors in 
Shari’ah governance the theoretical perspectives related to SSBs, functions, and characteristics 
of these Islamic boards are detailed, in addition to the existing issues and challenges. 
Chapter 4 elaborates the research methods applied to this study to collect relevant data to 
answer the formulated research aims and research questions. The chapter begins with a 
discussion of the research paradigms, followed by design, the structure of the interview process, 
sampling approach, data analysis, consistency and trustworthy of the collected data, and 
identifies possible ethical issues that emerge during the duration of this study. 
Chapter 5 further details findings from the interview sessions held with the BODs, SSBs and CEOs 
members considering the formulated research questions. The main findings revealed that the 
BODs and SSBs in Saudi IFIs serve to complement each other. In both cases, the boards have an 
important monitoring and control role. While the BODs ensure managers work towards the 
realisation of shareholder interests, the SSBs ensure that managers in banks serve the interest of 
the wider public. The study also noted that there are several factors which promote the uptake 
of SSBs in Saudi IFIs largely due to growing demands for corporations to align their operations 
with Islamic and Shari’ah regulations. On many aspects of CG, the BOD and SSBs complement 
each other as evident from their regular meets held to exchange information on corporate 
performance and report documentation. As evident, both boards supplement each other in 
terms of ensuring IFIs in Saudi Arabia meets the Shari’ah and Islamic stipulations upon which 
their financial operations are founded. 
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Chapter 6 serves to give an in-depth and critical discussion of results presented in Chapter 4 
considering past literature studies on this topic. Findings drawn from this study postulates a 
model to capture the distinct roles of SSB and BOD and those that are shared and negotiated, 
within the Saudi banking sector. The model illustrates that the BODs and SSBs complement each 
other where BODs ensure effective control and monitoring of managers to fulfil shareholder 
needs, while SSBs monitor and control managers to ensure they work towards the realisation of 
the wider public interests.  
Chapter 7 concludes the study by summarizing the primary insights of this study, outlines 
important recommendations, and provides suggestions for future study prospects anchored on 










Chapter 2: Literature Review  
2.1. Corporate Governance Overview 
The current study sought to investigate the central question on the nature of the relationship 
between BODs and SSBs in Islamic financial institutions in Saudi Arabia. Essentially, the literature 
reveals that BOD tasks are grounded in mainstream corporate governance theories, while the 
SSB tasks are grounded in Shariah law. In the current chapter, the literature details and argues 
about corporate governance theories upon which BOD tasks are grounded. According to Abd 
(1998), CG denotes the control and regulation of top management by the BODs, executive 
initiatives, associated structures, and other schemes of bonding and monitoring. In the process 
of this control, the structure and scope of the BODs are narrowed.  
Kaplan and Norton (2000) pointed out that CG entails the established connection between 
managers, directors, customers, suppliers, creditors, shareholders, and employees to the 
corporation and to each other. As such, CG denotes the unified set of external regulations and 
internal regulations where concerns like leadership structures, the size of the board, and the 
independence and dependence of the chief executive officer (CEO) are defined, assuming boards 
influence the performance and strategic directions of the companies they govern (Azid, Asutay, 
& Burki, 2007; Beekun et al., 1998). The subsequent sections detail about CG and its importance 
in the governance of organisations. 
Baysinger and Hoskison (1990) shared that CG deals with a connected set of internal and external 
regulations. As noted by Kaplan and Norton (2000), governance matters in an organisation focus 
on issues related to leadership and board size since the board have a significant influence on the 
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strategies implemented within an organisation. Beekun et al. (1998) also noted that when 
assessing the internal control processes which are limited to company management, while 
external control reflects on matters related to connecting a company to important stakeholders 
and giving an organisation a sense of legitimacy. Beekun et al. (1998) also attempted to define 
CG, which has been argued to provide the most appropriate definition by highlighting the overall 
objective that the governance board plays within an organisation (Azid, Asutay, & Burki, 2007). 
Specifically, the research pointed out that the governance approach is not attributed to only 
issues related to business operations in a company. Instead, governance entails giving an overall 
direction of an organisation with a focus on controlling and overseeing the executive actions 
which the management undertake, while on the other side aspiring to meet genuine outlooks of 
regulation and accountability by interests besides the company boundaries. The next section 
provides an introduction on the main issues which are examined and assessed in this chapter. 
2.2. Introduction 
CG is among the key components of corporations. For many years, scholars and other 
stakeholders have maintained a heated discourse regarding CG, largely due to the fact that recent 
years have seen many companies go down, because of poor CG. As it stands, there is no 
consensus regarding what constitutes CG; hence, no common definition for the term. This is 
attributable to the actuality that people have variant comprehensions of the objectives of 
corporations in connection to variant frameworks of CG and a plethora of economic systems that 
have variant compositions. Therefore, CG has been able to attract various definitions, depending 
on the context within which it is being defined.  
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Iqbal and Mirakhor (2004) maintain that the rising focus on the study and discourse surrounding 
CG is down to the upsurge in the number of institutional investors, loopholes in the shareholder 
framework of CG, a departure from the stakeholder value framework, and globalisation. This 
chapter investigates all these aspects, which allows it to advance a theoretical building block of 
CG that will allow for the adoption of a more accommodating view of CG. Thus, one could argue 
that it attempts to provide a definition that covers all the bases, and one that would be supported 
by a wide array of scholar classes, at least when exploring the financial service institutions. The 
discourse entails a highlight of the CG framework, institutions, mechanisms, models, and 
conceptual definition. Therefore, the objective is to cultivate a rudimentary comprehension of 
CG in mainstream scholarly work, to facilitate the development of a perception of CG inside the 
Islamic institutions. 
2.3. Conceptual Definition 
CG, as an independent discipline of study, is relatively new and has evolved considerably over 
the years (Azid, Asutay, & Burki, 2007; Cadbury 1999). There are multiple descriptions of the term 
CG, with many stakeholders failing to strike an agreement as to what should universally 
constitute CG. However, integrating the various schools of thought of CG gives rise to a couple of 
major descriptions, including the one contained in the subsequent sections of this chapter, which 
define governance, corporations, CG in financial services and CG in general (Bhatti & Bhatti, 
2010). The Oxford Dictionary defines a corporation as a contingent of natural persons with the 
legal mandate to operate as one institution (Bhatti & Bhatti, 2010). Similarly, the American 
Heritage Dictionary defines a corporation as an enterprise that personifies its powers and rights, 
within the law, distinct to those of people who constitute it (Bhatti & Bhatti, 2010). The Blacks’ 
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Law Dictionary, on the other hand, characterises a corporation as an artificial person developed 
by the laws or mandate of a country (Bhatti & Bhatti, 2010). Therefore, one can define a 
corporation as an enterprise that exists distinctly from those that constitute it, personifying rights 
independent to the natural persons that constitute it.  
Looking at the definition of governance, it draws from the Latin term, gubernare. This refers to 
leading or steering, as per observations in Cadbury (2002). Other definitions of the term 
governance associate it with the Greek term kybernan, personifying the same meaning as the 
term outlined in Cadbury (2002). Merging the two terms, one could say that CG denotes to the 
process of steering an artificial person. This is attainable by establishing a consistent system of 
leadership that draws its power from the law or authority that is responsible for establishing the 
corporation (Azid, Asutay, & Burki, 2007). The Oxford English Dictionary expands on the definition 
of these terms further, indicating that the term governance refers to the process or technique of 
governing (Bhatti & Bhatti, 2010). Looking at all these definitions, one could say that there are 
various meanings for the term governance, given that it can be used in many aspects of life. Chief 
among these aspects is public administration, politics, social justice, and economics. 
Alternatively, the term governance refers to the technique and philosophy on the way that an 
artificial person is overseen.  
Integrating the variant definitions of CG above, one can then split the meaning of CG into two 
perspectives, i.e., an expansive perspective and a narrow perspective (Bhatti & Bhatti, 2010). The 
narrow perspective stands for an institutionalised accountability framework between 
shareholders through the BODs and the management team of an organisation (Azid, Asutay, & 
Burki, 2007). The expansive perspective implies the complete system of informal and formal 
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interconnections between stakeholders of an organisation, with some of the chief stakeholders 
being employees, the community, management, environment, and shareholders.  
2.3.1. Defining CG 
The definitions above tend to cover the concept of CG in a broad business sense, which makes it 
essential to narrow it further in order to gain a proper look of the thought in the financial sector 
context. In the financial services sector, CG, as a term and as an act, operates within an 
environment with distinct features and circumstances (Azid, Asutay, & Burki, 2007). As a result, 
gaining a proper understanding of CG in this sector requires going a bit deeper, with the unique 
features and characteristics in mind. According to OECD (2004), CG refers to a collection of 
relationships existing amongst company management, its shareholders, the BOD, and parties 
with close interest with the organisation under consideration. While this definition acknowledges 
components of both the expansive and narrow views of CG, it does not provide a school of 
thought that can be exclusively applied in the financial services sector (Bhatti & Bhatti, 2010). 
A more compelling and industry-focused definition has been proposed by the Basel Committee 
for Banking Supervision (BCBS), which defines CG when considering the finance industry as the 
way that the financial industry is governed in line with the claims of the stakeholders, regulations, 
and laws that surround its business environment. Thus, one could say that BCBS (2009) provides 
a more specific and comprehensive view of CG in the financial services sector. According to Azid, 
Asutay, and Burki (2007), this definition covers the responsibility of the authority to all 
stakeholder groups, which includes depositors, suppliers, employees, government, supervisors, 
and the community. Bhatti and Bhatti (2010) further shed more light by creating a comprehensive 
definition of CG in the banking services sector by highlighting the significance of affirming that 
27 
 
investment and capital returns are monitored, as well as installing safeguards to protect 
depositors (Bhatti & Bhatti, 2010). With this in mind, it is imperative to note that financial 
institutions operate within a tougher regulatory environment, in comparison to other types of 
business. 
2.3.2. Role of CG in the Banking Sector 
As indicated earlier, discourse regarding CG has been on the rise in the past three decades due 
to the increase in cases related to bank failures or mismanagement largely because of CG 
mistakes, as well as an upsurge in the loopholes identifiable in the stakeholder model. Looking at 
the aspects that cause stakeholders to be concerned with the CG system in place, it is safe to say 
that the fundamental purpose of CG is to minimise agency costs (Azid, Asutay, & Burki, 2007). 
This is a responsibility that fits well into the United States’ view of CG, where agency costs could 
rise substantially because of the rise of mergers and conglomerates. From here, the role of CG 
grows exponentially to encompass aspects such as monitoring systems that management has put 
in place to generate returns from the input of shareholders. This is a notion advanced by Macey 
(2004). Scott (2003) supports this position, explaining that the goal of CG, and the overall 
framework adopted by countries for this practice, is to create regulations and forge behaviour 
that will ensure that the economic potential of an organisation is realised.  
Shifting the focus back to the financial services industry, Claessens (2003) views CG as an integral 
component of firm governance, especially in measuring the performance of a financial 
institution. The study observes that CG can influence the capacity by a firm to operate by 
determining how well it can source resources from lenders, reduce the cost of capital, promote 
internal performance, and reduce the risk that they face. Claessens (2003) also maintains that CG 
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influences the way that an entity relates to its stakeholders, an aspect that shows it is an integral 
component for those that are looking to succeed in the financial sector. With this point of view 
in mind, one could argue that a proper CG structure will intensify the efficiency of a financial 
institution, culminating into better output, lower agency costs and better control of the 
relationship between the BODs and management.  
Another area where CG comes in handy is in the realisation of accountability, transparency, and 
fairness, a view advanced by Wolfenson (1999). This study observes that CG demands financial 
institutions to become transparent and observe principles of fairness, not only when dealing with 
shareholders, but all stakeholders of the institution (Bhatti & Bhatti, 2010). The pursuit for 
greater accountability within the corporate ranks through CG helps to create organisations that 
can serve stakeholders for longer while growing in a manner that reduces prospects of 
unsustainability. Besides, Grais and Pellegrini (2006) find that a firm that is accountable, 
transparent, and fair can exude a greater level of efficiency, in comparison to one that does not 
personify these virtues. Thus, one could argue that the roles of CG integrate well with each other 
to promote the formation of financial entities that can serve stakeholders and withstand the test 
of time.  
Bringing everything together, CG is a critical cog in the functioning of financial institutions. It helps 
to ensure that financial institutions can meet the goals that they set for themselves. In this 
particular sector, it plays an important role in setting up roles that companies should operate 
within, creating an atmosphere that promotes virtues such as accountability, fairness, and 
transparency (Azid, Asutay, & Burki, 2007). By personifying these virtues, companies are able to 
put themselves in a position where they can achieve the highest level of economic efficiency. 
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Furthermore, promoting positive behaviour among those that are responsible for leading the 
organisation is crucial for facilitating longevity. The financial services sector is an intricate 
business context to navigate due to the presence of tighter rules and a wider stakeholder cohort, 
an aspect that expands the coverage of CG in firms that operate in this industry. More so, it 
increases the importance of CG to these institutions.  
2.4.1. The Anglo-Saxon Model 
This is arguably the most prevalent CG system in the world. The Anglo-Saxon model deploys the 
agent and the principal framework. In elaboration, the agent, in this case, include the 
management who are tasked with running the company on behalf of the principal, who are the 
owners of the organisation. This is a very common approach to CG across the world and widely 
applied in Europe, the United States and Asia. In fact, its prevalence in the two countries has seen 
wide adoption around the world. It has also grown popular with the rise of the stock market, 
where prospective shareholders can go to buy a stake of a company that they do not even have 
access to, in terms of operation (Azid, Asutay, & Burki, 2007). However, the management 
continues to run the organisation on their behalf. This model is influential for firms that operate 
in countries that support this approach to CG, and it is the main goal to generate as much profit 
as possible for the shareholders.  
While CG is a subject of intense discussion over the years, discourse on the model of CG deployed 
by a particular jurisdiction or organisation remains weak. For instance, the discussion on CG gains 
traction in the 1970s when the agency theory comes to being, as per observations by Lazonick 
and O’Sullivan (2004). The agency theory introduces the notion that the essence of CG is to 
maximise shareholder value (Bhatti & Bhatti, 2010). Furthermore, this theory advances the idea 
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that the installation of BODs is to create an authority within the corporate ranks that will assure 
the pursuit of shareholder interests (Azid, Asutay, & Burki, 2007).   
According to Farag, Mallin, and Ow-Yong (2014), the agency theory presents an important upside 
to CG because it pinpoints a connection where one group assigns roles to another, i.e., 
shareholders assign roles to the BODs and management. This way, the shareholder, through the 
stewardship of the management and the oversight role of the BODs, can reap the reward from 
their investment. Therefore, looking at CG from the view of the agency theory, it can be pointed 
out that the BODs are integral to the realisation of the basic function of CG. Farag, Mallin, and 
Ow-Yong (2014) indicate that there are likely to be problems between the principle and the agent 
in this relationship. It is at this point that the BODs come in to smoothen the rough edges by 
ensuring top management serves the shareholder interests. Therefore, through this CG model, 
firms can attain low agency costs through the promotion of efficient corporate practices that 
have the shareholders’ interests at heart. Cernat (2004) resorts to provide an even deeper 
description of the Anglo-Saxon model, showing that shareholders have access to their 
organisation through the management and the BODs; hence, ensuring that employees undertake 
their responsibilities in the desired manner. 
Miller (2004) reinforces the notions articulated by the agency theory, arguing that the 
fundamental goal of CG under the Anglo-Saxon model is ensuring that shareholder interests are 
advanced and their rights within the corporation respected. Under this model, the value of the 
shareholder gets to increase, because of the safeguards that are in place to inform and monitor 
the behaviour of those that have been put in charge of the organisation. Thus, the main aspect 
here is that each party is motivated by a mutual desire to make a profit, an aspect that ensures 
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all the relevant stakeholder to the firm are happy. For instance, in the spirit of remaining relevant 
in the market and make profits, the company will generate products that satisfy the consumer. 
Once the consumer is satisfied, they will keep paying for services and products, an aspect that 
increases shareholder value by generating more profits for the organisation.  
2.4.2. The European Model 
Yamak and Suer (2005) outlined a wide array of challenges experienced by the CG model, and 
they manage to point out some inherent problems with the shareholder value framework, i.e., 
the Anglo-Saxon model. Macey and Miller (2004) support some of the challenges outlined in the 
study above, perceiving the shareholder value-based system as flawed, because of some agency 
problems that arise from the deployment of the way of thinking inherent to the Anglo-Saxon 
model. These concerns have led to the rise of a contemporary way of thinking that addresses 
some of the challenges identified in Berle and Means (1932). The stakeholder theory adequately 
captures this transition in a model of CG that focuses on more than maximising the value that 
shareholders draw from an enterprise.  
The European model personifies a distinct view of CG that focuses on the stakeholder model. 
Here, one can say that the scope of focus of CG increases substantially to include a wider 
stakeholder cohort. According to Clarkson (1995), all stakeholder groups have a claim on the 
organisation and personify an internal demand for value from the organisation. As a result, 
attaining balance across the board in terms of meeting stakeholder needs is essential for optimal 
corporate performance. As a result, focusing on the interests and value of a singular stakeholder 
group alone is not enough to attain the goals of CG. Instead, the organisation has to look at how 
it will be able to maximise value for all the stakeholder groups that have a claim on the 
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organisation. Yamak and Suer (2005) support this point of view, arguing that the efficiency of this 
approach to CG is evident in the many companies that have chosen to take an ethical approach 
in their dealings, an aspect that has culminated to greater corporate success (Bhatti & Bhatti, 
2010). For instance, the capability to work towards achieving the interests of every stakeholder 
group enables companies to cultivate trust and sustainable relations within the value chain, 
which helps to increase profitability. Similarly, Donaldson and Preston (1995) shared that such 
an approach works in a way that ensures there is a reduction of capital and credit costs, because 
of the positive ties that the organisation is able to establish across the business environment.  
A comprehensive review of the stakeholder theory shows that it is against the notions advanced 
by the shareholder value. Most importantly, it refutes the establishment of a CG system that 
focuses on the claim of a single stakeholder group. Therefore, the stakeholder theory expands 
the mandate of the managers’ fiduciary duty in addition to that of the BODs to cover all the 
relevant parties attached to the company. Besides, the corporation should outline goals and 
objectives that seek to serve stakeholder interests that have a claim and inherent value towards. 
Farag, Mallin, and Ow-Yong (2014) supports this point of view, arguing that optimal CG is one 
that can look at a wider group of stakeholders, not just shareholders. He makes this view on the 
back of the fact that modern corporations have grown exponentially, and stand a chance to 
influence a larger group of people, not just shareholders. Thus, it will be against the basic virtue 
of fairness to create enterprises that solely focus on maximising shareholder value. Freeman 
(1984), who is responsible for coining the stakeholder theory, observes that variant groups of 
people usually have legitimate claims on the company’s existence. Among these stakeholder 
groups are suppliers, customers, creditors, and contractors. Thus, cultivating an organisation that 
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only approves a profit-oriented behaviour undermines the prospect of addressing the claims of 
these groups of people.  
Iqbal and Mirakhor (2004) argue that based on the CG framework, the European model suggests 
an intricate CG system, far much more distinct from the one that emerges in Europe and North 
America. In this CG framework, there is an additional SB that is distinct from the BODs, as well as 
a distinct management board that comprises of executive members only. According to Dignam 
and Galanis (2009), this model creates a CG framework that is highly distinct when compared to 
the one which is presented in the Anglo-Saxon model, because of the emphasis that it places on 
creating an organisation that considers a wider stakeholder cohort. An area where this approach 
to CG excels is in Germany. Much of this is attributable to the fact that German society views 
corporations as components of the social and economic framework of society. The Anglo-Saxon 
model, on the other hand, emerges and thrives in market-based societies, where corporations 
are viewed as components of the economic system alone. This is the reason the CG systems that 
emerge from the two regions vary, with the system that emerges in Germany creating a CG 
structure that is responsive to a wider stakeholder collection (Azid, Asutay, & Burki, 2007).  
A deeper look at the European model shows that the model introduces an SB. According to 
Dignam and Galanis (2009), the SB usually consists of stakeholders from the external 
environment, who represent different interests. In some cases, the board consists of work council 
liaisons, trade union representatives, and shareholders. Under this system, the board consisting 
of executive members, i.e., the management board, have a duty towards the interests that the 
stakeholders represented in the SB have, and it is the responsibility of this additional board to 
ensure that they always satisfy this responsibility. Schilling (2001) ties up the discussion by 
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indicating that the essence of having SSBs under the European model is to ensure that the needs 
and claims of other stakeholders are represented at the organisation, not just those of the 
shareholders. 
2.4.3. Variations between the European and the Anglo-Saxon Models 
The European and Anglo-Saxon models personify several similarities, but also major differences. 
While the differences are the focus of this section, it is imperative to look at areas where the two 
systems converge. First, they all believe in installing a management oversight author that ensures 
the operation practices undertaken by agents satisfies the needs of stakeholders placed outside 
the organisation. In the case of the Anglo-Saxon model, the BODs serve as an oversight 
framework that ensures the management does not undermine shareholder rights and interests. 
The SB, under the European model, does push the organisation towards addressing the needs of 
additional stakeholder groups, such as suppliers and customers. The second and final 
convergence between the two models is that they create an organisation that is subject to the 
external environment, i.e., they lead to the formation of entities that must tweak their internal 
models to meet demands that emanate from the external environment, a point well advanced 
by Schilling (2001).  
Focusing on the differences, they largely build on the ideological variations between the regions 
where both models emanate from. This leads to the rise in differing notions in terms of how the 
corporation is owned and controlled. While the Anglo-Saxon model would like the control of the 
organisation to be built around maximisation of shareholder wealth, the European model would 
like control to be built around the fair and collective representation of all stakeholder groups. 
According to Schilling (2001), the two models assign priorities to shareholders differently, an 
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aspect that leads to very different approaches to CG. Because of this, Bhatti and Bhatti (2010) 
view the European model of CG as one that has multiple points of stakeholder contact. In that, 
this model pushes organisations to connect with a wider array of stakeholder groups, not just 
shareholders. Through the SB, the organisation can bring in trade unions, employee monitoring 
entities, in addition to different stakeholders in the CG process (Bhatti & Bhatti, 2010). However, 
this is not the case where the shareholders are the primary focus of interest when one explores 
the Anglo-Saxon model.  
Despite these notable differences, Kraakman et al. (2004) maintain that drawing a tangible line 
between these CG systems in practice is difficult, despite the differences that manifest in theory. 
OECD (2004) encourages the integration of both the agency and shareholder systems to realise 
far more efficient organisations. According to the insights shared by Macey and O’Hara (2001), 
these perceptions are correct in that the BODs need to expand the scope of focus of their 
oversight responsibility by focusing on more stakeholder groups, not just the shareholders.  
2.5. Primary Participants in the CG Financial Sector 
When assessing the banking industry, the primary participants in the CG environment have been 
grouped either into external or internal players. On the one hand, the literature has identified 
internal key participants into four main groups (Salacuse, 2003). They include the depositors, the 
shareholders, the managers, and the SB or BOD (Salacuse, 2003). On the other hand, the external 
key participants are used to refer to government regulatory bodies, the court, and the stock 
markets which play an imperative part in ensuring that financial institutions observe to 
government rules (Salacuse, 2003). Importantly, the institutions play unique roles in the financial 
corporations where the central purpose is to advance the rights and welfare of the stakeholders 
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and the shareholders. A summary of the CG style and structure has been presented in Figure 1. 
According to Figure 1, the structure combines the European and the Anglo-Saxon models and 
that the only difference which exists between the two models is the corporate goals or objectives 
and the SB. 
 
Figure 1: An illustration of a CG structure in the banking sector (Source: Nienhaus, 2007: 129; Choudhury & Hoque, 2004: 86). 
2.5.1. Internal Key Participants 
2.5.1.1 Board of Directors 
The BODs have been noted throughout the CG to be central key participants. A major debatable 
issue in the scholarly and practitioner literature has concentrated on identifying the purpose of 
BOD in the CG framework. According to the Cadbury Report (2002), the primary function of the 
BOD is to define the purpose of an organisation, create strategies, plan for the objective, establish 
company policies, appoint the CEO and other management, and examine the performance of the 
management team. The role played by the BOD has been divided into five primary functions, 
according to Nathan and Ribiere (2007). That is: (i) being independent thinkers and working to 
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shape the strategic direction of a bank, (ii) monitors and influences strategies as opposed to 
implementing strategic choices, (iii) guides the top management as opposed to creating the 
actual strategy, (iv) provides strategic alternatives and advice, management team, and (v) 
monitors strategy implementation, advises the CEO, and establishes standards (Nathan & 
Ribiere, 2007). 
Within the financial industry, the BOD serves an essential part in the internal control mechanisms 
where they protect the stakeholder and shareholder interests. Salacuse (2003) pointed out that 
the BOD has a strong part to play when taking CG into consideration. As such, this explains the 
reason board members must possess high moral standards and be technically qualified to play 
their role. The literature identifies different duties which the BOD plays in the corporate sector. 
Some of these important roles include supervising and monitoring the performance of a 
company, framing specific company policies, and developing and initiating the business goals and 
objectives. Nathan and Ribiere (2007) agree that the main function of the board creates the 
company’s objectives and aims in addition to making sure that every objective that has been 
created is realised. Therefore, it is the main function of the BOD to create policies and plans to 
achieve the very aims, in addition to monitoring and appointing the specific management team 
that would work towards the realisation of the set objectives. 
2.5.1.2 Supervisory Board  
Although there is only one BOD model in the Anglo-Saxon framework, some European countries 
that emphasise the importance of stakeholders demand a two-tiered BOD framework. In 
elaboration, this two-tiered structure includes both the management board members and the 
SB. The management board includes members of the organisation, while the SB includes 
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members of the non-executive branch largely appointed through employee elections or 
shareholder elections (Cadbury, 2002). In efforts aimed at improving accountability and ensuring 
the corporation adheres to governance regulations, the SB is empowered to appoint the 
management board. According to Weil and Manges (2002), the two-tier system has a clear and 
recognised distinction between the SB and the members being monitored and managed.  
2.5.1.3 Managers  
Third, managers also form a significant segment of the key participants in every financial 
institution. The management team largely denotes the CEO and other members who are enrolled 
in performing management functions. In most cases, the managers are accountable and 
responsible before the BOD since the managers and the CEO are appointed by the directors. 
Considering that the decision-making quality relies on the quality, relevance, and volume of 
gathered information, the executive members and the CEO are responsible for availing the 
relevant data before the BOD. According to the stakeholders’ model, managers have fiduciary 
responsibilities not only to the shareholders but to every party with interest within a given 
organisation, including the public and the community (Nathan & Ribiere, 2007). 
2.5.1.4 Shareholders and Depositors  
Fourth, the depositors and shareholders are also key participants in the financial sector both in 
the European and Anglo-Saxon models of CG. However, in the Anglo-Saxon framework, the direct 
participation of the shareholders is limited to electing the directors while in the European model 
their role is to elect the SB and the directors (Salacuse, 2003). Salacuse (2003) also shares that 
the shareholders approve some processes such as decisions on mergers and acquisitions. In 
Germany, the European model of CG largely emphasises on the need for wider stakeholder views 
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and interests to create strong partnerships between employees and employers in addition to 
amongst shareholders (Dignam & Galanis, 2009). In the process, employees influence whom they 
can elect into the board to represent them. In comparison, the Anglo-Saxon model of CG 
stipulates that shareholders elect the board members in efforts to defend the interest of owners 
via strong legal actions than in the European model. 
Dignam and Galanis (2009) observed that in the traditional financial sector, the depositors were 
not strongly incorporated at the core of CG. Similarly, the depositors whose interests are at stake 
in the financial and banking sector rarely get attention either in the European model or in the 
Anglo-Saxon model. One of the reasons is that the depositors are often insured based on some 
level of a positive rate of return. In addition, Cull et al. (20045) added that the depositors also 
have some guarantee which is hoped to lessen their exposure to loses in the case of system 
failure in efforts to stabilise the financial system. Thus, most conventional models of CG in the 
financial industry have not dealt with the interests of the depositors in-depth. Instead, Chapra 
and Ahmed (2002) elaborate that the financial sector has largely focused on working and 
protecting the interests of the shareholders who are noted to have invested their wealth in the 
company, and not the depositors who have already been guaranteed their returns. 
2.5.2. External Key Participants 
Important members of the external participants include institutions which influence and support 
CG within banks such as regulatory bodies, government agencies, and the judiciary. Caprio and 
Levine (2002) indicated that the government creates a legal and regulatory framework to manage 
corporations and influence managerial choices. Regulatory entities give sound guidelines for 
banks and create internal control, monitor all banking operations, risk management processes, 
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and create internal controls. When considering regulations and laws, every institution of CG must 
comply and adhere to rules propagated by regulatory or legislative agencies, while the judiciary 
enforces the remedies of violating the promulgated corporate rules (Dignam & Galanis, 2009).  
2.6. Board Characteristics 
The current section presents and elaborates of different functions and antecedents of the boards. 
Findings from the literature show that the success of a board can be influenced by various factors. 
These factors include the independence of a board, board capital, leadership structure, and its 
size. 
2.6.1. Board Size 
The size of a board refers to its structure, and it ranges from a small board of five members to a 
large board of 30 or more members (Daily & Dalton, 1992). Over the years, the literature has 
revealed that the average board size is about 12 to 14 members large. However, the size of a 
board can increases when critical resources and expertise of an organisation is increased (Pfeffer, 
1973). The presence of a large board prevents the CEO from taking actions which are not aligned 
to shareholder interests. However, a large board may hinder strategic actions and initiatives, 
further resulting in unproductive interactions (O’Reilly et al., 1989). In contrast, a small board has 
the capacity to adapt and execute effective control since there is increased social cohesion and 
participation (Muth & Donaldson, 1998). 
2.6.2. Board Leadership Structure 
The role duality of a CEO in terms of holding both the Chairperson and CEO positions in an 
organisation affects board structure. Studies show that the ability of a chairperson includes the 
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capacity to devote time to run a board, willingness to play behind the scenes, and informed about 
the industry (Weir & Laing, 2001). In addition, the chairperson ensures the directors have the 
needed information and facilitates efficient communication with shareholders. In addition, the 
CEOs run daily management issues in the company in addition to implementing board decisions. 
Agency theorists argue that the CEO and Chairperson roles need to be separate jobs since 
performance can be improved when the board is able to better monitor the CEO. There are 
concerns that when a company merges the CEO and Chairperson position, more power is 
concentrated in a single person who can make decisions that fail to optimize shareholder wealth 
(Mallete & Fowell, 1992). Thus, separating the two roles can help in avoiding conflict of interest 
between management and company constituencies, since the board leadership structure has a 
greater ability to govern. 
Rechner and Dalton (1991) observed that role duality raises conflict as an individual who serves 
both as a CEO and as a chairperson may fall into conflict-related with the two positions. In the 
process, it may become possible for the same individual to avoid critical assessment and 
evaluation of the unique tasks in both offices and favour an approach which is in line with 
personal believes. In the end, role duality may contribute to a situation where two unique 
positions are merged and run as a single unit without critical input during decision-making 
processes. Weir and Laing (2001) expressed similar concerns and noted that the same person 
may be unable to juggle between the demands of the two positions especially in terms of 
devoting their time to learn about the marketing environment, take part in strategy formulation, 
run and organise the board, and address diverse matters arising from both inside and outside the 
organisation. Another aspect is that the chairperson needs to make sure that the directors have 
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every needed information that is required and that there is appropriate communication in place 
with every shareholder (Johannisson & Huse, 2000). Lastly, the literature also focuses on the 
need to explore the BODs and the members of the board, managers, and the committees in 
efforts to define the relations that exist between the top executives and other subordinate 
corporate members. 
On their part, the CEOs play an important part in ensuring that the company is managed in a 
suitable manner, in terms of the daily running of its activities, in addition to ensuring that the 
decisions of the BODs are implemented. Harrison et al. (1988) expressed that when an individual 
serve as a chairperson and as a CEO within the same corporation, they tend to acquire a dominant 
stature and influence among the other members of the board and executive. As noted previously, 
such a new aspect can have some negative outcomes according to Beatty and Zajac (1994), who 
pointed out that the role duality can hamper the monitoring capacity of the BODs. Harris and 
Helfat (1998) advocated the need for separate roles and duties when the chairperson and CEO 
jobs are taken into consideration, in a framework which is related to the principles of agent 
theory. According to Mallete and Fowell (1992), one of the key aspects, why the critics advocate 
for the separation of the two roles, is tied to the fears that are concentrating the two roles to a 
single individual may affect the positive impacts of creating positive decisions which may 
negatively affect any prospects of maximising shareholder returns. As pointed out by the OECD 
(2004) separating the chairperson and the CEO roles is considered a positive move in the financial 
sector in terms of addressing potential conflict of interest, which may emerge between 
management and corporate constituencies. Therefore, separating the two roles will not only 
result to a more independent board, but it will also contribute to a well enhanced and improved 
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environment in terms of the board of director’s capacity to govern and check the operations of 
the CEO and those of the chairperson. 
2.6.3. Board Capital 
The board capital denotes the capital that board members bring to an organisation. The capital 
can either be social or human in nature. Lester et al. (2008) noted that the capital includes 
resources directors bring to the company such as skills, reputation, knowledge, experience, and 
expertise. Human capital also includes capabilities, acquired skills, and knowledge. Hillman and 
Dalziel (2003) define social capital as a relational capital, cognitive, and structural. Structural 
capital includes networks of relations, and relational capital includes the types of personal 
relations people possess through historical interactions within the company. Social capital 
defines resources that give shared systems, interpretations, and representations (Hillman & 
Dalziel, 2003). 
Therefore, any form of capital that the board members bring to the organisation is of paramount 
importance to the success and growth of the organisation. As noted previously, understanding 
the two types of capital (social and human capital) goes a long way in helping determine the key 
aspects that can contribute to the success of failure of a board in its operations. Researchers such 
as Hillman et al. (2007) and Hillman and Dalziel (2003) have also referred to social capital as 
relational capital. In contrast, the term relational has been used in different ad manner by Lester 
et al. (2008) since they use the term to describe it as part of the three dimensions of social capital, 
where the remaining two dimensions often denote the structural and cognitive functions. In 
addition, the researchers advance the topic and elaborate that structural is used to imply the 
characteristics of social systems and the interconnected networks, which result from all the 
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relations (Bazerman & Schoorman, 1983). In comparison, relational is used to create an 
understanding of the specific personal associations that individuals have created with each other, 
mostly drawn from past engagements (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). In this study, the term board 
capital is used to denote the social and human capital that members bring into the organisation. 
Nonetheless, it is critical to share that Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) elaborated about the four 
benefits under precise circumstances where the director of a corporation has networked with 
other organisations. First, one of the four benefits are associated with the board capital, and it is 
about the provision of counsel and advises, which every director facilitates via their expertise, 
experience, and knowledge. For example, Baysinger and Butler (1985) identified up to 13 unique 
groups of directors and reported the diverse nature which exists within a single board where 
every director brings unique skills to the organisation. Some of the important skills identified 
from the 13 categories include top company management, former government officials, financial 
players, lawyers, and other companies and directors (Certo et al., 2001). Considering their 
diversity, Baysinger and Butler (1985) noted that each of these units could offer suitable counsel 
and advice by applying their sophisticated knowledge to company operations. 
Second, the literature also identifies another benefit that directors bring into an organisation and 
this benefit is closely tied to their board capital which is reputation (Bazerman & Schoorman, 
1983), and legitimacy (Galaskiewicz, 1985). Galaskiewicz (1985) shared that a key inter-
organisational strategy that can be used to improve workplace legitimacy in the board is to 
ensure that a corporation is in a position to identify with legitimate power figures and cultural 
symbols in the environment within its operations. A key approach by which this can be attained 
is by recruiting prestigious individuals into the corporation’s BODs. Therefore, reputation and 
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legitimacy become a key benefit when the right individuals who hold prominence and importance 
are identified with a certain corporation, which serves to ensure trust and confidentiality among 
the shareholders and other stakeholders. 
Third, the board capital also brings another important benefit to a company as it creates a reliable 
avenue for information and communication between the company and external corporations. 
The focus is attained in the company with the help of the director’s external links, which are 
central elements of the social capital. In most cases, Bazerman and Schoorman (1983) highlight 
that the external ties come into play because of the multiple appointments which have been 
identified in terms of the various corporations, which are broadly discussed in the literature in 
terms of interlocking executives. Fourth, the board capital is also important in terms of assisting 
in the access to important resources from the external environment into the company (Baysinger 
& Butler, 1985). D’Aveni (1990) shared that this influence in the form of political bodies, financial 
capital, and other stakeholder groups serve to enhance the position of the company which in 
turn means that the market share and its competitiveness would grow over time. Pfeffer (1972) 
further indicated that board capital serves the sustainability role in a corporation by ensuring the 
long-term success of company operations which adhere to the needs of the shareholders and 
help eliminate the potential conflict between the agent and the principal as discussed under the 
agency theory. 
Based on the discussions which have been presented in this section, it appears there is a strong 
relationship between board capital and resource functions. The provision between the two is 
clear and remains elaborate because when the board capital is high, then there is a growing 
likelihood that the resources which are provided to an organisation are also likely to increase. 
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Further, the literature argues that the primary focus of research on this relationship has been 
limited to incentives (such as the compensation a direct receives) as one of the main antecedents 
of the monitoring function. The expertise and knowledge of the directors from past experience 
in other corporations, or from their recent appointments in various boards can result in effective 
monitoring processes (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001). Thus, based on the insights which have 
been well articulated in this section, it can be noted that board capital can be anticipated to have 
positive impacts on the board in terms of its corporate mandate. 
2.6.4. Board Independence 
An independent board has more members from outside the organisation while a less 
independent board has more inside members. Inside members include employees of a company, 
serving managers, and top executives. In contrast, outside members of the board include persons 
not working within the company. The independence of a board may not be achieved if the 
member has been an employee, had business relations with the company, received 
remunerations from the company as director fee, and has family members at top company 
positions (Johannisson & Huse, 2000). The literature reveals that a high independent board is 
needed to bring about diverse ideas into the boardroom. In the process, an independent board 
is able to protect shareholder interest in line with agency theory compared to a less independent 
board where top leaders may be less monitored (Hillman et al., 2009).  
Concerns about board independence also emerge when assessing the status and condition of 
directors who come from outside the company. In this case, such external directors can be said 
to be independent, but only when they satisfy a diverse criterion, otherwise they would be 
labelled as being affiliated with the corporation (Hillman et al., 2009). The past literature has 
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explored and examined such a criterion in detail to show aspects that can be used to define the 
directors based on various recommendations, laws, codes, and company governance practices. 
Thus, the status of independence in a company is considered not to have been achieved if the 
director: 
a). Was previously employed in the company and that the tenure of their last employment 
in the company falls within the last 5 years. 
b). Has or had in the last 3 years been involved in material business transactions with the 
company in question. 
c). The payment received from the company is largely or solely based on the performance 
record. 
d). Has been shown to have close family connections with the advisors in the company, 
senior employees, or the directors. 
e). Shows to have had significant links or cross directorships with other directors via their 
involvement with the other firms or agencies (Johannisson & Huse, 2000), 
f). He or she is identified as being a significant shareholder with the company, or 
g). has been shown to have served on the board of the company for a period of more than 
nine years in the past. 
Over the years, the issue of board independence has been substantially extrapolated in the 
literature and went on to attract research interest among regulatory bodies, professionals, and 
scholars. The increased level of freedom has been informed by the perception that an 
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independent board is essential for company success because it promotes and advances diverse 
attributes within the company boardroom (Hillman et al., 2009). The primary objective of the 
BODs is to protect the interest of the shareholders and in line with agency theory which was 
earlier discussed, the key role the board plays is monitoring the decision and management 
process of an organisation. Dalton et al. (1998) have argued that outside directors may be suitably 
positioned to fulfil the role of controlling organisational processes, especially when not burdened 
by professional and/or personal relationships with the company or the company’s management 
(Dalton et al., 1998).   
Besides the agency theory and the important role that having independent directors play in the 
company, Hillman et al. (2009) pointed out that the appointment of external directors into the 
board can be an important aspect in terms of achieving the provision of important resources. 
Further, the researchers share that by differentiating affiliated groups from independent 
directors, the external members with personal connection such as family links with the 
company’s management may be less effective in terms of their resource expertise, counsel, and 
dependence roles compared to the external members of the board who do not have a similar 
relationship (Daily & Dalton, 1994). 
Based on the above deliberations, it becomes clear that the independence of the BODs has close 
preferences to issues of the independent boards (Boyd, 1994). There is a growing focus on the 
fact that key positions that are largely traced in academic literature, codes of conduct, and CG 
practices (Johannisson & Huse, 2000; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Similar observations have also 
been stressed in the literature where more focus has been anchored on corporations which are 
able to create board independence by finding a balance of internal and external directors in line 
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with the objectives of the company. Even so, the presence of inside directors in a company is also 
supported because they play a key part in the effectiveness of an organisation. Similar 
deliberations have also been shared by Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990) who shared that external 
directors prefer to maintain a subjective and open relationship with the company’s top 
management team, an approach that might result into inadequate quality and amount of 
information upon which such relationships need to be founded. Having internal directors offers 
approaches that are key to overcoming the burden of information processing which in turn works 
to improved he effectiveness of decision-making process during board meetings and running the 
organisation (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990). 
Finally, another argument which has been used to support the insider dominance has been 
proposed by Zahra and Pearce (1989). The researchers support the fact that outside directors in 
a company might not have in their possession the required expertise and time to execute all their 
jobs fully. In the process, it would be fundamental to carry out additional research and 
examination of the composition which the boards are made of to evaluate whether there is an 
effective balance between external and internal members in the board composition, and how 
the ratio of this composition might influence the board’s independence. 
2.6.5. The Importance of Boards in CG 
Understanding corporate boards necessitates the need to understand the duties of corporate 
directors. Also, there is a need to understand what directors should do in a company and 
distinguishing it from what they do. The legal obligation imposed by corporate law influences 
what they can do in addition to fiduciary duties (Adams et al., 2010). Adams et al. (2010) noted 
that this distinction was important to identify what needs to be followed in practice and its 
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significance. Generally, it can be noted that the BOD is the composition of the highest 
organisational performance agenda to ensure executives engage in a way that meets shareholder 
needs (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Moreover, most researchers have elaborated that the primary 
purpose of the board’s existence is to assess, monitor, and reward management, in addition to 
voting vital corporate decisions in efforts to maximise shareholder value (Becht et al., 2003; 
Salmon, 1993). 
2.7. Board Functions/Roles and Responsibility 
The theories which have been discussed in the previous section are central to exploring and 
understanding the BOD tasks, functions, roles, and responsibilities. Based on the emerging 
theoretical framework from the discussed mainstream corporate governance theories, the 
current section discusses the different functions which boards play in line with the established 
literature resources. Despite the several literature discussions on the issue, there is a growing 
consensus that boards have important common roles such as the provision of resources and 
monitoring functions. These functions include control/monitoring board functions, service 
functions or provision of resources, and offer strategic direction.  
Thus, it is important to examine the various board functions and understand how they are framed 
in the literature. A growing body of literature tends to reveal that the boards play a central part 
in influencing the success of corporations. Despite various terms and approaches have been 
shown to explore the state roles, there is a possibility that the role of boards includes ensuring 
effective resource monitoring and their provision to meet company needs. Furthermore, Forbes 
and Milliken (1999) argue that TMTs and BODs are all exposed to complex and multifaceted 
commitments that take into consideration strategic-issue evaluation and assessment. The 
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researchers denoted these tasks as being within the service and control frameworks and can be 
closely matched with the provision and monitoring of functional resources, respectively. In the 
following subsections, the functions and roles of the boards are discussed in light of the past 
literature publications. The sections also try to combine the different terms and approaches that 
have been given in the past under the same functions as applies to control functions of boards, 
provision of services, and director responsibilities in directing strategic direction in the 
organisation. 
2.7.1. Monitoring/ Control Function of Boards 
The control and monitoring functions of the board are in line with the agency theory where the 
principals are separated from managers who make important decisions, although the two parties 
can potentially have divergent interests. According to Boyd (1994), the control role the board 
plays can be internal or external. The external control includes taking market-based approaches 
such as company failure, while internal control can be attained by recognizing agent’s behaviour 
by investing in BOD, more layers of management, reporting procedures, and budget systems 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Such mechanisms enable the board to monitor operations to protect the 
owners’ interests by delegating most decisions on management functions (Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
The literature is in consensus that the board plays an important part in monitoring the various 
organisational processes. The monitoring function has been closely tied to agency theory, which 
makes it the central theme for the BODs, as previously mentioned and discussed. Key to this 
function is the principle that companies tend to show agents and principals who are distinguished 
from the activities that a manager plays within the workplace (Fama & Jensen, 1983). In line with 
the agent dilemma, the interests, and objectives of the agents (managers) and principals 
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(shareholders) may differ on one or several occasions. Considering this danger, it can be argued 
that when management and ownership create a gap, there is a need to have in place effective 
controls to bridge this gap and aspire to align the objectives of the owners and managers to 
maximise returns. Boyd (1994) shared that the internal control mechanism of a board is to bring 
into line the welfares of the managers and shareholders, where the BOD serves as a 
representative of the stakeholders.  
In the process, the observation triggers the argument that a Bobsleds to embrace a monitoring 
role through close observation and assessment of the company’s management to protect the 
interests of the owner. The notion has been elaborately shared and detailed by Fama and Jensen 
(1983), who stated that a board serves to delegate most of the decisions about management 
operations and duties within the company’s operations. Also, the board serves in its capacity to 
delegate control aspects of its agents’ functions, although it still serves the internal interests such 
as monitoring and ratifying company policies, in addition to recruiting the company agents and 
disciplining them (Fama & Jensen, 1983). The efforts which are played by the boards through 
monitoring and control helps to achieve stakeholder interests where the monitoring reduces any 
cases of malpractice contrary to shareholder interest, while controls serve to correct flaws that 
have been identified within the organisation. As such, the boards play a central role in ensuring 
the success of the organisation through their diverse monitoring and control roles. 
2.7.2. Provision of Services/ Resources 
The board is associated with top management teams (TMTs), where they have the main role in a 
company’s control system. Nonetheless, Forbes and Milliken (1999) noted that boards only have 
a role in influencing and monitoring strategy and not in creating and implementing strategies. 
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Moreover, boards have a duty of monitoring how organisations are managed by overseeing the 
functions of the TMT members and those of the CEO. Hillman and Dalziel (2003) added that the 
activities of monitoring functions include monitoring strategy implementation, monitoring CEO, 
evaluating, and rewarding top managers/CEO, and planning CEO succession. In all, the board 
ensures the provision of service by ensuring the TMTs operating at the interest of the 
shareholders. The literature refers to this board function as monitoring (Boyd, 1990), while 
others call it a control function (Boyd, 1994; Pearce & Zahra, 1992). 
By exploring and assessing the various definitions which have been discussed under the two 
terms of services and resources provision, it is clear to point out that at the conceptual basis, 
there is a variation in the two terms although they are used to confer similar meaning. For 
instance, the notion of control largely appears to derive important insights from the study 
undertaken by Fama and Jensen (1983). These scholars elaborated about the decision-making 
initiative to fall into four steps, which they outlined as monitoring, implementing, ratifying, and 
initiating. The researchers then shared that these four tasks are maximised when they are 
performed and executed by different organisational agents. 
Precisely, the researchers pointed out that the initiation and implementation steps need to be 
categorised under the same management term when decisions are made. The researchers also 
added that the tasks emerging from the two processes need to be allocated to a single group of 
agents preferably the top management team in the organisation (Boyd, 1990). In contrast, 
monitoring and ratification steps need to be incorporated under the terms of management 
control and be assigned to diverse agents in the management teams, which is composed of the 
BODs. In this aspect, control processes incline on two steps of the decision initiative processes 
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that include monitoring and ratification (Boyd, 1990). Thus, the primary part in management 
control is that case forms an important basis for evaluating the strategic direction that a company 
needs to follow. 
Fama and Jensen (1993) further explain this concept by narrating the rights associated with the 
board’s control decisions. Specifically, this includes obligations of hiring, disciplining, and 
compensating the top management teams and monitor and ratify essential decisions which have 
a direct impact on the company. Furthermore, evaluating this process shed more light to the fact 
that they incorporate the duty of regulating managers by exercising their mandate, in addition 
to the role of controlling their actions. In the same spirit, Forbes and Milliken (1999) used the 
term control to denote undertakings that incorporate choices that concern the process of hiring 
top managers, compensating them, and replacing the company’s senior or top managers, in 
addition to exercising their control to approve or disapprove the main initiatives proposed by the 
top managers (Machold & Farquhar, 2013). Such an argument tends to be in line with the one 
that the researchers have when elaborating about the monitoring functions and its activities. As 
applies to this study, bother terms are used to refer to the same function when examining the 
functions and roles of the BODs (Dalton et al., 1998). The agreement is in line with findings which 
have been documented by other researchers who have used the two terms in their studies such 
as Pearce and Zahra (1991) and Machold and Farquhar (2013). 
Irrespective of the above observations, there are some important observations that need to be 
taken into consideration. Although both terms have been extensively used under similar 
functions, the prominence of the two words (control and monitor) is different. Therefore, there 
are operations and terms better explained using monitoring, such as monitoring strategy 
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implementation and monitoring CEO, while others such as rewarding and evaluating the top 
managers or the CEO are better explained using the term control of tasks. Either way, the 
remaining fact is that the board has an important role to play when they are providing services 
and resources in their company. Like monitoring and control, the provision of services or 
resources by the board serves to achieve a broader objective of maximising stakeholder returns 
and expectations. 
2.7.3. Directors’ Responsibility to Strategic Direction 
Zahra and Pearce (1989) noted that the role of the board is to service and control. Their insights 
were captured from their research on two board perspectives, including hegemony and legalistic 
approaches. Nonetheless, when they assessed the function of the board from agency theory and 
RDT approaches, they acquired a third role, which is strategic in nature. In the process, when 
they integrated their findings, Zahra and Pearce (1989) concluded that a board has three roles of 
strategy, service, and control. Examining the board’s responsibilities from the strategy and 
service focus, it can be noted that this broader function further includes the provision of 
resources into the two roles. Therefore, noted that the service role includes the focus of 
enhancing corporate reputation, creating contacts with the environment, and giving advice or 
counsel to the TMTs. These activities include roles closely related to the strategic duties of a 
director. Hillman and Dalziel (2003) added that part of the strategy is to aid in formulating 
important company decisions and in formulating strategies. Forbes and Milliken (1999) also 
supported similar observations where the board is mandated in formulating a strategy with a 
specific focus on the service role. In addition, the board also plays an important part in approving 
major initiatives which have been proposed by management managing strategic management an 
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important area of the control role that boards play within their organisations (Forbes & Milliken, 
1999). 
Even if the strategy role makes a clear distinction from the service role in that sense is used when 
describing strategy which involves the directors in the process formulation process, there is lack 
of clear assessment in terms of the activities which are involved in both cases. For instance, the 
two roles have been reported to require the counsel and advise to the executives and/or the 
CEO, and there is uncertainty regarding how this can be different in each of the two roles. Further 
literature discussions have also argued that the second most important function which the board 
plays in their mandate involves providing important resources. Often, these functions are 
accompanied by resource and service dependence functions, which also falls within similar 
descriptions (Forbes & Milliken, 1999). Nonetheless, it is more complicated when attempting to 
understand specific propositions that are related to strategy roles, and even if it seems right to 
some capacity to be presented and evaluated as a separate function, there is a need to point out 
some unclear arguments which remain unclear in the body of literature. When the duties of the 
directors who oversee resource and control roles are examined, it becomes clear that both roles 
entail activities which are related to the strategic duties assigned to the directors (Judge & 
Zeithmal 1992). 
Forbes and Milliken (1999) illustrated that directors take active positions in participating during 
the various stages of strategy formulation—with a specific focus on service roles.  Forbes and 
Milliken (1999) further stated that part of the control role entails approving key initiatives that 
have been postulated by the top management which has been involved during the strategic 
decision processes during the control role. Therefore, these observations lead to the conclusion 
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that the involvement of the directors in the strategic processes is related to the resource provider 
and the monitoring provision roles. By advancing this idea further, it becomes even more 
elaborate that it is not easy to break down and discuss strategy as a separate role. Instead, the 
focus on strategy should be presented as part of the two roles which have been discussed in this 
section (depending on the nature of the activities being examined at one time), thereby making 
them either fall under the controlling or under the advisory roles. In summation, the 
responsibility has an outcome, that of ensuring that the interests of the shareholders and the 
stakeholders have been taken into consideration. 
2.8. CG: A Theoretical Perspective 
2.8.1. Introduction 
As applies to this study, BOD tasks are grounded in mainstream corporate governance theories 
which are discussed in this section. These theories form the basis of the theoretical framework 
that can be used to understand BOD tasks within the IFIs. Researchers and practitioners have 
postulated diverse schools of thought to explore issues of CG, with a keen interest in the 
attributes of the boards. These different schools of thought have been formulated and explored 
to extrapolate on the fundamental issues related to CG, with a specific focus onboard attributes 
(Bhatti & Bhatti, 2010). The specific schools of thought include a social network and institutional 
perspectives, stewardship, upper echelons, RDT, and agency. Each of these schools of thoughts 
has different perceptions and views about CG from diverse lenses. The subsequent subsections 
focus on detailing an in-depth description of the schools of thought from their individual 
perceptions and opinions based on past literature studies. 
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Even if the perspectives are being approached by diverse scholars, the most dominant schools of 
thought when exploring the concept of CG appears to be resource dependence theory (RDT) and 
agency theory. One of the main reasons why these two schools of thought appear to have strong 
explanatory power in terms of CG is attributed to their assessment and evaluation of the 
functions and nature of the BODs. Moreover, both the RDT and the agency theory can clearly be 
applied in explaining the responsibilities and roles of the BODs and the existing relationship with 
the connected stakeholders. In the subsequent sections, there are additional justifications made 
to understand and explore these concepts. In the process, the agency theory, and the resource 
dependency theory (RDT) will be discussed and detailed with a specific focus on CG. The two 
theories also form the basis of this study’s theoretical framework. All the important perspectives 
are provided in the subsequent sections by giving the contextual examples denoting applications 
of these theories, with prominence focusing on RDT and agency theories. In addition, the section 
also discusses other important schools of thought or theories which include social network 
theory, institutional, stewardship, and upper echelons theories. 
2.8.2. Agency Theory 
The agency theory (AGT) was postulated in the late 1960s when Wilson (1968) and Arrow (1971) 
attempted to describe the risk-sharing challenges in corporations. In their approach, they 
indicated that risk-sharing emerges when diverse parties such as groups or individuals cooperate 
with various views towards potential risks. Subsequent literature discussed the issue in the light 
of RDT (discussed in section 2.9.3.), which emerges if organisations tend to display principal-
agent relationships. As applies to this study, the principal assigns duties to an agent who must 
execute the assigned obligations. When such a relationship exists, Eisenhardt (1989) pointed out 
59 
 
that two problems need to be confronted. First, the agency challenge emerges once proposed 
goals or objectives by an agent and the principal do not align, implying that there are costs 
involved by the principal in verifying every activity that an agent engages with. That is, there is 
uncertainty when attempting to verify the undertakings by an agent and whether they are 
fulfilling the needs of the principal. Second, another issue is related to risk-sharing, resulting 
when the agent and a principal have diverse views about a risk. The difference is translated in 
terms of the choice of action each of the parties would take considering their various risk 
preferences. 
In the literature, agency theory concentrates on exploring the BOD’s functions and points out 
that when agency costs are reduced, it is possible to improve corporate performance. In 
elaboration, this suggestion indicates that the primary function of BOD should be monitoring the 
agents (management) of the corporation, to safeguard shareholders (principals) ambitions. The 
main interest of the principals is to ensure that their organisation records improved performance. 
Furthermore, the framework used to analyse how companies address the differences between 
agents and principals can play an important role in examining the efficiency of existing executive 
positions (Beatty & Zajac, 1994). 
As noted by Jensen and Meckling (1976) when principals and agents that are parties to a 
relationship have a common focus of maximizing utility, then it can be argued that substantial 
reasons exist to indicate that the agent is not always going to put in place measures tailored at 
promoting the interests of the principal. Further, the researchers allude that the principal can act 
to reduce potential losses from their interests by creating suitable incentives to their agents, or 
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by having in place monitoring costs which can serve to ensure that the agent is able to make 
optimal choices which serve to maximise shareholder returns from the principal’s point of view. 
Fama and Jensen (1983) point out that controlling agency problems is central when the executive 
members of the firm (who are the decision-makers), who develop and implement important 
choices are not the primary claimants (owners). As a result, they do not have access to the share 
if the wealth impacts of their choices. In the case that there is no effective control of what the 
decision-makers have in place, it becomes increasingly likely that the decisions by managers may 
vary from the interests of the primary principles. The literature also shed more information that 
in efforts to ensure that there are effective control processes of the choices made, the selected 
nature of the control needs to be separate and unique from the decisions made by the 
management. Therefore, if the assumption is that the decision process contains four steps which 
include creation, authorisation, implementing, and monitoring, then it is recommended that the 
entire processes need to be allocated to diverse agents in line with their name. In step one and 
step three, the allocation is made on similar agents, where these agents are categorized based 
on similar decision-making conditions, whereas in the control management terms the second and 
fourth steps of ratification and monitoring are taken into consideration. 
Past literature on agency theory has largely focused on the need to monitor functions of the 
BODs, with results obtained from these studies stressing the need to reduce agency costs to 
improve company performance. That is, there is a strong indication that the primary function of 
the BODs is to monitor agents to promote the stakeholder interests (principals’ needs), which is 
strongly translated to mean an improved company or organisational performance. Often, the 
relevant structures on how the executive need to be compensated are assessed based on the 
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compensatory scheme, which has been agreed by the director’s contract. Often, the agreement 
can be based on aspects like getting stock options, or monetary rewards which are directly 
related to the risks which a company bear. Based on the compensatory scheme, it becomes 
possible for the agents to have diverse shares in terms of the wealth they create based on the 
choices and decisions they make in day to day running of the company. As such, the executives 
are often paid based entirely on their level of performance and anticipated to show higher 
inducements aimed at performing well because such processes also work to influence their level 
of compensation which they should expect from the company. 
By making elaborate structures of the tissues which surround and influence the CG framework, 
this implies that the board’s dependence and duality-separation (the ratio between internal and 
external members). For instance, past literature findings have pointed out that most boards are 
constructed based on the interest of establishing the independence of the board. In this 
approach, the preference is based on the need to have more external directors in the board, 
since boards which largely contain internal members are often regarded as being less 
independent. Also, internal members of the board tend to benefit from remunerations from the 
organisation, meaning that they have fewer incentives that work to promote effective 
management of the company operations. Thus, a board with a higher ratio of external members 
is considered more independent and competitive in aligning shareholder needs than the one with 
more internal members. Similarly, the literature has elaborated that when the CEO doubles up 
as a chairperson within the same company, the board ends up having limited powers in terms of 
overseeing how the firm is managed. Thus, an effective organisational board should consider the 
need to separate the two positions. 
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2.8.3. Resource Dependence Theory 
The focus of RDT is on the management of the external company resources. The RDT theory was 
formulated beginning the 1970s to describing how external corporate resources can be managed. 
According to Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), such an approach is necessary for understanding 
organisations and in controlling and managing them. Moreover, this perception holds that 
company success and sustainability are reliant on their environment. Every corporation is 
connected to environments by social-legal apparatus, competitive relationships, customer-
supplier relationships, associations, and federations (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Hillman et al. 
(2009) noted that the RDT theory elaborates that five mechanisms can be applied to reduce 
external dependencies. Some of these mechanisms include joint ventures, executive succession, 
political action, BODs, and vertical integration or mergers. These five mechanisms were initially 
pointed out by Pfeffer and Sanlancik (1978), but in this study, the interest is limited to the BODs 
and to some extent the issue of executive succession within organisations. 
Researchers have attempted to link RDT to CG, mainly in consideration of the BODs. Pfeffer 
(1972) indicated that boards could empower corporations to control external impact and reduce 
organisational dependence on the environment. The BODs are also connected with the possibility 
of bringing resources to a company. Provision of resources is considered a primary function of 
the BOD in line with resource dependency theorists and agency theorists who point out those 
BODs monitors the resource functions. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) also supported this critical 
perception where the governing or advisory board need to facilitate a company to appoint 
external directors to monitor company functions, offer managerial expertise, and offer support 
to the company.  
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An initial approach entails providing the corporation with unique and tailored managerial 
expertise, considering that one of the processes of making an appointment for directors to the 
board is based on experience and skills. A second approach is to give the company the necessary 
support it requires to fulfil its objectives. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) noted that a corporation 
which makes appointments for directors to its board often anticipates that the appointed 
individual will fill in the gap by supporting the vision and mission of the organisation. In addition, 
the company expects that the newly appointed individual will immerse him or herself in company 
issues, problems, and challenges, be loyal to the company course by making favourable 
presentation about the company to others and try to help the company in every way possible so 
that it can succeed (Pfeffer &Salancik, 1978). Often, all the appointments of an external director 
are informed by their personal attributes. 
However, the RDT theory has been criticized because it has not been questioned, tested, or 
explored, leaving it largely neglected in the scholarly and practitioner literature. According to 
Pfeffer (2003), the success of RDT has been problematic and difficult to explore. Moreover, there 
may be some additional challenges which may impact the reliability and validity of this theory. 
Hillman et al. (2009) observed that the validity of the RDT approach might be weakened by the 
disconnection of the theory with the resource-based view (RBV) theory. Even so, the researchers 
point out that integration of RDT with RBV theory of CG might result in productive outcomes in 
terms of assessing, exploring, and applying the RDT theory in different fields. 
Despite this proposal, observations made from the examined literature reveal that the distinction 
between the two theories (RBV and RDT) are not very elaborate neither are they distinguished. 
Thus, this may be one potential source of limitation of the RDT theory. Insights which have been 
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shared by Hillman et al. (2009) point out more about this argument and extrapolate it on the 
conception that both perspectives are complementary to one another because they focus on 
resources. On their part, Kraaijenbrink et al. (2010) pointed out that RBV tends to explain that 
the internal company resources of a company contribute and influence the nature and 
competitive advantage which a company has. At first, this definition tends to reveal that there is 
a distinction between the two theories since the RDT tend to observe the external environment 
and its focus is based on the nature of resource dependencies that originate from the external 
environment. In contrast, the RBV tends to explain the nature of internal resources. 
2.8.4. Upper Echelons Theory 
According to the Upper Echelons approach, company outcomes, both in terms of effectiveness 
and strategies, are shown by the cognitive biases and values of the most important and powerful 
actors of the corporation. The theory was initially introduced by Hambrick and Mason (1984) and 
is largely focused on studying top management teams in a company, which can also be used to 
examine the nature of success in the companies they run. In line with this theory, the argument 
is that executives act, make, decisions, and interpretations based on their personalities, values, 
and experiences. Thus, if it is possible to capture these personalities and values, it is possible to 
predict company outcomes. Hambrick and Mason (1984) also indicated that it is important to 
take two aspects into consideration. One, it is essential to focus on aspects of top management 
teams as opposed to focusing on a single executive such as the CEO since leadership is shared, in 
addition to the collection of interactions, skills, and cognitions of all the top management team. 
Two, the executives’ cognitive bases and values can be recorded using demographic data because 
gathering psychological data (which is more suitable) is often challenging. Further, accessing 
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higher managerial discretion and job demands would contribute to the collection of better 
executive characteristics that will help to predict corporate outcomes. 
Over the decades, the upper echelons theory was also developed and advanced to include two 
more moderators to its predications. The two moderators include a managerial description, 
which was proposed by Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) and the job demand on the executive 
side postulated by Hambrick et al. (2005). A recent assessment given by Hambrick (2007) 
identified that the concept of managerial discretion tends to exist when several acceptable 
substitute sexists in the company’s environment such as industry growth, corporate issues, and 
the nature of the executives in terms of tolerating ambiguity and failure. In a similar fashion, job 
demands which are taken into consideration in this model tend to point out whether the CEO 
must execute the available tasks at hand under comfort. In this case, the general conception is 
that every CEO usually carries a heavy load. On the ground, the CEO jobs and their requirements 
differ substantially in the nature of the level of their difficulty. Hambrick (2007) gave an 
illustration of these challenges and noted that CEOs who operate in bountiful environments, 
which have well-fortified strategies and highly experienced, committed, and able subordinate 
members of staff tend to deliver on their operations compared to CEO who lack similar workplace 
environments. 
The literature further argues that when the job demands and managerial discretion is high, there 
is a direct impact in terms of having more executive characteristics that matter when predicting 
the outcomes of an organisation. Nonetheless, the primary problem is that there are few studies 
in the field of CG which tend to approach this topic from the upper echelons point of view 
although most researchers on board governance tend to largely neglect this theory and apply it 
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in their studies. The reason for such occurrence can be explained by the fact that the theory 
largely proposes that organisational outcomes and strategic choices can be explored from 
examining the demographic characteristics of the executives because it is the duty of the 
managers and not the board’s responsibility to make fundamental organisational deliberations. 
The responsibility by the board is to monitor and ratify strategic decisions; thereby, it can be 
noted that the members of the board should not have their characteristics considered when 
accounting for potential predictors of corporate outcomes. 
2.8.5. Stewardship Theory 
The theory argues that managers are considered stewards instead of agents, and in the process, 
they act in the best interest of the principals. Davis et al. (1997) elaborated that in line with the 
agency theory, managers engulf themselves in rational behaviour. However, Argyris (1973) 
cautioned that such an approach is a simplified perception of a human being and more 
humanistic, and complex model is needed (Donaldson & Davis, 1991). The theory notes that 
humans focus beyond individual utility and instead result in collective engagement instead of 
personal behaviour (Davis et al., 1997). In the literature, this concept has been applied to board 
research to explain practical outcomes and most articles it used to supplement agency theory as 
a contrasting model (Martynov, 2009).  
The stewardship theory appeared to be rooted in psychology and sociology domains and was 
created for scholars in efforts meant to explore potential conditions where executives act like 
stewards. In that case, a steward is considered to be true to the course of the company growth 
in terms of promoting the interest of the principal who in this case is the shareholders and not 
propagating the perception of working to serve their selfish ambitions as argued out in the 
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agency theory when examining the role of the principals.  Today, there is a growing debate that 
the two theories exist for several decades and falls under the efforts of researchers to elaborate 
more on the model of man (Donaldson & Davis, 1991). Further, as pointed out by Davis et al. 
(1997) in line with the agency theory that the man is anchored on the concept of economic 
rationality (Martynov, 2009).  
Researchers have attempted to discuss the variation between these schools of thought can and 
linked it to deliberations about the use of power, identification, and motivation. Concerning the 
motivation aspect, the whole focus is based on the concept of stewardship theory. That is, a 
steward tends to be more inclined to intrinsic rewards like the desire for self-actualisation, 
affiliation, achievement, and growth all which are not often easy to identify. In comparison to 
another perspective of the agency theory, proponents argue that managers can be viewed in the 
light of being motivated by extrinsic rewards such as retirement plans, medical insurance, 
exchangeable commodity like salaries, and tangibles (Martynov, 2009). Furthermore, one can 
point out that by identifying the managers with the objectives of a company, it is possible to help 
the same managers to start acting like stewards. The last aspect concerns the powers of the 
managers. However, this managerial power is not similar with institutional power (that is, power 
that may be derived from their managerial position), instated it refers to the personal power 
(that is, the power which is created over a period of time in the context of his work and corporate 
relationships), which eventual is considered to have a substantial influence in generating a sense 
of steward behaviour (Martynov, 2009).  
Over the decades, the stewardship theory has been used in some board studies where it has been 
useful in explaining empirical findings (Dignam & Galanis, 2009). In other circumstances, the 
68 
 
theory has been applied in addition to agency theory to explore and understand the opposite 
application of the agency theory (Donaldson & Davis, 1991; Martynov, 2009). Despite this 
shortcoming, the stewardship theory has been considered to be diametric in nature, and it would 
be anticipated that one can find the two theories being applied in a similar context in CG. To this 
end, the projected outcome of the agency and stewardship theories is diametric mainly in nature, 
even if the primary reason it has not been used widely is the essential conceptualisation of the 
stewardship theory. 
An important consideration is that the stewardship theory hardly bases its assumptions on issues 
such as distinguishing company control and company ownership, rather tends to focus on the 
nature of the managerial behaviour. Suggestions about stewardship theory reveal that the 
owners may appear to gain rewards for their decisions, although the central reason emerges 
from their desire for collective behaviour (that is an intrinsic reward). In comparison, agency 
theory largely anchors its traditions on the association between the managers and the owners 
based on the argument that every time there is separation, there is an increased possibility for 
conflict of interest to emerging further leading to agency costs. Also, the conflict of interest draws 
managers and the BODs away from the primary objective of the company, where strategies 
initiated by the top management may fail to be implemented. Similarly, conflict of interest 
potential generated the concerns about the agent deviating from the core principal’s objectives 
and interests related to financial growth and capital returns (Donaldson & Davis, 1991). 
2.8.6. Institutional Theory 
According to Scott (2005), the institutional theory points out those corporations exist in the way 
they do because it is the only legitimate way to organize them. In elaboration, when some 
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operations obtain legitimacy with time, everyone becomes interested in complying to avoid 
contradicting with others in the same group (Zucker, 1977). In this manner, the institutional 
theory can be used in predicting practices within companies and comparing their operations 
within legitimate behaviours. Boyd et al. (2011) argued that institutional theory and RDT are 
similar because they argue that companies must adapt to uncertain and constantly changing 
environments. 
Scott (2005) pointed out that institutional theory was largely dominant in the 19th century in 
explaining the various operations within organisations. In addition, the theory was widely used 
and applied in diverse fields, which include a political arena, economic assessment, cognitive 
psychology, and sociology. Institutional theory, over the decades, has been noted to be a diverse 
model which is not in any way single or have in place unified systems of propositions and 
assumptions. Instead, the theory appears to be amorphous of complex and related concepts and 
ideas, with a family of diverse approaches or broader theoretical conceptions (Scott, 2005). On 
his part, Eisenhardt (1988) noted that from a company perspective, corporations exist in the 
manner which helps them to maintain their identify and form. Over time, companies tend to 
behave in a certain manner where their actions are recorded over decades and proven to be 
effective. In the process, every aspect of the company starts to run and adhere to the concepts 
already established within the company. Zucker (1997) noted that any deviations from the pre-
established operations are likely to attract scrutiny and opposition since such actions are noted 
to move contrary to the needs and established objectives of the company. 
Considering the nature of institutional theory, it can be pointed out that the theory can be widely 
used and applied in predicting practices within the company, based on current practices and 
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future behaviour perceptions on various operations. The behaviour can be supplemented with 
cultural values, the management trends in the company, and the industry or firm traditions. It 
can be pointed out that the use of processes and structures that aspire to become legitimate 
within institutions from their operational environment can have practical implications. In the 
process, this can result in the establishment of rational, appropriate, and modern corporations 
which tend to avoid negligence claims in the event something goes contrary to the set 
expectations (Zucker et al., 1997). Boyd et al. (2011) allude that RDT and institutional theory 
appear to be similar because the two argue that corporations must aspire to adapt with changing 
times, and the uncertain and dynamic business environment in which they operate. 
A handful of studies on CG, according to Beekun et al. (1998) have applied the institutional 
perspective to explain or predict certain operating market environments. Similar findings have 
also been reported by Eisenhardt (1998) and Judge and Zeithaml 1992) where the primary idea 
which drives the theory (when used to study BODs) is that the board can be a potential 
mechanism which can influence the process of achieving legitimacy and that the external 
environment appears to provide or influence constraint this same function. Board legitimacy 
goes a long way in influencing various company operations such as affecting the board 
independence, shareholder trust, and the decisions made in efforts to promote stakeholder 
value. 
2.8.7. Social Network Theory 
The theory focuses on examining how company performance and behaviour can be explained 
using the pattern of ties with external aspects. Boyd et al. (2011) pointed out that corporations 
are interlinked with each other via diverse social networks. Some of these networks include 
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alliances, the relationship among employees, associated memberships, resource flows, and 
supplier relationships. At first, this perception appears to be the same as RDT, since it alludes 
that the organisation is dependent or related in resources to other entities. However, the two 
approaches differ in that social network theory emphasises the role of social context to resource 
constraints, which appear in RDT. Boyd et al. (2011) pointed out that an organisation’s social 
network contains past inter-firm connections, and it is the informational advantage from the 
social networks than empower a company creates new connections and promote 
trustworthiness, capabilities, and reliability of new possible partnerships. 
As noted by Boyd et al. (2011), two inter-organisational connections or links exist where 
information advantages from created social relationships help the companies to develop 
stronger ties and improve on their reliability when they engage with new business partners. 
However, the theory has not yet been extensively applied across various aspects of the CG 
literature. When applied, however, the social network theory serves the purpose of examining 
how interlocking executives might influence and shape company outcomes based on their pre-
established networks with other companies and industries (Boyd et al., 2011).  
For instance, Yoko et al. (2009) pointed out that the boards serve a unique formal mechanism 
that is often used to create a link between or amongst top managers from different companies. 
As such, the social network theory puts into place important opportunities for managers to share 
and exchange information, explore and evaluate different leadership practices, and examine the 
style of leadership their peers use while getting important opportunities to witness first-hand 
insights of the consequences of the various practices (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001). Therefore, 
the literature holds that connections that directors create with other organisations might be of 
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important influence in terms of formulating decision-making processes and improving on their 
existing corporate strategies (Boyd et al., 2011; Palmer et al., 1993). 
2.9. Applying Theories to Develop Underlying Theoretical Framework in Relation to SSBs and 
BODs 
According to Rahman and Bukair (2013), the literature findings reveal that the factors which 
affect BODs also affects and influences SSB operations within the IFIs. Bhatti and Bhatti (2010) 
also revealed that when compared to IFIs, the structure of the CG and conventional board seems 
to be alike in their operations and objectives. Thus, the CG theories such as the RDT, STD, and 
AGT discussed in section 2.9 can be used and extended to explain the expected roles between 
SSBs and BODs within the IFIs (Azmat, Skully, & Brown, 2015). The subsequent sections provide 
details which help theorize the association between SSBs and BODs in the light of the theoretical 
lenses. 
2.9.1. SSBs’ and BODs’ Expertise 
The RDT postulates that financial institutions such as IFIs require resources which they can access 
from the environment which they operate for them to survive in their daily operations. The BODs 
make positive contributions in terms of availing valuable resources to the IFIs in terms of work 
experience, educational qualification, expertise, skills, and knowledge (Bassens, Derudder, & 
Witlox, 2011). Further, the BOD uses its resources when deliberating on important financial 
issues and when making suitable decision processes. Board members also rely on individual 
resources to exercise their mandate of controlling and steering financial organizations into the 
current direction. When examining risks taken, the BOD which tends to have diverse skills also 
tends to show more experience when taking risks due to in-depth comprehension of their 
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organization's risk appetite. Making risky decisions also demand that the BOD has a sound 
financial background.  
In contrast, the SSB members include Shari’ah scholars who make positive contributions through 
effective resource use in the various situation which calls for SSB’s decision-making processes 
and deliberations. The literature agrees that SSBs represent depositors and shareholders of the 
IFIs in efforts to ensure and certify financial transactions, contracts, and banking operations in 
line with Shari’ah law. Therefore, SSB members are mandated to have the necessary experience 
in Shari’ah and education qualifications before serving as Shari’ah experts (Samra, 2016). In 
addition, the RDT stresses that SSBs must be constituted of personnel who have banking 
experience or financial knowledge that empower them to make careful assessments on financial 
contracts applied to various banking services and products of IFIs. 
2.9.2. Educational Level of SSB and BOD Members 
Besides the level of expertise, another important resource among the SSBs which facilitates IFIs 
performance is the educational level of its members. The educational level becomes an essential 
resource which both the BOD and SSBs bring to the IFIs when making quality decisions in addition 
to handling complex challenges. In line with the AGT, the BODs and SSBs are mandated to use 
their education to advance stakeholder interests where they ensure top management execute 
the interests of their stakeholders instead of their own interests. Moreover, based on the 
stewardship theory, both SSBs and BODs have to work in the best interest of their stakeholders 
when using their educational level to make informed decisions. When considering SSBs, they 
have to apply stewardship theory when deliberating on Shari’ah requirements in the IFIs 
financing and banking options when assessing financial contracts and associated risks applied to 
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various banking services and products. Rahman and Bukair (2013) noted that SSB members with 
doctorate qualifications in IFIs are highly acquainted in the structure and procedure of IFI 
products unlike some of the members in the BODs.  
2.9.3. Gender Diversity in SSBs and BODs 
Boyd et al. (2011) noted that RDT and institutional theories are anchored on the assumption that 
corporations have to adapt to constantly changing and uncertain business environments. One of 
the main changes in SSBs and BODs over the recent past has been the composition and diversity 
of its members. Further, Social Network Theory elaborates the need to develop alliances which 
reflect improved supplier relationships, alliances, and the nature of associated memberships. The 
literature reveals that BOD diversity can serve corporate performance because of the unique 
characteristics by its members and their contributions to the board. Similarly, performance 
improvement in SSBs is considered a positive outcome because of diversity which results in 
innovation, creativity, and high-quality decision processes. Gender diversity presents one aspect 
of boar diversity in BODs and SSBs within the IFIs. The literature alludes that compared to males, 
females are often different in their education background, communication style, personality, and 
career expertise or experience. When such variations are evident in the IFIs boards, it becomes 
highly possible to achieve broader decision-making processes. Women are also considered to be 
less self-interest oriented, benevolent, more involved and committed, and more diligent 
compared to male directors.  
2.9.4. Board Independence  
The AGT indicates that the SSBs play an important role in promoting the stakeholder needs in the 
presence of agency conflicts with board members and top management in the IFIs. Nonetheless, 
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the extent to which the SSBs are able to exert this monitoring role over the top management and 
BODs depends on the level of their independence (Azmat, Skully, & Brown, 2015). Farag, Mallin, 
and Ow-Yong (2018) shared that SSBs which are independent of any control and influence from 
powerful CEO and BODs are better positioned to exercise their monitoring roles. Empirical and 
theoretical literature shows that a high number of independent SSBs denotes a greater level of 
monitoring of the SSBs. In contrast, lack of board independence has been reported to be 
associated with CG failure and increased financial risks resulting from defaulted loans and debts. 
Williams and Zinkin (2010) indicated that SSB independence ensures minimal influence from 
management and this further establishes the accountability and integrity of the BODs in terms of 
discharging their mandate. As a result, a high degree of independent SSBs can help prevent the 
BODs from making excessive risks since they serve as strong risk mitigation system. Independent 
SSBs can be counted on to scrutinize investment and financing proposals made by BODs in an 
objective manner.  
2.10. Summary of how Literature Insights Shaped the Focus, Purpose, and Design of Study  
The insights gained for the literature discussed in this chapter have largely informed and shaped 
the research focus, purpose, and design of the study. Insights by Azmat, Skully, and Brown (2015) 
and Williams and Zinkin (2010) have substantially formed a foundation for the conceptual scope 
and theoretical framework of CG based on the two dominant governance systems in the banking 
sector. That is, the European and the Anglo-Saxon models. As evident, insights by Farag, Mallin, 
and Ow-Yong (2018) and Farook and Farooq (2013) on CG model have elaborated how the value 
system based on shareholders form the basis of the agency theory are relates to the Anglo-Saxon 
model. In contrast, the works by Yamak and Suer (2005) and Macey and Miller (2004) have been 
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essential in exploring the European model which offers solutions for the shortcomings evident in 
the shareholder model by emphasizing more focus on stakeholder approach, with its main basis 
informed by the stakeholder theory. Further, the gap between the two models is bridged by the 
BCBS and OECD CG models by taking into consideration the stakeholder interest and shareholder 
value in the banking institutions (Ullah, Harwood, & Jamali, 2018). Therefore, this section has 
delved into providing an extensive literature overview and survey of CG from convention 
approaches, specifically related to the financial institutions. 
Considering that the Anglo-Saxon model is based on the agency theory, the framework clearly 
represents a clear system aimed at promoting and facilitating shareholder value. In contrast, the 
European model has been shown in this study to be anchored and formulated on stakeholder 
theory and in the process, it can be pointed out that it offers remedies in support of the 
shortcomings of the shareholder model by putting in place stakeholder value generation system 
(Pollard & Samers, 2013). When considering the issue with the banking operations, the OECD 
values on CG and the BCBS principles on promoting CG in the financial sector appear to create a 
link between the two models (Bhatti & Bhatti, 2010). Such an approach is realised because the 
principles acknowledge the important role that the shareholders play and their value in the 
financial sector, while also taking into consideration the important part of the stakeholders and 
their interests. 
Considering the above insights, it can be argued that the key participants who influence all the 
aspects of the CG process include the regulatory authorities, the depositors, the shareholders, 
the managers, the SB, and the BODs. These conclusions are suitable and genuine with a specific 
focus on both the conventional and contemporary financial services sectors (Bhatti & Bhatti, 
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2010). Furthermore, the literature findings have proved that there are a trend and a tendency 
for the convergence of two CG systems in addition to the resolve of the stakeholder system or 
the shareholder system. The approach is preconceived by five main considerations which include 
the issues with economic conception, culture or social norms, existing political environment, the 
formulations around the legal frameworks, and the factors which influence national diversity 
(Jacoby, 2000). 
Therefore, the current section has played an important part in providing an extensive literature 
overview and survey of CG. Specifically, the overview of this literature has served the purpose of 
the study by focusing on financial institutions. Comprehension of the theoretical framework of 
CG is domineering in the current study because it serves as a basis of enlightening other studies 
in the field of CG, and specifically as applies to the Islamic perspective. From the conventional 
approach, the model of CG triggers issues of having in place effective and efficient design for 
proper CG to be realised, especially when focusing on IFIs within the Islamic corporate sector 
(Ainley et al., 2007). Today, it is fundamental to identify the behaviour, the norms, the values, 
and the characteristics of CG based on Shari’ah guidelines, a key research focus of this 
dissertation. The initial observations on this topic reveal that the CG paradigm in Islam is largely 
focused on the stakeholder value creation, where its style of governance is focused at the desire 
to protect the entire group of stakeholders (Bhatti & Bhatti, 2010). Also, the literature examines 
the foundational and conceptual dimensions of CG in Islamic literature and further details its 
diversities and differences. Before delving into Islamic literature, the next section presents the 
theoretical perspectives about CG. 
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Notably, some of the theories have been noted to generate contrary views such as stewardship 
and agency theories, while others remain complementary such as social network theory and RDT, 
and others are non-related such as upper echelons and agency theories. Today, the attention is 
also focused on other fundamental issues that seek to address the functions of the BODs. In 
addition, further research has been focused on exploring the functions of CG from the Islamic 
point of view. In the next chapter, the functions of Islamic CG are discussed in detail. 
The literature insights from the CG framework has played a central role in terms of informing and 
shaping the research focus, purpose, and design of this study. Findings help examine the 
moderating effect of SSBs on the link between BODs and IFIs management, which is the main 
research focus in the current study. In line with the agency theory, the SSBs have an oversight 
mandate to control the self-fulfilling interests among the top executives in the IFIs (Pollard & 
Samers, 2007). Islamic. Specifically, SSBs which consist of independent Shari’ah advisors and 
BODs which are made up of independent directors can form the basis of protecting stakeholder 
interests and promoting their financial returns. Even so, the board members must have the 
required resources in terms of gender diversity, expertise, independence, education, and 
experience in line with RBV to be in a position to make suitable contributions in terms of quality 
decisions and oversight. As applies to the Saudi IFIs, these aspects are integral to the success of 
any financial institution and SSBs have to work collaboratively with BODs to promote stakeholder 
interest in efforts to reduce conflict of interest in line with the AGT (Pollard & Samers, 2013). 
The reviewed literature also stresses the theoretical frameworks of such as the Upper Echelons 
theory and stewardship theory which can be used to understand how SSBs and BODs can be 
integrated to work seamlessly within the IFIs in Saudi Arabia. A clear assessment from the 
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literature was that SSBs serve to ensure that IFIs operate within the Shari’ah framework, where 
top management and BODs act in line with Stewardship theory where they make investment 
decisions and financial deliberations that align with the interests of the stakeholders. Moreover, 
the Upper Echelons theory is in line with the Stewardship theory where the primary argument is 
that top management needs to make decisions based on the experience and values in the best 
interests of the company. To this end, integrating the two theories to this study makes it possible 
to comprehend that the oversight role of SSBs and BODs can better contribute to competent 
decision processes aimed at controlling potential financial and credit risks resulting from IFIs 
lending. In line with Saudi IFIs, the literature creates an emphasis on the fact that SSB attributes 
such as greater diversity, education qualification, bank- and Shari’ah-related experience 













Chapter 3: CG from the Islamic Perspective 
3.1. Introduction 
The current chapter discusses the theoretical framework which can be used to explain the SSB 
tasks which are largely based on the Shariah law. Over the years, the literature has extensively 
explored CG in the context of Islamic banking but there is still a lack of an overarching and unifying 
theory of CG for Islamic banks. Today, the concept of CG (either the European model that 
promotes stakeholder value or the Anglo-Saxon model that advances the shareholder value 
system) has been a subject of continued debate among scholars and practitioners. By 
comparison, there are limited studies which have been undertaken to explore the Islamic 
perspective of CG, specifically when examining the Islamic finance (Ainley et al., 2007), even 
though there has been the rapid growth of the Islamic banking in the global financial markets 
since the mid-1970s (Yunis, 2007). Studies on IFIs started in the 1980s with studies by 
Abomouamer (1989) examining how Shari’ah control was applied in Islamic Banks, while Banaga, 
Ray, and Tomkins (1994) explored external audit of CG within Islamic banks.  
However, the two studies were undertaken by individuals and only limited their scope to Shari’ah 
control and audit. Over the years, additional studies have been conducted to understand CG from 
the Islamic point of view, a focus of this section. In the literature, the existing studies on IFIs CG 
can be grouped into three main phases (Bhatti & Bhatti, 2010). Phase one includes the pre-1980s, 
phase two includes the period between the 1980s and 1990s, and phase three include the post-
2000s. In the first phase, the era is characterised by the absence of studies on CG on IFIs, and the 
topic received less research interest in mainstream CG. The claims are supported by the initial 
surveys which were undertaken by Siddiqi (1991) on contemporary studies on Islamic financial 
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economics (Ainley et al., 2007; Bhatti & Bhatti, 2010). However, there was some increased focus 
and commitment to the topic of CG of IFIs in the second phase (1980 to 1990). For instance, a 
study by Abomouamer (1989) set to examine the functions and roles of Shari’ah control in Islamic 
banks. Additional research five years later by Banaga, Ray, and Tomkins (1994) attempted to 
undertake external audit and CG in the Islamic banks (Banaga, Ray, & Tomkins, 1994; Choudury 
& Hoque, 2004). 
The two studies by Abomouamer (1989) and Banaga et al. (1994), however, were undertaken by 
individual scholars and limited the scope of their study to Shari’ah audit and control in the Islamic 
banks. In the light of the limited corporate studies on IFIs during the first two phases of the 
literature overview, there was increased research interest beginning in the mid-1990s to 2000s. 
The reason for increased research interest in the IFIs during this period was triggered by several 
failures of some Islamic banks such as the Islamic Bank of South Africa, Ihlas Finance House in 
Turkey, and Islamic Investment Companies of Egypt. As a result, a number of CG studies were 
undertaken by different institutions, organisations, and individuals in the third phase (post-
2000s). 
One of the major studies that were undertaken on CG in IFIs was research by Chapra and Ahmed 
(2002). The researchers focused on examining the issue of the functions and roles of the SSBs, 
accounting, auditing, and the overall framework of CG with a specific focus on IFIs. Subsequent 
studies further expanded on the topic where researcher like Al-Baluchi (2006) assessed issues of 
disclosure practices of IFIs, while Al-Sadah (2007) investigated CG of IFIs, the role of Islamic bank 
supervisors, the effects of IFIs on stakeholders, and its characteristics. At the height of the global 
financial meltdown in 2008, IFSB published a study on Shari’ah boards (SBs) of Institutions 
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Offering Islamic Financial Services in various jurisdictions (Ainley et al., 2007; IFSB, 2008). The 
study by IFSB (2008) was followed by the one by Faizullah (2009) who examined the 
standardization, transparency, and governance of the Islamic banks in line with CG. 
However, despite the studies above in the three phases, further analysis of the literature reveals 
that there are inadequate findings that have attempted to establish and deconstruct the 
theoretical foundations of CG with a specific focus on Islamic banking. Some attempts, however, 
had been made by Iqbal and Mirakhor (2004) and Choudhury and Hoque (2004) to create a 
theoretical framework of CG of Islamic banking. Choudhury and Hoque (2004) attempted to 
expand on the theory of CG based on the Tawhid epistemology on the Oneness of God (Al-Faruqi, 
1982). In contrast, Iqbal and Mirakhor (2004) recommended the use of stakeholder-based value 
system anchored on the principle of contractual obligation and property rights. The existing 
literature was also extended by Safieddine (2009) by examining variations of the agency theory 
in a complex and unique Islamic banking context. To date, the issue of CG continues to be an area 
of major concern for international standard-settings agencies, supervisors, regulators, 
shareholders, and other stakeholders in the IFIs, thereby the need for this study. 
Considering the overview above, it can be noted that CG is one of the essential components in 
the Islamic banking sector. The importance of CG is reflected by its role in developing and 
advancing the important principles of transparency, accountability, and fairness. Compared to 
the conventional banking system, the IFIs face a greater challenge and risk in ensuring strict 
adherence to the Shari’ah law governing financial transactions (Jabbar, 2009). Thus, there is a 
strong regulatory requirement where any Islamic corporation, especially the IFIs, must have in 
place appropriate strategies and sound governance systems that will work to promote the 
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adoption of effective and strong CG within the Islamic framework. In the light of these 
deliberations, the focus of this section is to provide a review of the key foundation of CG from 
the Islamic point of view, with special deliberations made on the IFIs framework (Cull et al., 2005). 
The section further seeks to construct basic insights about CG in Islam and to clarify important 
issues so as to distinguish its features and values from those of the western-based banking 
systems and financial institutions (Cull et al., 2005). The study argues that as applies to IFIs, Islam 
becomes the key distinctive aspect in the bank’s special characteristics and values in service and 
product delivery in its CG. As such, the primary aim of the IFIs CG is based on the need to uphold 
and maintain the central principles of social justice by working towards the interests of the 
shareholders and those of the stakeholders at large. 
3.2. The Framework of Islamic CG 
The concept of CG from the IFIs perspective appears not to show any divergence from other 
conventional definitions. The process denotes a system where organisations are controlled, 
directed, and managed, with the objective of meeting corporate goals and objectives where the 
interests of stakeholders are taken into consideration (Bhatti & Bhatti, 2010).  Within the Islamic 
paradigm, however, CG as some exceptional features and characteristics when compared to the 
Western theories and approaches like the Anglo-Saxon and European models (Becht & Barca, 
2001). The primary difference is that the IFIs are faith-based in their theoretical framework in 
terms of how decisions are made (Choudhury & Hoque, 2006). Hence, it is important to refine 




3.2.1. Defining ‘Corporation’ 
The concepts of partnerships, such as mudhārabah or mushārakah, have been widely known. 
However, there is limited discussion on the concept in relation to the corporation. Vogel and 
Hayes (2006) pointed out that classical Islamic law discussed partnerships in that time and not 
modern corporations with artificial personalities. The existing literature defines the Islamic 
corporation by assessing its characteristics (Vogel & Hayes, 2006). Choudhury and Hoque (2006) 
define it as a legal entity of shareholders with proportionate and principal owner of assets in line 
with individual group equities and profit-sharing capacity. Iqbal and Mirakhor (2004) noted that 
a corporation profit-oriented and market-driven legal entity within a responsible and social 
milieu. Vogel and Hayes (2006) also added that within the IFIs paradigm, a corporation includes 
an entity focused on maximizing profits without infringing the interest of stakeholders or 
violating property rights (Vogel & Hayes, 2006).  
Modern Muslim scholars such as Hasanuzzaman, Mustafa Zarqa, and Abdul Qadir have pointed 
out the concepts of limited liability and legal personality in defining a corporation. The scholars 
have accepted the concept of a juristic person (shahsiyyah itibāriyyah) which is based on the main 
principles of dhimma, masalih mursalah (public interest), Istihsan (equity), and qiyas (analogy) 
(IFSB & IRTI, 2007; Visser, 2009). Moreover, the AAIOIFI Shari’ah Council and the Islamic Fiqh 
Academy confirm the recognition and acceptability of the limited liability concept. According to 
the Islamic Fiqh Academy, there is no objection towards the Shari’ah setting and creating a 
company which has limited liability to its capital (IFA & IRTI, 2000; IFSB & IRTI, 2010). In contrast, 
AAOIFI Shari’ah Council has in its Shari’ah Standards No. 12 a stipulation which spells out the 
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acceptance of the limited liability practice based on incorporated laws and regulations (AAOIFI, 
2003; AAOIFI. 2008a). 
However, considering that this section elaborates on the CG framework concept, the limited 
discussion does not delve into the debates on corporation concepts in Islam. In Islam, it is 
indicated that a corpus or the concept of artificial personality with a distinct legal entity is widely 
accepted (Kraakman et al., 2004). In business organisations, the concept of the corporation is 
critical since it provides some clear key characteristics such as shared ownership by capital 
holders, absence of delectus personae in the shareholder group, the central management system 
based on a board structure, and a separate legal personality (Kraakman et al., 2004). However, 
the acceptability and recognition of the concept of Islamic corporation generate another concern 
which is related to its conceptual definition.  
To this point, the available literature appears to define Islamic corporation with a specific focus 
on its unique characteristics. Choudhury and Hoque (2006) defined Islamic corporation in the 
light of it being a legal entity composed of shareholders with proportionate and principal owner 
of assets in line with profit-sharing abilities and individual group equity. The similar definition has 
also been given by the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) based on similar ownership 
(SAMA, 2013). Beng and Ming-Hua (2009) further pointed out that additional commercial and 
social criteria of the Islamic corporation as a profit-oriented and market-driven legal entity within 
a responsible and social cooperative milieu. Iqbal and Mirakhor (2004) provided another 
definition and pointed out that an Islamic corporation can refer to a business entity which has a 
primary objective of maximising on its returns within the framework of property rights, and with 
careful planning to ensure that the rights of the stakeholders in the same business group are not 
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infringed. Thus, it can be argued that the concept of an Islamic corporation is characterised by 
three primary objectives: 
i). It is a legal entity that has limited liability, 
ii). It is a market-driven and profit-motivated entity and 
iii). It operates within the confines of Islamic social justice. 
Within the above frameworks, it becomes elaborate that Shari’ah principles and rules have 
largely played an important part in terms of determining and defining the scope of Islamic social 
justice as it applies to corporations. Importantly, its definition has been key in the banking and 
financial sectors in terms of providing a conceptual framework on financial transactions that are 
permissible, and those that are non-permissible, in the banking sector.  
3.2.2. Defining ‘Governance’ 
In Arabic, there is a lack of consensus on the standard translation for the term governance. 
According to Iqbal and Mirakhor (2004), CG is vaguely comprehended in the Arabic world. The 
term has been widely associated with hawkamah or wilaya. The word wilaya denotes an exercise 
of authority or representing people in a show of power to initiate actions (Mawil, 2004). The 
word Hawkamah denotes authority of legal personnel or an individual in initiating actions to steer 
operations, direct something or someone, or govern in addition to monitoring, directing, 
managing, and controlling an organisation.   
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3.2.3. Defining CG in IFIs 
CG is defined as a set of organisational arrangements which denotes how a corporation is 
controlled, governed, managed, and directed. The arrangement serves to give a structure of 
governance to protect stakeholder interests, ensure company goals are attained, and promote 
social responsibility, and the principles of Shari’ah. Under IFIs, CG obtains its definition from IFSB-
3, which includes institutions that offer Islamic financial services only (Cull et al., 2005). In this 
case, CG is defined as a set of relations between the management of a company, the 
shareholders, and the BOD (IFSB, 2009a). In addition, CG in IFIs includes a set of company 
arrangements, where the management of actions in IIFS are aligned to reflect shareholder 
interests. In addition, CG in IFIs facilitates the need to attain adequate operations of the BOD, 
and in the process ensuring IFIs uses resources in a compliant and efficient manner in line with 
Shari’ah rules (IFSB, 2006). 
In line with IFIs, CG has been defined based on the illustrations given in the IFSB-3, with a specific 
focus on the CG guiding principles for Islamic-based institutions (IFSB, 2009b). However, the 
concept often excludes the Islamic Insurance (Takafu), as well as Islamic mutual funds and related 
institutions (Visser, 2009). In their governance framework, IFSB-3 defines CG as a set of relations 
that exist between the management of a company, its shareholders, its BODs, and other 
stakeholders that provide the structures upon which the objectives of a corporation are created. 
Also, it refers to the structures upon which the focus of attaining the set objectives and 
performance monitoring is determined (IFSB, 2008a). Further, it explains the issues affecting CG 
in IFIs to include a set of company arrangements where actions of management of IIFS are 
coordinated (as far as possible) with the interests of its stakeholders (IFSB, 2008b). Besides, it 
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refers to efforts put in place to assure the provision of adequate incentives for governance organs 
such as management, Shari’ah board, and the BODs to pursue objectives that are in the 
stakeholder interest (IFSB, 2006). 
In line with IFSB-3, there is an elaborate and clear definition of the actual framework and meaning 
of the term CG as it applies to IFIs. In elaboration, it is clear to note that the definition given by 
IFSB-3 contains all elements that are important to the framework of CG which also takes into 
consideration the important features of Shari’ah requirements (IFSB, 2009b; Kechichian, 2013). 
In the first segment of the definition, there is a clear assessment of the general functions of the 
roles and responsibilities of CG as stipulated in the relationship that exists among the 
stakeholders (Kechichian, 2013). In the second segment of the definition, there is an 
incorporation of essential requirements in line with the Shari’ah principles and rules, a move that 
clarifies the actual conceptual framework which underlies the CG in the IFIs. When referring to 
how Shari’ah and its framework has been defined in the concept of business organisations such 
as the IFIs, it becomes clear that most of the Shari’ah issues are closely connected to the context 
of CG where they fall under the scope of fiqh al muāmalāt (Cadbury, 2002). 
3.3. Role of CG in IFIS 
Considering growing concerns about corporate failures and challenges in IFIs, like the case with 
the Bank Islam Malaysia and Dubai Islamic Bank, the need for efficient and good governance 
systems are considered essential in corporate success. The cases reveal that IFIs are not entirely 
immune from failures and crisis because of the various governance issues. In the IFIs, the 
objective of CG is like the general concept of CG in other types of corporations (Cadbury, 2002). 
An important elaboration of CG goal is about the need to promote accountability, transparency, 
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and fairness. In efforts to protect the interests and rights of every stakeholder (Macey & O’Hara, 
2003). However, the context of CG as applies to IFIs moves beyond the relationship between 
stakeholders, management, BOD, and shareholders because it also promotes the need to 
maintain a relationship with God (Cadbury, 2002). 
In the process, IFIs emphasise an additional framework for Shari’ah in efforts to promote and 
safeguard not just a relationship with God but also include the environment and other humans. 
One of their main functions is to create confidence among stakeholders by ensuring conducts by 
agents comply with Shari’ah principles. The second focus is that stakeholders need to be assured 
that IFIs is interested in improving and maintaining company growth and that they can prove 
their trustworthiness, stability, and efficiency (Macey & O’Hara, 2003). In the process, CG in IFIs 
functions to promote harmony in these two functions to attain Shari’ah requirements and work 
towards maximizing of company profits without violating stakeholder interests and rights (Iqbal 
&Mirakhor, 2007). 
Based on the above assumptions, it can be noted that in the purview of CG, good and 
transparency processes are central in efforts aimed at protecting the interests of every 
stakeholder in the Islamic financial sector (Ainley et al., 2007; Chapra, 2008). The current interest 
is one of the main reasons why there has been a growing focus in the research literature on 
financial institutions to assess how IFIs adhere to Shari’ah rule (Macey & O’Hara, 2003). 
Kechichian (2013) noted that in close examination of the CG concepts in IFIs (Chapra & Ahmed, 
2002), the framework could be said to move beyond the existing association between the 
management, the BODs, the shareholders, and the stakeholders, this is because it also creates a 
strong emphasis on the need to forge and maintain a close relationship with God (Macey 
90 
 
&O’Hara, 2003). Closely related to this approach, it can be noted that IFIs require alternative 
Shari’ah framework to maintain and safeguard, not just the close relationship with God, but also 
incorporate the same relationship with the environment and other human beings tied with these 
financial institutions (Chapra, 2008). 
The roles of CG can be categorised into two broad frameworks that are unique to IFIs. First, the 
initial interest entails the desire to re-assure stakeholders that their financial products and 
services fully comply with the Shari’ah principles. Second, there is a growing interest to assure 
the stakeholders that IFIs has clear cut objectives which are meant to be maintained and 
improved as the growth of a corporation is realised over time, with subsequent commitment 
anchored on ensuring trustworthiness, stability, and efficiency (Chapra & Ahmed, 2002). The role 
of CG, therefore, is to harmonise these two functions in efforts aimed at meeting the Shari’ah 
requirements and to justify the natural objective of organisations which is to maximise on profit 
returns without infringing on the interests and rights of the stakeholders. 
Moreover, CG in IFIs is essential because this means that the corporations must address several 
types of risks encountered in the environment, such as the risk of governance. In defining 
governance risk, Iqbal and Mirakhor (2007) pointed out that this is a risk which arises from failed 
efforts to govern the corporation, in addition to potential negligence in running the business, 
failure to meet the set contractual obligations, and weakened processes from the external and 
internal environment. Further, Iqbal and Mirakhor (2007) classified the risk of governance into 
reputation risk, Shari’ah risk, transparency risk, fiduciary risk, and operational risk. In addition to 
the emerging complexity and unique features of IFI related risks (different from the risks in the 
conventional financial sector), an efficient and sound CG system in the IFIs must be availed so as 
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to mitigate against potential risks that might emerge in the Islamic banking organisations 
(Cadbury, 2002). 
The unique IFIs characteristics that need to comply with Shari’ah laws in every activity of the 
banking operations demand the need to have in place precise governance processes and 
operations. Since they operate under the confines of the Islamic corporations, IFIs need to avoid 
any potential involvement with every kind of Shari’ah prohibition, including restrictions such as 
gambling, speculation, uncertainty, and interest (Chapra & Ahmed, 2002; Grais & Pellegrini, 
2006). At the same time, Islamic institutions need to avoid investing in unlawful practices and to 
adhere to all principles and ethic codes that govern Islamic morality and the Quran. In addition, 
the issue of CG in Islam in Islamic institutions is a necessity for proper and ethical operations that 
govern the operations of these financial institutions (Cull et al., 2005; Iqbal & Mirakhor, 2007). 
Embracing ethical practices is central to the central operations because it builds and promotes 
confidence among the stakeholders in addition to emphasizing positive enlightenment from the 
public concerning activities, operations, and products offered by the banks to ensure they are in 
with the Shari’ah principles and rules (Macey & O’Hara, 2003). 
3.3.1. The Development of CG in IFIS 
The development of CG in IFIs underwent two broad phases where the first phase occurred in 
the pre-20th century, while the second one occurred in the post-20th century. The second phase 
is further grouped into two stages with the first stage occurring in the pre-1970s and the second 
one occurring post-1970s. The pre-20th century was marked with the absence of CG in traditional 
IFIs (Cadbury, 2002). The term ‘bank’ was unknown to the early Muslim period with words like 
Bayt al-māl extensively in use. In the 8th and 9th century, financial players were called jahbadh 
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and sarrāf with their roles resembling modern banks. Through jahbadh and sarrāf, financial 
negotiations under mudhārabah and mushārakah were made possible in terms of facilitating 
trade and other instruments such as a letter of credit, promissory notes, and cashing cheques 
(Cull et al., 2005). While jahbadh mainly focused on the public sector while sarrāf focused on 
private and public sectors. At the time, however, CG was less an issue since they were not 
classified as a corporate legal entity.  
During the post-20th century, the first emergence of CG in modern IFIs started before the 1970s 
(Chapra & Ahmed, 2002). In the first stage before the 1970s, the rise in the use of ṣarrāf among 
Muslims declined due to rise in non-Muslim ṣarrāf families created by Greek, Armenian, and 
European ṣarrāf (Becht & Barca, 2001; Saeed, 2002). The colonization of Muslim regions also 
affected existing financial systems, and this resulted in replacement with western banking, which 
is an interest-based financial market. By 1950s, efforts to establish IFIs commenced in Pakistan 
with the establishment of local banks to provide financing to the poor. The process was further 
followed by the establishment of similar banks in Egypt, such as Nasser Social Bank in Egypt. In 
the second stage, between 1975 and 1990, there was a significant evolution in the Islamic 
financial sector. Several banks emerged such as Kuwait Finance House, Faisal Islamic Bank, and 
Dubai Islamic Bank, which triggered the need for CG systems. The issue was further emphasised 
with failures of IFIs in the 1990s and 2000s with the objective of creating effective Islamic 
Financial corporations (Ainley et al., 2007). In the process, IFSB and AAOIFI were created to 
address these concerns by providing CG in IFIs and practice guidelines. Today, AAOIFI has issued 
seven governance standards based on Corporate Social Responsibility, Governance Principles for 
IFIs, Independence of SB, Audit and Governance Committee for IFIs, Internal Shari’ah Review; the 
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Shari’ah Review, and Appointment, Composition and Report (AAOIFI, 2008b; Chapra & Ahmed, 
2002). Additional guidelines on supervisory and disclosure have also been detailed in the IFIs to 
improve CG, such as disclosures to promote governance (Cadbury, 2002). 
3.3.2. CG Framework in IFIS 
In the IFIs, some studies have attempted to construct an Islamic model different from the 
principles and models of CG in western countries (Chapra & Ahmed, 2002). Different from the 
western concepts that are based on secular humanism, Islamic CG is based on aspects of Tawhid 
and incorporated into Shari’ah principles and rules (Bhatti & Bhatti, 2010; Al-Faruqi, 1982). The 
goal of Tawhid is to promote consultation where every stakeholder shares a common goal of the 
oneness of Allah (Choudhury, 2006), while Shari’ah principles work to achieve stakeholder-based 
values. In the subsequent sections, the composition of the SSB is presented and discussed (Al-
Faruqi, 1982). 
3.3.3. Conceptual framework of Shari’ah governance systems 
The conceptual framework of SSB tasks is based on Shari’ah governance. However, the definition 
of Shari’ah governance system remained unclear and contentious until the issuance of the IFSB 
guiding principles on Shari’ah (IFSB, 10). In line with the IFSB-10 Shari’ah governance is defined 
as a set of organisational and institutional arrangements through which IFIs ensures availability 
of effective and independent oversight of Shari’ah compliance in efforts to offer suitable Shari’ah 
pronouncements, information dissemination, and internal review efforts (Chapra & Ahmed, 
2002). Thus, three main issues make up Shari’ah governance: 
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(i). Organisational and institutional arrangements— The Shari’ah board and other 
institutions like the internal audit and Shari’ah division. 
(ii). Efficient oversight of Shari’ah compliance— Having in place independent and efficient 
processes of promoting Shari’ah compliance.  
(iii). Shari’ah pronouncements— Disseminating information and internal review on 
Shari’ah compliance. 
Table 1 compares how Shari’ah governance compares with existing CG frameworks (Stanley, 
2008). The IFIs and regular financial institutions share common arrangements in terms of 
compliance, control, and governance. However, a different element between the two is that IFIs 
has institutional arrangements specific to Shari’ah -compliant governance. 
Table 1:Institutional Arrangement in the Shari’ah Governance System (IFSB, 2009). 
Functions Regular Financial Institutions IFIs Exclusive Institutions 
Governance BOD Shari’ah board 
Control External/Internal Auditor External/Internal Shari’ah 
review 
Compliance Financial and regulatory compliant 
officers 
Internal Shari’ah compliance 
unit 
In addition, IFIs require a different corporate arrangement which operates in the form of Shari’ah 
board which serves to meet the various religious requirements. Figure 2 presents the Shari’ah 
governance system, which adds more layer of governance typical of IFIs, where the Shari’ah 
board and internal or external review that ensure all aspects are regulated (Chapra & Ahmed, 
2002). The governance is based on the AAOIFI standards which place the Shari’ah board at par 
with the BODs in the corporate structure, implying that it is directly subjected to stakeholder 
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control (AAOIFI, 2005). In contrast, the IFSB-10 model places the Shari’ah board either as 
subordinate or parallel to the BODs (Stanley, 2008). Nevertheless, both the IFSB and AAOIFI agree 
that the Shari’ah board need to be independent of the BODs and always be accountable to both 
the stakeholders and the shareholders (Saeed, 2002). 
 
Figure 2: CG Structure in IFIs (Stanley, 2008). 
The scope of the Shari’ah governance also covers ex-post and ex-ante aspects of Shari’ah 
compliance. Ex-ante refers to the issuance of Shari’ah ruling and sharing of related information, 
while ex-post refers to annual and periodic review processes. Figure 3 elaborates on the scope of 
Shari’ah governance system both in the ex-post and ex-ante phases. Notably, the process 
illustrated shows only the generic aspect for the approval of Islamic financial services and its 
products, which may differ from one IFI to another (Chapra & Ahmed, 2002). Thus, Figure 3 
provides a general idea of the Shari’ah governance approach and its wholistic framework under 




Figure 3: The scope of the Shari’ah Governance Framework (Dar, 2009). 
3.4. The Shari’ah Supervisory Board 
The current section discusses on SSB elaborating on the conceptual framework upon which they 
are based. The section also elaborates more on the main purpose of the SSBs and sheds 
additional light on their governance systems when compared to the conventional governance 
systems. Further, the chapter explores how the SSBs have been integrated into financial and the 
banking institutions especially when focusing on the IFIs. Subsequently, the section also presents 
insights on the role and models of the SSBs, in addition to their internal-external characteristics. 
The philosophical framework which informs CG in Islam demands additional insights of 
governance in efforts to attain Shari’ah compliance. Taking this aspect into consideration, CG in 
IFIs requires effective institutional arrangements to promote Shari’ah -compliant efforts in the 
financial sector (Cadbury, 2002). In this section, the conceptual framework upon which Shari’ah 




3.4.1. Objectives of the Shari’ah governance system 
The objectives of Shari’ah governance model exist because of ensuring compliance based on 
religious values. The objective entails different procedures and processes which incur 
involvement and cost of diverse organs in IFIS (Chapra & Ahmed, 2002). Islamic financial 
instruments need to be genuinely legitimate and comply with Shari’ah principles. In the process, 
IFIs demand having specialized bodies with experts in Shari’ah, specifically usul al-fiqh and fiqh al 
muāmalāt to help banks determine the legitimacy of some Islamic financial products (Ainley et 
al., 2007). There are various issues involved in the process, including transparency, 
accountability, reporting structure, and independence of the Shari’ah board (Wilson, 2009a, 
2009b). Such considerations are key towards attaining the recommended Shari’ah governance 
system and hence its credibility and transparency. 
Shari’ah governance system also works to promote justice and moderation in all financial 
transactions. In return, there is more public confidence in IFIs in terms of compliance with 
Shari’ah principles. Thus, the Shari’ah governance system not only focuses on meeting 
shareholder need but also promote trust and confidence of the community and the public, who 
depend on the financial services from these institutions (Cull et al., 2005). Lack of proper 
governance or control may erode public confidence in the legality and legitimacy of the offered 
services (Chapra & Ahmed, 2002). A Shari’ah governance system which promotes ex-post and ex-
ante compliance models would contribute to improved credibility of IFIs (Choudury & Hoque, 
2004). The governance process addresses important risks, such as fatwa rejection and other 
forms of regulatory and operational regulations. 
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3.4.2. Institutionalization of the Shari’ah board 
Shari’ah governance has been noted to be a relatively new discourse on fiqh al muāmalāt. 
However, the concept of market enforcement and regulation via the institutionalization process 
had already been practised since the pre-modern Islamic societies and is widely known as hisbah. 
The institutionalization of hisbah was initiated to supervise public morals, where the markets 
were monitored and regulated by the muhtasib (executor) (Abdur, 1984). There are some 
similarities between Shari’ah governance and hisbah institution, specifically when examining 
their functions and objectives. Today, the institutionalization of the Shari’ah board can be 
considered a new muhtasib concept in modern Muslim communities. Uptake of this modified 
hisbah concept is fundamental in ensuring all operations, transactions, and activities of IFIs attain 
the principles of Islamic morals and Shari’ah principles. 
Underwriting the above considerations, the Shari’ah board, especially at the regulatory level, is 
a suitable institution in a position to promote muhtasib functions as hisbah institution within the 
IFIs context. Similar to the hisbah institution in pre-modern Muslim times directing between right 
and forbidding wrong, strong growth and spread of the Islamic banking sector need specific 
organisational frameworks to provide code of conduct, guidelines, and suitable behaviour for IFIs 
(Choudury & Hoque, 2004). Thus, there is a need to emphasise on the Shari’ah board institution 
and its governance system in IFIs. Shari’ah board commenced around 1976 when Sheikh Saleh 
Kamel founded the Dallah Al Baraka Group (AbdulRahman, 2010). The Shari’ah board was 
instituted in Egypt by the Faisal Islamic Bank, and its mandate was to advise the banks on Shari’ah 
matters. In 1978, the practice then spread to Jordan Islamic Bank and Faisal Islamic Bank of 
Sudan, later followed by Islamic banks in Kuwait, Malaysia, and Dubai. The practice grew and 
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became modern, although some issues remain in the Shari’ah governance process. Some of these 
issues include the remit of SSBs, Shari’ah -based products and Shari’ah compliance, disclosure, 
transparency, confidentiality, conflict of interest, competence, and the board’s independence. 
Considering the diversity of Shari’ah governance approach in IFIs, there is a need to implement a 
high standard of Shari’ah governance to empower the institution of Shari’ah board to deliver on 
its mandate in a more effective manner (Choudury & Hoque, 2004). 
3.4.3. Role of the Shari’ah Board 
The role which the SB plays varies depending on the degree, extent, and nature of Shari’ah 
compliance amongst different boards. Based on its stakeholder value and foundational 
dimension, SB has fiduciary duties to all stakeholders of IFIs. Furthermore, the status of Shari’ah 
compliance largely influences the integrity of IFIs and subsequently defines behaviour towards 
Shari’ah norms, professional competence, and the impact of products (Ayub, 2007). Thus, the 
Shari’ah board plays an important role in enhancing and promoting the credibility of IFIs in 
addition to the authority of fatwa through collective ijtihad (Choudury & Hoque, 2004). Also, 
the Shari’ah board plays another role as a control where it monitors the operations and 
activities of IFIs to ensure Shari’ah compliance and ensure zakah obligations. 
Dawud (1996) shared that the Shari’ah board has an important role in guiding IFIs in setting 
regulations and policies that are in line with Shari’ah. Besides, SSBs approve their financial 
transactions from the legal point of view and facilitates their contract formulation in line with 
Islamic law. Abu Mouamer (1989) shared that SSBs have a proactive role as opposed to a reactive 
role where in line with its fiduciary obligations, it works to force IFIs management to disclose 
revenue from unlawful dealings to charities and undertake audits on zakah funds. Adballah 
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(1994) also noted that the Shari’ah board must be proactive and not reactive. Also, the Shari’ah 
board sets the formula for allocating profits between account holders and shareholders in a fair 
manner, in addition to ensuring that revenues are from lawful transactions. The Shari’ah board 
also ensures that IFIs undertake their social responsibilities in the society or community and 
towards other stakeholders (Adballah, 1994). Banaga et al. (1994) summarize the role of SB into 
five main areas of calculating and distributing zakah, ex-post audit, ex-ante audit, advising on 
income distribution and expenses, and disposing of non-Shari’ah compliant income to charity. 
3.4.4. Models of Shari’ah Boards 
There are three main types of SSBs, which include: 
 Shari’ah board consisting of scholars— Consists of judicial advisors mandated to deal with 
Shari’ah issues. 
 In-house Shari’ah department— Include Shari’ah experts who give professional services 
related to Shari’ah matters. 
 Common individuals—Consists of members other than Shari’ah scholars like the case with 
BNM and SBP (SBP, 2008; BNM, 2008). 
In addition, the Shari’ah board may include external and internal boards. In the internal board, 
there is an in house of IFIs, while in the external boards, the members include national and 
international participants (Choudury & Hoque, 2004). In some cases, there are agencies that set 
standards, although they do not issue a fatwa. Instead, they play a part in developing Shari’ah 




3.4.4.1. Internal Shari’ah Boards 
The internal SSBs include two models: individual IFI level and whole group level. First, the SSBs at 
individual IFI level is the most common practice for IFIs. The model requires the establishment of 
a Shari’ah board in line with the articles of association. However, the internal Shari’ah structure 
may vary from one board to the next, where the focus is to determine the nature of governance. 
In the process, the individual IFI model enables the board to establish its Shari’ah board. Second, 
for the whole group, the central Shari’ah board focuses on a group of companies. The model is 
used by the Dallah al-Baraka Group, but it has been noted to be inefficient in most jurisdictions. 
Part of the concern is that the model is unable to handle several Shari’ah issues from diverse 
jurisdictions at a single specific time. 
3.4.4.2. External Shari’ah Boards 
External SSBs are grouped into individuals engaged in Shari’ah advisory boards, Shari’ah advisory 
firms, international level SSBs, and national level SSBs. First, there are few national SSBs created 
by the government. Some of these boards are created by securities commission or central bank 
as evident in Sudan, Pakistan, Brunei, Indonesia, and Malaysia. National SSBs have a common 
function as the highest fatwa authority for IFIs, and they focus on standardizing and harmonising 
Shari’ah practices. Their decisions are binding and final (Beng & Ming-Hua, 2009). Second, the 
international level SSBs include boards formed via the cooperation of several Islamic countries 
such as the IDB and AAOIFI. The AAOIFI plays different roles compared to national and 
international SSBs in that it creates and promotes uniform Shari’ah governance practices at the 
international level (AAOIFI, 2008). Third, Shari’ah advisory firms offer Shari’ah services either at 
consultative or supervisory capacity. Some of these firms include the Institute of Islamic Banking 
102 
 
and Insurance (IIBI), Yasaar Limited (YL), Failaka International (FI), and the Minhaj Shari’ah 
Financial Advisory (MSFA). These entities are business groups and not part of IFIs since they 
provide supervisory and consultative services for different aspects of Islamic finance and banking 
in line with Shari’ah laws. Finally, individuals who take part in Shari’ah advisory roles rarely play 
a direct role in IFIs. When there is no internal SSBs (Beng & Ming-Hua, 2009), IFIs may seek 
services from individual Shari’ah experts instead of hiring Shari’ah advisory firms. The practice is 
common in small-scale first, in the case of Islamic windows, and in non-Muslim IFIs countries 
(Choudury & Hoque, 2004). 
3.5. International Standard-Setting Agencies 
The governance and risk management in financial and banking institutions has been achieved 
through guidelines provided by several agencies such as BCBS, the International Organisation of 
Securities Commission (IOSCO), and OECD. The OECD gives guidelines on CG, while IOSCO details 
out capital market governance, and BCBS I and II (BCBS, 1999). However, these standard 
guidelines have been noted to have shortcomings in addressing specific issues related to Islamic 
finance (Beng & Ming-Hua, 2009). Since the nature and model of Islamic finance is different from 
the existing international model, there is a need to have standard-setting agencies that align with 
the Shari’ah law (Ainley et al., 2007). In the process, the initiative by several IFIs, IFSB, AAOIFI, 
and several regulatory authorities established Islamic focused international standard settings 
agencies which are discussed in the next subsections. 
3.5.1. The AAOIFI Governance Standards 
Over the years, AAOIFI has offered up to 81 guidelines and standards which include 2 codes of 
ethics, 42 Shari’ah standards, 7 governance standards, 6 auditing standards, and 25 accounting 
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standards (IFSB, 2010). The Governance Standard for IFIs No. 1 includes specifications on the SSB, 
including its composition, appointment, and report. The standard has 8 parts, which include an 
effective date, publication of Shari’ah guidelines and rulings, report publication, report on basic 
elements, dismissal and selection, composition, appointment, definition, and introduction. The 
standard of governance was developed and adopted by the AASB in 1997, according to AAOIFI 
(2005).  
The most fundamental insights about this standard are presented in Section 2, which contains 
three essential elements which have an elaborate and detailed definition of the term Shari’ah 
board. The first provision elaborates in detail that the Shari’ah board exercises a high degree of 
independence, which is largely composed of professional jurists that are anchored on Islamic 
jurisprudence. Through this first provision, the banking and financial sector can find important 
guidelines on how to appoint the members of the Shari’ah board who lack the needed speciality 
in fiqh al-muāmalāt, although they are experts in Islamic finance (Cull et al., 2005).  
The second provision further details and gives specific information on the role which SSBs need 
to play in the corporate sector. Specifically, the role of the Shari’ah board is anchored on 
promoting corporate compliance in line with the Shari’ah rules where the members of the board 
have the capacity to supervise, review, and direct all IFIs activities. Finally, the third role of the 
board is to serve as a binding authority between the IFIs and the boards in efforts to ensure the 
banks serve the interests of their Islamic customers. 
As applies to this study, the important section as applies to this study is section 3 which details 
about Shari’ah review and points out that it entails an assessment of the capacity of this review 
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in ensuring IFIs are compliant with the Islamic principles of finance (AAOIFI, 2005a). Although 
section 3 emphasises the authority which the Shari’ah board must obtain every important 
information required for efficient Shari’ah review, section 5 states that the management has the 
responsibility of ensuring reviews are done in a manner that is Shari’ah -compliant (AAOIFI, 
2005a). However, the AAOIFI is limited in its mandate and scope because the Shari’ah board has 
a limited responsibility in terms of expressing and forming important opinions about the extent 
the IFIs have gone to ensure that they have become, or are reflecting, the required levels of 
Shari’ah compliance (AAOIFI, 2005a).  
The third standard for IFIs specifies the operations and guides the process of internal review 
(AAOIFI, 2005b). Since the management of a company has a duty and responsibility of ensuring 
necessary Shari’ah compliance, it is important upon the top managers to institute suitable 
processes that would promote the review process in line with the Shari’ah policies (AAOIFI, 
2005b). Even if IFIs are mandated by AAOIFI to undertake Shari’ah review of their internal 
operations, the specific requirements which companies fail to promote the establishment of 
separate internal audit department which supports Shari’ah reviews are largely lacking. The 
review process inside the company, however, can be undertaken by either party of the internal 
audit department or by an independent division (AAOIFI, 2005b). 
Further, the guidelines which have been given by the internal Shari’ah review by the AAOIFI 
places more emphasis on the need for these reviews to be fulfilled both independently and in a 
manner that is in line with the IFIs auditors and the accountants’ code of ethics. The BOD and the 
management have a task to give continuous and comprehensive support to the internal 
reviewers in close observation of the Shari’ah standards (AAOIFI, 2005b). Specifically, the head 
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of internal Shari’ah review processes is directly accountable to the board of the specific 
corporation under assessment. Considering the fact that the internal Shari’ah review process is 
a unique aspect to the traditional processes used in company auditing, there is a need to ensure 
that the reviewer who oversees the internal reviews need to have highest levels of proficiency, 
in addition, to have the necessary training and suitable academic background essential to achieve 
the needed Shari’ah review standards (AAOIFI, 2005b). Specific qualifications required for this 
process need to reflect proficiency in fiqh al muāmalāt and Shari’ah laws. In addition, the 
structure of reporting specifies that the person overseeing the internal reviewing process need 
to deliberate on the obtained results with the management (AAOIFI, 2005b). Once all the 
discussions have been held between the internal reviewer and the management, the final report 
must be presented to the board, and a copy of it left to the management and the Shari’ah board. 
In the event of any disputes between the internal Shari’ah reviewers and the management, the 
teams should present their grievances to the Shari’ah board for further assessment and verdict 
(AAOIFI, 2005b). 
Governance Standard for IFIs No. 4 elaborates more on standards which regulate the governance 
and audit committee. The standard advocates the need to create a CG framework for IFIs based 
on audit and governance aligning with Shari’ah law. The standard was adopted in 2001 by the 
AASB (AAOIFI, 2005c). According to AAOIFI, companies need to create an Audit and Governance 
Committee (AGC) in their boards, a move which AAOIFI perceives to be important if corporations 
are to complement their CG frameworks (AAOIFI, 2005c). The composition of the AGC is proposed 
to comprise of at least three important members as previously noted, which include the 
members that have been appointed by the BOD from both the independent members of the 
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board to the executive members of the board (AAOIFI, 2005c). In their qualifications, these 
members need to have the relevant knowledge concerning the applicable laws and regulations 
in addition to the institutional affairs, all which must be anchored on the Shari’ah principles and 
rules (AAOIFI, 2005c). 
Considering that the AGC largely influences and oversees the activities of both the BOD and the 
Shari’ah board, it has precise functions of conserving the legality of the financial processes and 
reports, ensuring the stakeholder interests are taken care of, giving any additional insurance on 
the information authenticity, and serving as an independent connection between the 
stakeholders and the management (AAOIFI, 2005c). Thus, it remains clear based on the AGC to 
conduct internal control reviews, audit plans, accounting processes, complying with Shari’ah 
rules, financial reports, annual and interim accounting, and applying restricted accounting 
investments in line with the IFIs auditors and the codes of ethics for accountants as pronounced 
by AAOIFI (AAOIFI, 2005c). In addition, the final AGC report needs to be submitted to the board 
and a copy of the same be addressed to the CEO of the company (AAOIFI, 2005c). 
Governance Standard for IFIs No. 5 defines the independence of the SSBs and mechanisms aimed 
at resolving potential issues emerging from the board’s independence. The standard was 
adopted in 2005 by the AASB (AAOIFI, 2005d). The standard is composed of 9 sections, which 
also has an appendix that details potential issues that might contribute to compromise and result 
in impaired board independence. For the company to win over public support and trust in their 
products and services, there is a high need to promote and exercise the independence of the 
Shari’ah board (AAOIFI, 2005d). In section 3, the Shari’ah board is restricted from subordinating 
its judgement received from the Shari’ah supervision committee to third party members. The 
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standard cautions against using IFIs employees in the Shari’ah board and the same applies to 
exclude the employees from operational decisions and managerial responsibilities. Importantly, 
the Shari’ah board is largely expected to undertake a regular and continuous evaluation of the 
IFIs, and engage in everything within its capacity to address any potential issues that might 
contribute to compromising with the board’s independence. 
3.5.2. The IFSB Guiding Principles 
IFSB is another standard-setting body with the focus of supporting Islamic finance in terms of 
promoting uniformity, standard, and databases of practice, research, training, guidelines, and 
regulations. The IFSB does not have a Shari’ah board since it plays a diverse role to external and 
internal SSBs. Also, IFSB does not issue fatwa or rulings concerning the Islamic finance and 
banking (IFSB, 2008). A major role that IFSB plays include creating different standards and 
offering recommendations for their regulatory guidelines, supervision, adoption, encourage 
cooperation among parties, establish a database for members in the Islamic industry, 
undertaking research, and facilitating development and training (IFSB, 2008). To date, IFSB has 
issued 10 guiding principles for IFIs: 2 of the principles are on capital adequacy needs, 1 on risk 
management, and 7 on supervisory and disclosure review process, and governance. 
However, the need to have in place Shari’ah governance mechanisms has not been 
comprehensive in terms of thorough assessment under IFSB-1 and IFSB-5, where both focus on 
establishing suitable institutional and policies arrangements in managing operational risks. As a 
result, this raises some risks which include Shari’ah risks in addition to specifying mechanisms of 
supervisory review processes (Nathan & Ribiere, 2007). Moreover, the IFSB-3, 6, and 8 are 
formulated to specify standards for IFIs, Islamic collective investments, and Takaful, respectively. 
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The earlier guidelines, however, address the general frameworks of CG but fail to specify its 
relevance when focusing on exclusive matters on Shari’ah (IFSB, 2008). Considering this 
shortcoming, the IFSB initiated IFSB-10, which focuses on addressing the issues related to 
Shari’ah governance models in IFIs. Table 2 presents the basic elements in the IFSB-10 in efforts 
to promote the best practice based on competency, independence, confidentiality, and 
consistency of the IFIs. 
Table 2: Key Elements of Shari’ah Governance in the IFSB-10 (IFSB, 2009). 
 
Although the governance framework upon which Shari’ah is based and the IFSB-10 often appear 
to take care of most aspects dealing with the Shari’ah compliance principles, researchers express 
that the process of covering the compliance level has not substantially been by merely invoking 
some components required to realise an optimal Shari’ah system of governance (Nathan & 
Ribiere, 2007). To this level, the regulatory authorities have a duty of determining how IFSB-10 is 
adopted, and this guidance framework on Shari’ah governance approach has been strongly 
recommended. However, the literature reveals that there may be some possible inconsistencies 
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between the AAOIFI governance standards and the IFSB-10 guiding principles and that this level 
of divergence needs to be addressed. For example, considering the possibility that some 
jurisdictions like Qatar, the UAE, and Bahrain have in their framework implemented the AAOIFI 
standards, other jurisdictions have largely remained reluctant and the IFSB-10, therefore, 
appears to be less relevant to such countries. Moreover, it appears that the IFSB-10 does not 
provide enough framework relevant in terms of the various financial sectors seeking to practice 
Shari’ah principles. Since the trend of the Shari’ah advisory firms is expected to increase in future, 
it becomes a matter of importance to formulate and institute in place guidelines and principles 
which define and elaborate on such practices. 
3.5.3. Comparative Analysis between IFSB and AAOIFI in Shari’ah Governance Guidelines 
While IFSB extensively provides a critical and essential definition of Shari’ah governance, the 
AAOIFI fails to provide a similar definition of what constitutes effective Shari’ah governance, 
especially with IFIs (IFSB, 2009). Considering the qualitative importance of Shari’ah board 
characteristics, there is a need to ensure that the two guidelines emphasize and discuss on the 
confidentiality, accountability, responsibility, competence, and independence of the SSBs 
(Mediawati, 2016). However, AAOIFI guidelines fail to take these issues into consideration. 
Furthermore, the importance of audit functions and Shari’ah review have been pointed out and 
outlined in the IFSB guidelines, but the AAOIFI framework discusses them in more detail (Hasan, 
2010). Another important aspect is that both IFSB and AAOIFI fail to mention or explore the issues 
of Shari’ah research functions and approaches they can use to reduce poor decisions which can 
result to lending risks within IFIs (Mediawati, 2016). Table 3 summarizes the differences evident 
between IFSB and AAOIFI guidelines. 
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Table 3: Comparative analysis among Shari’ah governance guidelines by AAOIFI and IFSB 
Topic of Discussion IFSB AAOIFI 
Mitigating poor decisions and 
lending risks 
Not outlined in its guidelines Not outlined in its guidelines 
Research functions of SSBs and 
BODS 
Not outlined in its guidelines Not outlined in its guidelines 
Definition of Shari’ah 
governance 
Provided in its guidelines Not provided in its outlines 
Responsibility, competence, and 
independence of SSBs 
Discussed in its guidelines Discussed in its guidelines 
Shari’ah audit and Shari’ah 
review 
Discussed in its guidelines Discussed in its guidelines 
 
3.5.4. The SSB Governance Process 
The Shari’ah governance process focuses on issues that are instrumental in promoting the 
operations of the board. The current section discusses issues related to appointment, 
composition, and qualification of the Shari’ah members.  
3.5.4.1. Appointment  
In modern practice, the appointment of the Shari’ah members is made by shareholders during 
annual general meetings. The appointment can also be made by BOD. In the IAIB document, the 
independence and freedom of the board can be ensured when the personnel in the bank are not 
exposed to the authority of the BOD. Also, the AAOIFI notes that shareholders have the power 
to appoint members of the Shari’ah board during the AGM, but the BOD lacks the same authority. 
Such an approach ensures the independence of the Shari’ah board is realised (Bakar, 2002). That 
is, the BOD does not have the power to dismiss or appoint members. Instead, the power is vested 
in the shareholders. The Shari’ah board can take part in the BOD meetings to examine the 




3.5.4.2. Composition  
Today, the Shari’ah board consists of Shari’ah scholars who are mainly experts in usul al-fiqh and 
fiqh al muāmalāt. At the international institutions and national levels, the Shari’ah board is 
consisted of leading regional and internationalist scholars. In contrast, SSBs of individuals have 
local and regional scholars with some having international experience serving in SSBs. Most IFIs 
are mandated to appoint 3 to 6 members on their Shari’ah board. In addition, AAOIFI Shari’ah 
consists of not more than 20 members elected by a Board of Trustees in a 4-year term among 
the Shari’ah scholars. In its requirements, AAOIFI governance directs that at least 3 members at 
IFI level are included as commonly practised in Malaysia, the UAE, Lebanon, Jordan, Dubai, and 
Bahrain (Ayub, 2007). 
3.5.4.3. Qualification  
Emphasis on the qualification of the members of the Shari’ah board is based on the need to have 
expertise on Shari’ah and law, especially in areas of usul al-fiqh and fiqh al muāmalāt. The focus 
is informed by the mandate of the Shari’ah board, which largely deals with matters related to 
financial and commercial transactions (Bakar, 2002). Both the IFSB-10 and AAOIFI governance 
models allow the appointment of experts in usul al-fiqh and fiqh al muāmalāt. The focus is to 
strengthen the Shari’ah board to understand and assess banking businesses and their operations, 
like operations by BNM and SBP. In both cases, the SSBs of the BNM and SBP are composed of 
experts from diverse fields, which include central bankers, judges, lawyers, chartered 
accountants, and Shari’ah scholars (SBP, 2007). In addition, SBP also has in place strict conditions 
on the qualifications of Shari’ah board members which include a minimum of 2nd class Bachelor 
Degree in Economics or in Takhassus Fil Fiqh (SBP, 2007; Peters, 2003). The board members also 
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need to have good knowledge of English and Arabic languages to enable the board to adhere to 
higher standards of practice as applies to Shari’ah governance in IFIs (Choudhury & Malik, 1992; 
Choudury & Hoque, 2004). 
3.5.5. The Shari’ah Compliance Process 
The current section discusses the Shari’ah compliance process, including existing standard 
guidelines for Shari’ah governance in terms of post ante and ex-ante auditing, product 
approval, and management. Some of the important concerns which emerge when considering 
the Shari’ah compliance process include Shari’ah coordination, compliance review, and Shari’ah 
report. 
3.5.5.3. Shari’ah Coordination 
An effective Shari’ah governance system is anchored on Shari’ah coordination, and this is 
essential in the same manner the company secretary is to the BOD. As such, the Shari’ah plays a 
role as a secretary or liaison officer who coordinates the entire Shari’ah governance process to 
include interaction with the various organs of governance such as external and internal review, 
and the Shari’ah board (Dar, 2009). A number of Shari’ah coordination models exist which can be 
classified into: 
 An internal Shari’ah liaison office, 
 External Shari’ah coordination as an advisory firm, 
 External Shari’ah coordination, 
 Shari’ah coordination department, 
 Shari’ah compliance officer, internal Shari’ah coordinator, 
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 Shari’ah coordinator, who is a secretary to the SB (Dar, 2009).  
The common practice, however, is to have a Shari’ah coordinator who is often a Shari’ah 
compliance officer or the secretary of the SB. In most IFIs, the Shari’ah compliance officer not 
only plays a coordinating role but also handles the Shari’ah review process. 
3.5.5.2. Shari’ah Compliance Review   
Different from conventional banks, IFIs are mandated to undertake the Shari’ah review process 
for ensuring that every transaction conforms with Shari’ah principles. The SB examines the 
capacity of Shari’ah compliance their products, business transactions, and other activities, and 
undertakes compliance review using an independent internal Shari’ah auditor (Choudhury & 
Malik, 1992; Choudury & Hoque, 2004). The process takes place as part of the internal audit-
based process in line with Shari’ah rulings and instructions from the board (Banaga et al., 1994). 
The SB is normally assisted by the internal audit unit, which helps in assessing the compliance 
standards in IFIs. The primary objective of the Shari’ah review is to promote compliance with 
Shari’ah principles and rules to align with rulings and instructions by the SB. In addition, AAOIFI 
governance standards stipulate several procedures for Shari’ah reviews, including reviewing 
working papers, executing review procedures, and planning review procedures (AAOIFI, 2005a). 
However, there is no standard format for the Shari’ah compliance report or Shari’ah review 
procedure. The Shari’ah review process takes into consideration issues of a product review, 
product implementation, product testing, product documentation, product design, and product 
conception (IFSB, 2008).  
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3.5.5.3. Shari’ah Report 
Shari’ah governance works towards promoting true and fair disclosure and transparency of 
financial transactions of the IFIs. Thus, the fundamental concept of governance in IFIs is to 
provide accurate insights and true disclosure in a manner that meets Shari’ah accountability. As 
applies to the SB, the process denotes the ability to generate Shari’ah reports either periodically 
or annually (Banaga et al., 1994). In most cases, expectations are put in a manner that the SB as 
to generate reports detailing IFIs services and duties, as well as financial activities. Generally, the 
Shari’ah report is submitted to the BOD (Choudhury & Malik, 1992; Choudury & Hoque, 2004). In 
the annual report, the information contained in the Shari’ah report includes services and duties 
of the IFI, declaration of Shari’ah compliance, SB’s activities, and fatwa issuance (Banaga et al., 
1994). According to Haniffa and Hudaib (2007), the Shari’ah report needs to contain additional 
information such as a number of meetings held, remuneration and pictures of the SB, names, 
and disclosure on the defects in offered products. Also, the Shari’ah report needs to include the 
signature of all board members, declaration of Shari’ah compliance, assessment of the 
documents, and actions taken by the management. Besides, the Shari’ah report needs to reflect 
the specific format proposed by the AAOIFI governance standards (Banaga et al., 1994). 
3.5.6. Critique of SSBs 
The literature has largely questioned the effectiveness of SSBs from multiple points of views. The 
focus of this section is to discuss some of the concerns which have arisen as applies to the 
effectiveness of SSBs is discharging their mandates within IFIs. Some of the main critiques of SSBs 
emerge from issues such as SSB independence, competency, and conflict of interest, disclosure, 
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and transparency, Shari’ah -compliant versus Shari’ah -based consistency, and remit of different 
institutions. 
3.5.6.1. SSB Independence 
As previously noted, the literature has widely debated issues of SSB. A primary concern regards 
the remunerations which the SSB receive from the IFIs, and this appears to be a concern in terms 
of potential conflict of interest. That is, the SSB members may be tempted to legitimize dubious 
and unlawful operations to ensure that they retain their jobs within the board and continue 
receiving their remunerations (Rammal, 2006). Having this in mind, it is elaborate to assess and 
improve the process used in appointing the members of the Shari’ah board. Some researchers 
advocate that the independence of the SSB can be achieved by promoting shareholder-based 
appointments (Choudhury & Malik, 1992; Choudury & Hoque, 2004). However, some scholars 
note that shareholder selected board can still be influenced by the BOD and may end up not 
being fully independent. To address these concerns, Grais and Pellegrini (2006) proposed that 
the independence of the SB can be achieved through three ways: 
 Defining the powers and responsibilities of the SB in all the articles of association, 
 Granting the board enough powers such as audit responsibilities, organisational status, 
and 
 Providing enough authority to the SSB, like the one enjoyed by independent directors of 
the audit committees. 
3.5.6.2. Competence, Conflict of Interest and Confidentiality 
The competency levels of the SSB need to align with the requirements of Islamic banking 
practices. Training and other qualifications in commercial law and Shari’ah law need to be taken 
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into consideration in addition to years of expertise in Shari’ah, economics, and law (Bakar, 2002). 
However, studies conducted on 41 SSBs noted that only 9 people had training in Islamic law 
whole 60% did not study religious subjects (Abomouamer, 1989). The results reveal that when it 
comes to competency, there are issues which emerge due to diverse qualifications and criteria 
in selecting members of the SSB. Therefore, it becomes evident that the members of the board 
and their selection process is not well coordinated; neither does it reflect any specific curricula 
for their selection (McMillen, 2003). In the process, this can affect the effectiveness of the SB and 
its functions, especially resulting in confidentiality issues related to their capacity to issue 
concrete and solid Shari’ah rulings since they may lack necessary training and knowledge and 
expertise in Shari’ah. Thus, suitable qualifications are essential in determining the level of 
competency in the SB, which also ensures that the members are aware of avoiding any conflict 
of interest.  
3.5.6.3. Disclosure and Transparency  
Another fundamental element of effective SSB is transparency and disclosure. In most IFIs, 
transparency is the foundation of all operations and compliance with the Quran and Shari’ah, 
which forbid evidence concealing. The operations are also in line with the IFSB standards which 
require IFIs to ensure their non-financial and financial reports attain specified demands of the 
internationally recognized accounting codes and the need to comply with all Shari’ah laws and 
principles (IFSB, 2006). Based on the various Shari’ah governance practices, it remains clear that 
the information needed is minimal now, even information of Shari’ah resolutions is hard to access 




3.5.6.4. SSSB-Compliant versus SSB-Consistency   
Over the years, there have been criticisms over the existing practices in Islamic finance on SSB-
compliant and SSB consistency. Researchers point out that there are no variations between a 
product being compliant and consistent. If the product is deemed to be SSB-compliant such as 
being interest-free, eliminates uncertainty, gambling, and align with the stipulations in the 
contracts (Aqd), then the product can be said to be SSB-compliant or SSB-based tolerant (ISRA, 
2009). In contrast, Dar (2009) pointed out that the SSB-based approach entails a combination of 
two processes which are focused on fulfilling social responsibilities and Shari’ah principles. 
Further, Dar (2009) characterized Islamic financial products as Shari’ah -compliant or Shari’ah -
tolerant based on their level of compliance with Shari’ah laws. Often, the SSB-based approaches 
require IFIs to only focus on the compliance aspect of the Shari’ah law in addition to fulfilling the 
social responsibilities.  
3.7. The Saudi Islamic Banking Legal Structure 
3.7.1. Introduction 
The current section seeks to explain different issues that relate the Saudi Islamic banking focusing 
on the Saudi Kingdom, primary sources of Shari’ah and their secondary sources, in addition to 
the basic laws. The application of the basic laws to the banking and financial sector are detailed, 
in addition to authorities with the mandate to regulate and supervise the Islamic banking sector 
in Saudi Arabia. 
3.7.2. Overview of Saudi Arabia 
Saudi Arabia has long been regarded as the birthplace of Islam, and it hosts two holiest shrines 
in Mecca and Medina. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was established by King Abdulaziz in 1932, 
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and it lies south-west of Asia. The total land area is about 2.25 million km2, with a population of 
about 27 million and 8.4 million foreigners. The country has thirteen provinces (mintaqah) where 
each of the provinces is governed by a member of the royal family. Islam is the official religion, 
and the country’s capital is Riyadh with its rulership based on the monarchy. The official title of 
the King is the custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, and he fills the two roles as a head of state 
and prime minister. The Saudi constitution is anchored and founded on the Shari’ah with ideas 
derived from the Quran and the Sunnah. As discussed in the subsequent sections, the Quran and 
the Sunnah are the primary sources of Shari’ah, while the secondary sources include Islamic 
scholarly consensus and analogical reasoning are considered secondary sources of Shari’ah. All 
administrative regions are governed by the primary sources of Shari’ah where interpretations are 
made by judges (Qadis) who have obtained their skills and knowledge from Islamic schools 
(Hanbali madhhab) of jurisprudence. The same interpretations are applied across the Saudi 
courts. 
3.7.3. The Definition of Shari’ah 
Shari’ah is considered to be an asset of rules and provisions that govern each aspect of a Muslim’s 
life. According to Mawil (2004), Shari’ah is not a law but a guide that covers all aspects of 
individual lives across the Muslim world; may it be economic, political, social, cultural, or 
religious. The provisions of the Shari’ah laws are derived from the Quran in addition to the sayings 
pronounced by Prophet Muhammad. The provisions include 5 different pronouncements: 
 Obligatory (wajib or fard)— it spells out the mandatory requirements which, when 
omitted amounts to punishment (Al-Sadr, 1982).  
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 Desirable (mustahab or mandub)— Actions which are rewarded, but when omitted, they 
are not punished (Al-Ghazali, 1937). 
 Indifferent (mubah or jaiz)— actions that are permitted and to which laws remain 
indifferent (Al-Sadr, 1982). 
 Undesirable (mukruh)— Actions that are disapproved but not considered a punishable 
offence, though their omission is rewarded (Al-Sadr, 1982). 
 Forbidden (haram)—Actions that are strictly forbidden and punishable (Al-Sadr, 1982). 
3.7.4. The Legal Sources of Shari’ah 
Muslims believe that Shari’ah defines and regulates each aspect of their life, whether personal, 
economic, social, and political. Shari’ah is driven from the Quran (Hadiths) which are largely 
sayings of righteous Salaf, and jurisprudence of Islamic clerics which serves to control people, the 
society, and the universe. Shari’ah guides the people on what can be done and what needs to be 
prohibited (Mawil et al., 2004). In the event of a dispute, Shari’ah is applied, and its provisions 
are derived from both primary and secondary sources as further discussed in the subsequent 
sections (Yoko et al., 2009). 
3.7.5. The Primary Sources are the Quran and Sunnah 
3.7.5.1. The Quran 
The most important source for Muslims is the Quran, and it governs the life of Muslim aspects 
such as legislation (Abdur, 1984). The central belief is that Allah sent the Quran in the night of 
the Ramadan to Prophet Mohammed. To date, the Quran is the main source of the organisation 
and structure of Islamic banking. In most cases, it has divine injunctions which prohibit interest 
and usury, and it elaborates how commercial interests must be written, with their signings 
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occurring before two witnesses. Since the Quran is believed to be a word of God, it has been 
widely applied in all aspects of IFIs. 
3.7.5.2. The Sunnah 
After the Quran, the Sunnah is the second primary source having been established in Mecca by 
Prophet Muhammad. Since Allah talks about Muhammad in the Sunnah, Muslims believe the 
Sunnah in a similar manner to the Quran since its origin is from Allah (Beng & Liu, 2009). The 
Sunnah contains different sayings the prophet made on various occasions and for multiple 
purposes. In most cases, the Sunnah is used in interpreting Quran verses and presents objective 
meanings of its divine prohibitions and injunctions (Abdur, 1984). Moreover, the Sunnah governs 
Muslim lives in every aspect, including issues on financial transactions. Some of the commercial 
applications are the sale of items not available at the time of a contract or offer to buy something 
already reserved for another person (Mohammad, 1989). 
3.7.6. The Secondary Sources are Ijma and Qiyas 
3.7.6.1. Ijma 
Ijma serves as one of the minor sources of Shari’ah. Specifically, it comes after the Quran and 
Sunnah implying that it is the third source of Islamic legislation. Compared to the Quran and 
Sunnah, Ijma is not deeply divine but serves as a rational proof. That is, Ijma provides consensus 
in agreement and opinion between Muslim scholars, making it a unanimous agreement (Mawil, 
2004). However, its limitation is that at times, there is a lack of consensus among Muslim 
scholars. The Ijma concept is based on the unanimous agreement of Muslim scholars on a given 
issue at a given period of time (Mawil, 2004). In some cases, it serves as an independent source 




Qiyas refers to the act of comparing something to another of a similar kind. The comparison 
began during the time of Prophet Muhammed and continues to date (Abdur, 1984). An essential 
aspect about the Qiya is that it is based on the analogy of existing laws if the rationale or basis of 
the two things are similar. In its entirety, Qiyas is considered the source of Islamic jurisprudence 
and the tools of ijtihad. Other sources of Shari’ah such as Istihsan (preferable), Istishab (legal 
presumption), Istislah (public interest, Urf (custom), and Ijtihad (self-exertion). These sources are 
applied in personal interpretation to avoid injustice and stagnation, which may result from the 
literal use of Shari’ah. Diverse views have resulted in the development of Islamic jurisprudence 
so that it can be used when facing new events either at the moment or in the future. 
3.7.6.3. Islamic Schools (madhhab)  
The Sunni schools started during the early years of Islam mainly following the death of Prophet 
Muhammed. Some of the reasons were the spread of Islam and exposures to diverse issues, 
legislations, and religions. Moreover, considering the historical situation encountered at the 
time, there was a need to resolve contentious issues and to meet growing demands among 
people concerning their questions. In the process, a group of scholars was formed to educate the 
people. In Islam, madhhab refers to four Sunni schools of jurisprudence with every school driving 
its provisions from evidence drawn from primary sources which are Sunnah and Quran in line 
with the principles and rules of Islam. 
3.7.6.4. The Hanafi School (690 –760)  
Hanafi falls under the madhhab as one of the Islamic schools and represents one of the oldest 
schools and also most flexible. The school derives its name from Abu Hanifa who founded it 
122 
 
where its doctrine was established in Baghdad, Iraq. Primarily, the school’s jurisprudence is 
driven from the Quran, but when there are contentions, the Hanafi school examines other 
distinguished sources such as the Sunnah to support the proposed ruling. In the event that the 
ruling is still deficient, the school employs secondary sources like Istihsan, Urf, ijtihad, Qiyas, 
and Ijma. Today, this school has been widely established in Morocco, the Levant, Egypt, Iraq, 
India, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Turkey. 
3.7.6.5. The Maliki School (711–795) 
Sunni Muslims follow the Maliki School as second out of the four schools of Islam. Its formation 
was established by Malik ibn Anas in Medina based on his sincerity in his quest for knowledge. 
Such an interest propelled him to become one of the greatest Fiqh scholars in the Sunni world. 
Similar to other schools, the Malik school is based on the key principles of Fiqh except that priority 
is assigned to Qiyas over weak Sunnah (Hadith). Most Malik schools are concentrated in Tunisia, 
Algeria, Libya, Kuwait, Bahrain, Abu Dhabi, and Dubai. 
3.7.6.6. The Shafii School (767–820)  
A third Sunni school is the Shafii which was founded by Imam Shafii in Ghazza. The principles of 
this school are derived from the Quran, and they incorporate sayings by Prophet Muhammed in 
addition to secondary sources such as Qiyas (analogy) and Ijma (consensus). Ijtihad, Istihsan, 
and Istislah, however, were rejected by Imam Shafii who preferred Ijma. In terms of followers, 
the Shafii School comes second with up to 29% of the Muslims across the world following it. 
Some of the countries that follow it include Somalia, Yemen, Sudan, Ethiopia, Indonesia, and 
Malaysia (Abo, 2010). 
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3.7.6.7. The Hanbali School (781–855)  
The last school is the Hanbali that was founded by Imam Ahmad, who learned from Imam Shafii, 
and the two schools were closely related. The principles of the Hanbali School includes Qiyas, 
Ijma, Sunnah, and Quran. Compared to other scholars, Imam Ahmad had diverse views about 
Qiyas since he would consider it when there was an urgent necessity. In addition, Imam Ahmad 
accepted sayings of a single companion and supported Ijtihad, although he rejected insights from 
Taqlid scholars (Visser, 2009). Of the four schools, Hanbali is the most conformist and most 
flexible when considering commercial questions. The school is spread in Qatar and Saudi Arabia, 
and applied in Saudi courts. One of the most distinctive features of this school is the prohibition 
of interest in Islamic economics (Emad, 2006). 
3.8. Basic Laws of Banking and Financial Activities in Saudi Arabia 
Saudi Arabia has three basic laws of banking and financial activities. These laws include the 
Banking control law (BCL), the Capital Market Law (CML), and the Law of Supervision of 
Cooperative Insurance companies. The subsequent subsections summarize these briefly outlines 
and discusses these laws. 
3.8.1. The Banking Control Law (BCL) 
The BCL was issued under the Royal Decree No. M/5 in 1966 and considered the main regulation 
used in all financial and banking services in the Saudi Kingdom (Faleh Al-Kahtani, 2013). The law 
empowers the SAMA board to supervise and regulate Saudi Banks and, in the process, serve in 
safeguarding the Banking sector in Saudi Arabia. In Article 3 of BCL, all applications with 
intentions of undertaking banking operations needed to be addressed to the SAMA. Some of the 
specifications and mandate of the BCL includes determining foreign exchange transactions, bills 
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of exchange, discounting bills, promissory notes, payment orders, collection and payment of 
cheques, issuing letters of guarantee, opening letters of credit, current accounts, capital 
adequacy, and confers licensing powers in all banking businesses. 
3.8.2. The Capital Market Law (CML) 
The CML was issued following a Royal Decree No. M/30 on July 30th 2003. Its primary focus was 
to develop and regulate the Saudi financial market by streamlining procedures that would 
mitigate potential risks associated with transacting in securities (Zulkifli, 2010). Regulations under 
the CML offers the CMA broad powers aimed at regulating the issuance of securities, in addition 
to monitoring and dealing with them (Zulkifli, 2010). Also, the CML protects investors and citizens 
from unsound and unfair practices in the Securities market, including malpractices like 
manipulation, cheating, deceit, or fraud (Zulkifli, 2010). Therefore, CML has a mandate of 
promoting efficiency, fairness, and transparency in the capital market transactions in Saudi 
Arabia. 
3.8.3. The Law of Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies 
The law was approved following a Royal Decree M/32 in 2003, which created a legal framework 
of the cooperative insurance companies in the Kingdom (Al Elsheikh & Tanega, 2011). The 
subsequent implementation regulations were later issues in a Ministerial Decision No. 1/596 in 
efforts of regulating the insurance sector. Both the cooperative insurance law and the 
subsequent implementing regulations gave SAMA diverse powers including controlling and 
policing the Saudi insurance sector, supervising, and regulating insurance market, licensed 
insurance professionals and insurance companies (Emad, 2006). Thus, SAMA plays an important 
role in regulating the cooperative sector across the Saudi Kingdom. The main objective of this law 
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is protecting shareholders and policyholders, promoting stability in the insurance market, and 
promoting fair and effective competitiveness in the insurance market. 
3.9. Authorities responsible for the regulation and supervision of Islamic Banking and 
Financial Activities in Saudi Arabia 
There are two authorities in Saudi Arabia responsible for supervising and regulating Islamic 
banking and financial services, as well as the Islamic Sukuk, and cooperative insurance. The two 
bodes include the Capital Market Authority (CMA) and the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency 
(SAMA). 
3.9.1. The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) 
The SAMA was created in 1952 under two Royal Decrees (No. 30/4/1/1046 and No. 30/4/1/1047) 
as the central bank of Saudi Arabia.  Its governance is based on the BODs with a Governor, Deputy 
Governor, and three members who are appointed to a term of 4 years by the King under a Royal 
Decree. Different from Malaysia, there is no independent SB in Saudi to supervise and regulate 
Islamic financial and banking activities. Today, the SAMA supervises and regulates IFIs which are 
involved in financial and banking activities in close association with banks under the BCL of 1966 
(Jabbar, 2009; Kabir et al., 2011; McNulty et al., 2011). In addition, the SAMA supervises and 
regulates the cooperative insurance companies under the Law of Supervision of Cooperative 
Insurance Companies of 2003, and its executing regulations of 2004. 
3.9.2. The Capital Market Authority (CM) 
The CMA was created under Article 4 of CML following the Royal Decree No. M/30 of 2003. Its 
main objective is to develop and regulate the capital markets of Saudi Arabia. The CMA is largely 
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independent and directly connected to the Prime Minister with administrative and financial 
autonomy. The CMA is governed by a board of full-time members appointed by the King in line 
with the Royal Decree. Additional functions of the CMA include developing and regulating the 
Saudi capital market in line with the CML (Jabbar, 2009; Kabir et al., 2011; McNulty et al., 2011). 
Further, the CMA oversees the issuance of securities and monitors the issued securities, including 
issuing Sukuk (Yoko, 2009; Al Elsheikh & Tanega, 2011). In the process, CMA ensures there is a 
suitable environment of running a stable security market by boosting investor confidence, and 
protecting dealers and investors (Kabir et al., 2012). 
3.9.3. Differences Between IFIs and Conventional Banks 
The design of CG in IFIs model has unique features compared to conventional banks. Further, the 
CG has distinctive features that are different from the ones used in conventional banks which are 
largely based on the Anglo-Saxon model and/or the European model (Ullah, Harwood, & Jamali, 
2018; Williams & Zinkin, 2010). The literature concurs that the two models and diverse, and in 
the case of the IFIs, the CG is classified into four aspects: capital-related ownership structures, 
management board, nature of management, and corporate objective. Thus, the literature 
indicates that several variations exist between CG principles and structures of non-Islamic 
financial bodies and corporations when compared to their Islamic counterparts (Hayat & Hassan, 
2017; Mejia, Aljabrin, Awad, Norat, & Son, 2014). In the CG principles on Islamic governance, 
Shari’ah rules are embedded in al-Sunnah and al-Quran and in the processes, this makes IFIs 
market-driven in addition to the emphasis to uphold mutual principles of social justice (Azmat, 
Skully, & Brown, 2015). Unlike the conventional banks where ownership is based on 
shareholders, the rights to sage, acquisition, ownership, and disposition of property in IFIs is 
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considered a property (al-mal) with beneficial value and use for stakeholders (Hassan & Aliyu, 
2018). Further, rights of property ownership under Islam are attributed to Allah as humans are 
just custodians and trustees, and this compels IFIs to manage property in line with Shari’ah rules 
(Gözübüyük, Kock, & Ünal, 2018). As such, the Islamic CG is anchored on the Tawhid 
epistemological model where the functional roles of all IFIs work under Shari’ah rules as opposed 
to conventional banks where CG is based on the Anglo-Saxon and European models as discussed 
under section 2.4. The primary principles of the Tawhid epistemology model are based on the 
concepts of equilibrium or justice (aladl wal Ihsan), trust (amanah), and viceregency (khilafah) 
(Choudhury & Hoque, 2006; Williams & Zinkin, 2010).  
First, conventional banks are largely based on the Anglo-Saxon model which emphasizes close 
engagement between investors and financial institutions, with short-term returns being the 
primary focus (Ullah, Harwood, & Jamali, 2018). Thus, the conventional CG model is based on the 
concept of fiduciary association between managers and shareholders which is anchored on 
profit-oriented motives (Bassens, Derudder, & Witlox, 2011; Bulliet, 1976; Farag, Mallin, & Ow-
Yong, 2018). A key distinctive aspect of the Anglo-Saxon model compared to the Islamic CG model 
is the ownership structure shares are widely distributed and the influence that shareholders have 
on the management is often weak. Another unique aspect about the CG structure in conventional 
banks is that the primary interest is the need by the CG to protect the rights and interests of the 
shareholders (Farook & Farooq, 2013; Garas & ElMassah, 2018). Nonetheless, control over the 
top management behaviour is exerted via different forms of debt and by the bank. In the event 
of distress, the incentive of debtors to influence bank behaviour is informed largely by their 
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rights. Thus, this means that in the conventional banking model, bankruptcy laws are the primary 
components. 
However, over the recent years, academics, regulators, creditors, and shareholders have 
proposed the need to streamline decision-making approaches in conventional CG models to 
enhance efficiency, transparency, and independence (Platteau, 2008). Even so, most insights are 
drawn from a large body of literature in unregulated and non-financial institutions (Platteau, 
2008). Information drawn from such sources is largely lacking because they are largely different 
from financial institutions which are strictly regulated. In the banking sector, the BOD is placed 
in an important role in terms of its governance structure although they bear similar legal 
obligations as other boards, but with additional expectations placed on them by regulators. The 
additional expectations come in terms of regulations, guidance, or laws and they serve to reflect 
interests played out in sound and safe institutions (Pollard & Samers, 2013. Following the 2008-
2009 financial crises, the most hit institutions were the non-Islamic financial bodies and banking 
groups. The observed trend indicates that there are some factors in the IFIs CG which serve as a 
sort of insulation for Islamic institutions, which only experienced minimal sub-prime crisis during 
the 2008 global economic meltdown (Grassa & Matoussi, 2014). 
In the context of IFIs CG, there is a limited number of researches which has been focused on 
developing an alternative corporate model. Initial findings by studies by Hamza (2013) and Obid 
and Naysary (2014) indicate that Islamic institutions have adopted a different model of CG unique 
from the European and Anglo-Saxon models as an alternative governance framework. The Islamic 
CG models are based on the principle of consultation where the primary focus is to promote 
stakeholder interests in addition to achieving oneness of Allah or Tawhid (Nawaz, 2019), while 
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the conventional models to banking are largely based on promoting shareholder values (Mullah 
& Zaman, 2015). Haniffa and Hudaib (2007) pointed out that even if the concept of CG is a 
universal subject, it is very difficult to compare how the Islamic CG and Anglo-Saxon governance 
operates. Pollard and Samers (2007) indicated that the focus of corporations is to achieve 
shareholder value in terms of wealth creation. Therefore, the focus of CG both in the western 
conventional models and in the Islamic financial institutions is to meet the primary goal of 
promoting shareholder value. 
Critics point out that the concept of CG from conventional banking models and the Islamic models 
does not differ significantly as often argued by proponents. Mohammed and Muhammed (2017) 
elaborate that the actual CG practice in most IFIs tends to be anchored on the Anglo-Saxon 
model. Williams and Zinkin (2010) noted that CG from the Islamic perspective implies a system 
by which corporations are controlled and directed with a primary objective of meeting the 
company’s objectives of protecting the shareholder rights and interests. However, different from 
the conventional banking models, the Islamic CG presents distinct features and characteristics 
compared with conventional systems because it takes into consideration broader decision-
making theories that are based on the Islamic socio-scientific epistemology anchored on the 
divine oneness with Allah (Narayan & Phan (2019).  
3.10. Summary of how Literature Insights Shaped the Focus, Purpose, and Design of Study 
The literature discussed in this chapter such as the works by Narayan and Phan (2019), Nawaz 
(2019), Obid and Naysary (2014), Platteau (2008), and Pollard and Samers (2007) helped in 
developing the theoretical framework on Shari’ah governance and the expected SSB roles in the 
IFIs. Findings from the explored literature revealed that the traditional concept of CG (either the 
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European model that promotes stakeholder value or the Anglo-Saxon model that advances the 
shareholder value system) has been a subject of continued debate among scholars and 
practitioners (Bassens, Derudder, & Witlox, 2011; Bulliet, 1976). Even so, there are still limited 
studies which have been undertaken to explore the Islamic perspective of CG, specifically when 
examining the Islamic finance (Ainley et al., 2007; Farag, Mallin, & Ow-Yong, 2018; Garas & 
ElMassah, 2018), even though there has been the rapid growth of the Islamic banking in the 
global financial markets since the mid-1970s (Gözübüyük, Kock, & Ünal, 2018; Yunis, 2007). 
Studies on IFIs started in the 1980s with studies by Abomouamer (1989) examining how Shari’ah 
control was applied in Islamic Banks, while Banaga, Ray, and Tomkins (1994) explored external 
audit of CG within Islamic banks. 
However, the extant literature also revealed that existing knowledge is limited in terms of helping 
develop a clear conceptual framework on the functions of SSBs and BODs, with studies limiting 
their research scope to Shari’ah control and audit as noted by Mejia, Aljabrin, Awad, Norat, and 
Son (2014) and Obid and Naysary (2014). In addressing this knowledge gap, additional studies 
have been conducted over the years to understand CG from the Islamic point of view, which was 
the main research interest in this study. As noted from the literature, it became clear that the 
existing studies on IFIs CG can be grouped into three main phases (Bhatti & Bhatti, 2010). Phase 
one includes the pre-1980s, phase two includes the period between the 1980s and 1990s, and 
phase three include the post-2000s. In the first phase, the era is characterised by the absence of 
studies on CG on IFIs, and the topic received less research interest in mainstream CG. The claims 
are supported by the initial surveys which were undertaken by Siddiqi (1991), Mannan (1994), 
and Haneef (1995) on contemporary studies on Islamic financial economics (Ainley et al., 2007; 
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Bhatti & Bhatti, 2010). However, there was some increased focus and commitment to the topic 
of CG of IFIs in the second phase (1980 to 1990). For instance, a study by Abomouamer (1989) 
set to examine the functions and roles of Shari’ah control in Islamic banks. Additional research 
five years later by Banaga, Ray, and Tomkins (1994) attempted to undertake external audit and 
CG in the Islamic banks (Mohammed & Muhammed, 2017; Mullah & Zaman, 2015; Narayan & 
Phan, 2019). 
The two studies by Abomouamer (1989) and Banaga et al. (1994), however, were undertaken by 
individual scholars and limited the scope of their study to Shari’ah audit and control in the Islamic 
banks. In the light of the limited corporate studies on IFIs during the first two phases of the 
literature overview, there was increased research interest beginning in the mid-1990s to 2000s. 
The reason for increased research interest in the IFIs during this period was triggered by several 
failures of some Islamic banks such as the Islamic Bank of South Africa, Ihlas Finance House in 
Turkey, and Islamic Investment Companies of Egypt (Nawaz, 2019; Platteau, 2008). As a result, 
several CG studies were undertaken by different institutions, organisations, and individuals in the 
third phase (post-2000s). 
One of the major studies that were undertaken on CG in IFIs was research by Chapra and Ahmed 
(2002). The researchers focused on examining the issue of the functions and roles of the SSBs, 
accounting, auditing, and the overall framework of CG with a specific focus on IFIs. Subsequent 
studies further expanded on the topic where researcher like Al-Baluchi (2006) assessed issues of 
disclosure practices of IFIs, while Al-Sadah (2007) investigated CG of IFIs, the role of Islamic bank 
supervisors, the effects of IFIs on stakeholders, and its characteristics. At the height of the global 
financial meltdown in 2008, IFSB published a study on Shari’ah boards (SBs) of Institutions 
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Offering Islamic Financial Services in various jurisdictions (Ainley et al., 2007; IFSB, 2008; Pollard 
& Samers, 2007). The study by IFSB (2008) was followed by the one by Faizullah (2009) who 
examined the standardization, transparency, and governance of the Islamic banks in line with CG. 
However, despite the studies above in the three phases, further analysis of the literature reveals 
that there are inadequate findings that have attempted to establish and deconstruct the 
theoretical foundations of CG with a specific focus on Islamic banking. Some attempts, however, 
had been made by Iqbal and Mirakhor (2004) and Choudhury and Hoque (2004) to create a 
theoretical framework of CG of Islamic banking. Choudhury and Hoque (2004) attempted to 
expand on the theory of CG based on the Tawhid epistemology on the Oneness of God (Al-Faruqi, 
1982). In contrast, Iqbal and Mirakhor (2004) recommended the use of stakeholder-based value 
system anchored on the principle of contractual obligation and property rights. The existing 
literature was also extended by Safieddine (2009) by examining variations of the agency theory 
in a complex and unique Islamic banking context. To date, the issue of CG continues to be an area 
of major concern for international standard-settings agencies, supervisors, regulators, 
shareholders, and other stakeholders in the IFIs, thereby the need for this study. 
Considering the overview above, it can be noted that CG is one of the essential components in 
the Islamic banking sector which needs further research, a factor that motivated the need for 
this study. The importance of CG is reflected by its role in developing and advancing the 
important principles of transparency, accountability, and fairness. Compared to the conventional 
banking system, the IFIs face a greater challenge and risk in ensuring strict adherence to the 
Shari’ah law governing financial transactions (Jabbar, 2009). Thus, there is a strong regulatory 
requirement where any Islamic corporation, especially the IFIs, must have in place appropriate 
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strategies and sound governance systems that will work to promote the adoption of effective 
and strong CG within the Islamic framework. In the light of these deliberations, the focus of this 
section is to provide a review of the key foundation of CG from the Islamic point of view, with 
special deliberations made on the IFIs framework (Cull et al., 2005). The section further seeks to 
construct basic insights about CG in Islam and to clarify important issues to distinguish its features 
and values from those of the western-based banking systems and financial institutions (Cull et 
al., 2005). The study argues that as applies to IFIs, Islam becomes the key distinctive aspect in the 
bank’s special characteristics and values in service and product delivery in its CG. As such, the 
primary aim of the IFIs CG is based on the need to uphold and maintain the central principles of 
social justice by working towards the interests of the shareholders and those of the stakeholders 
at large. To explore the topic and establish the relationship between BODs and SSBs, the 
theoretical frameworks from Chapter 2 (on mainstream banking) and Chapter 3 (on Shari’ah 
governance) were integrated to create a single conceptual framework which is further discussed 
in Chapter 5 (section 5.4). The next chapter presents the research methods and approaches used 







Chapter 4: Research Methodology 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter provides a detailed breakdown and justification of the research process. It provides 
information regarding the method that the researcher deploys in conducting the research, 
together with the rationale for such a selection. The chapter also contains the various 
components of the study, including the sampling process, interview questions breakdown and a 
short section that describes the data analysis technique that the researcher deploys to make 
sense of the data from the data collection phase (Beattie, McInnes, & Fearnley, 2004). Another 
area of the chapter is a discussion of the contribution of the researcher to the overall research 
process, and prospective challenges that are inherent to the research design deployed (Jabbar, 
2009; Kabir et al., 2011; McNulty et al., 2011). The final part of the chapter provides a discussion 
of reliability and validity measures that the researcher takes to ensure that the data collection 
process and other components of the research are rigorous. All these components are necessary 
to ensure that readers are conversant with the framework that the study uses, its advantages, 
disadvantages, and the measures that the study takes to ensure its robustness. Therefore, this 
chapter is crucial for understanding the purpose, foundation, and prospective impact of this 
study.  
This research explores the relationship between the BODs and the SSBs in IFIs in Saudi Arabia. To 
collect data that will have meaningful implication for theory and practice, the researcher resorts 
to a method that will facilitate dialogue between the participants and themselves. Taking this 
approach ensures that the study captures experiences, insights and suggestions that emanate 
from those who have the knowledge, as well as the credibility, to discuss happenings in the study 
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context. Consequently, the researcher draws from fundamental components of qualitative 
research to ensure that the quantity and quality of data that the research acquires is of 
meaningful standard.  
4.2. Research Philosophy and Paradigms 
Critical realism was the philosophical approach used in this study. According to Beattie, McInnes, 
Fearnley (2004), critical realism is a philosophical framework which distinguishes between the 
observable world and the real world. Belk (2007) added that real-world events cannot be 
observed and that they exist independent from individual constructions, theories, and 
perceptions. As applies to this study, the assumption was that entities exist independently of 
being perceived, or independently of how the researcher theorizes about them. As such, by 
interviewing the BODs and SSBs, it was assumed that their shared insights and experiences within 
the IFIs and other banking institutions could be central to examining the association between 
SSBs and BODs. 
Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill (2012) further pointed out that realism denotes the real features 
and events which occur in the world. In this study, reality refers to the actual events which take 
place within the IFIs and how BODs and SSB interact and engage when executing their mandate. 
Further, Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill (2012) noted that the reality of events which occur in the 
real world causes the phenomena to be perceived with human senses. As such, the use of 
interview sessions with participants to collect information was essential in assisting to identify 
and observe the lived experiences of SSBs and BODs within the Islamic financial institutions. That 
is, both the SSBs and BODs are real and if they are studied through interview sessions, then they 
can provide important knowledge that can be offered to other people, and understand the 
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research topic on the possible interaction between SSBs and BODs. As such, critical realism was 
considered a suitable framework for examining the formulated research aim and research 
questions for this study. 
4.3. Research Design 
The current study chooses to deploy a qualitative research design, with interviews as the data 
collection method. Unlike a quantitative research design, which deals with exact figures and data 
trends, qualitative research entails subjective, unquantifiable data that expresses individual 
insights on a certain topic (Marshall & Rossman 2014). Subjective data does not provide exact 
parameters that the research can use to make conclusions; rather, it entails synthesizing data 
using an analysis framework that can yield subjective trends, comparable to theory. Therefore, 
taking this research approach gives researchers the ability to cultivate a holistic image of the 
phenomenon under investigation, especially given the fact that the research process experiences 
few constraints (Marshall & Rossman 2014). Such an approach to the investigation process is one 
of the reasons why this study elects to go with a qualitative research design. Another rationale 
for choosing this approach over a quantitative study is that it allows the researcher to look 
beyond exact components of the relationship between SSBs and the BODs (Saunders, Lewis, & 
Thornhill, 2012). Like any components of the organization, they personify a wide array of 
elements, with the chief elements being people, culture, structure, and tasks. Consequently, 
focusing on an exact approach or taking a research design that only investigates a singular aspect 
of the relationship between the boards do not give a full picture (Belk 2007). While quantitative 
studies offer an admirable framework for assessing relationships, it confines the researcher to a 
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set of variables that control the direction of the entire study; hence, it would be impossible to 
gain a proper understanding of how the two boards work when taking this approach.  
Another incentive of choosing a qualitative research design is that it gives the research freedom 
to interact with the source of the research data. For instance, answers could be long and 
descriptive. This way, the respondent does not leave any crucial details out. Finally, a qualitative 
research design is compatible with the objectives of this study (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 
2012). Literature indicates that the research strategy that a study deploys relies on the type of 
research question or subject under investigation. Consequently, the research strategy that a 
researcher deploys should be responsive to the fundamental propensities of the study. For 
instance, this study investigates the relationship between SSBs and the BODs. Such an 
investigation requires a profound analysis of the way these boards interact, both inside and 
outside the corporate boundaries (Flick, 2018). In addition, participants who will be able to 
provide data that is adequate to make conclusions are experts in IFIs, or are part of the CG 
structure of these institutions. As a result, they have a wealth of information that they can supply 
regarding the workings of these boards; hence, it is only right to adopt a research approach that 
will ensure that the study takes advantage of their vast knowledge in the subject under 
investigation (Belk, 2007).  
The study not only ensures compatibility in terms of the guiding research principles but also in 
the selection of research context, participants, and the timeline. Given that the findings of the 
study need to be submitted within a given timeframe, the data collection process takes all the 
necessary measures to ensure that all the relevant steps are concluded within the allocated time. 
For this reason, the entire process outlined in this methodology chapter took three months. In 
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this period, the researcher acquired permission from the various financial institutions to conduct 
research on their premises and with some of their stakeholders. While not all companies were 
willing to open their directors up to outside scrutiny, they were quite responsive after receiving 
a detailed package outlining the purpose of the study and its potential significance to the banking 
sector (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2012). Taking this approach ensures that the researcher has 
the requisite platform to ask deep questions regarding the workings of the two boards. 
Furthermore, the researcher opts to work with a participant cohort that comprises of individuals 
that have notable expertise in matters that relate to the CG structure of IFIs. Installing this 
filtering mechanism ensures that the study has reliable data that reflects the state of SSBs and 
the BODs inside the Saudi CG environment.  
This methodology is essential in the sense that it provides a foundation that will guide the entire 
research. Therefore, it is essential to ensure that it covers all the necessary aspects. For instance, 
the study elects to work with a methodological approach that will facilitate the understanding of 
SSBs and the BODs at a level that current research is yet to explore to a notable degree. To do so, 
the study has to build on current theory, while at the same time looking to synthesize new theory, 
or evolve current theory, to ensure that it has a tangible impact on practice and literature 
(Robson, 2011). The epistemological research approach ensures that the study is able to achieve 
this because it holds the view that a researcher uses the knowledge and experiences of experts 
to develop theory and a guidebook for practice. Importantly, the study selects a data collection 
instrument that will be able to satisfy the just demands of an epistemological research approach. 
In order to ensure the credibility of the final findings of the study, especially if they will be 
disruptive from a theoretical point of view, the study requires a solid evidence base (Saunders, 
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Lewis, & Thornhill, 2012). Resorting to using interviews for data collection ensures that the 
participant group supplies this evidence without having to suffer validity and trustworthiness 
constraints, provided the study works with the right sample (Beattie, McInnes, & Fearnley, 2004). 
Consequently, the study has the right combination of theoretical elements and research 
procedures to succeed in realizing the objectives identified in the earlier stages of the study. 
4.4. Participant Sampling 
Purposive sampling, a non-probability sampling technique (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2012), 
was used to recruit potential interviewees into the study. Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill (2012) 
noted that purposive sampling or judgemental sampling is used to recruit study participants who 
have specific characteristics that can help the researcher explore the phenomenon under study. 
However, the use of purposive sampling has some limitations in that there is increased 
vulnerability to errors based on the researcher's judgement during participant selection (Beattie, 
McInnes, & Fearnley, 2004). In addition, the sampling approach introduces high levels of bias and 
low level of reliability and this means that the obtained results cannot be generalized to different 
research contexts (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2012). In this study, the use of purposive 
sampling was essential in identifying only BOD and SSB members from the Saudi IFIs who have 
relevant knowledge pertaining the relationship and interaction between SSBs and BODs within 
the Islamic banks.  
To select appropriate participants for the interview sessions, all appropriate banking and financial 
institutions in Saudi Arabia were identified (see Appendix 3 for the research population). These 
financial institutions and banks included Arab National Bank, National Commercial Bank, AlJazira 
Bank, Al Rajhi Bank, Alawwal Bank, Alinma Bank, and Riyadh Bank. Additional banks included 
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Saudi Investment Bank, SABB Bank, Samba Bank, and Albilad bank. Upon identifying these IFIs, 
an email was sent inviting them to take part in the study. A total of seven IFIs expressed interest 
as some BODs and SSBs dropped out of the study leaving 14 participants to take part in the 
interview sessions. Of the fourteen respondents, five were members of the BODs, six were 
members of SSBs and three were CEOs as presented in Table 4.  
Table 4: Demographic characteristic of the interviews who took part in the interview sessions 
Pseudonym Gender Occupation working experience (years) 
1 Maher Ali Male CEO in Bank 22 
2 Rami Saleh Male BOD member in Bank 25 
3 Sheikh Saad Ali Male SSB member of Bank 21 
4 Mohsen Noor Male BOD member in Bank 25 
5 Sheikh Khaled Abdallah Male SSB member of Bank 18 
6 Noor Jaber Male BOD member in Bank 24 
7 Sheikh Mamdouh Zafer Male SSB member of Bank 27 
8 Nasser Rashid Male Chairman of SSB in Bank 40 
9 Sheikh Zuhair Mansour Male SSB member in Bank 31 
10 Sheikh Mohammed Sultan Male SSB member of Bank 19 
11 Fahad Ali   Male BOD member in Bank 23 
12 Amer Samer Male CEO of Bank 28 
13 Eng. Hani Fayez Male CEO in Bank 16 
14 Hasan Ahmed   Male BOD Bank 25 
 
The inclusion of CEOs as respondents was necessary for several reasons. First, on top of being 
directly in charge of operations as executive directors, they are an essential component in the 
information gathering process, because they interact with both groups across various 
organizational contexts. Most importantly, the chief executive officer attends board meetings 
that involve both SSBs and the BODs. Looking at the credentials that all groups are constituting 
the sample carry, it is conceivable that the study establishes a sample that has the requisite 
amount of credibility to respond to the interview questions. Another step that the study takes to 
affirm that the participants have the credibility that it takes is to collect information regarding 
their experience. Understanding the relationship between the two boards entails evaluating how 
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they interact with each other and the experience of the members during such interaction. 
Therefore, it becomes vital to target a respondent group that can report on experiences that can 
direct judgement regarding the relationship between BODs and SSB. As outlined in the 
subsequent sections of the methodology chapter, the experiences of the participants will be 
essential for the study, as it helps the study learn how the two boards interact with the CG space. 
Thus, using individuals who serve at the highest levels of the corporate hierarchy to participate 
in the study affirms the credibility of the sample to take part in the survey. Like in any other 
research, the sampling process will be essential in ensuring that the study meets its goals. Table 
3 shows the respondent information; the name and bank name have been eliminated for 
anonymity purposes. 
4.5. Interview Structure 
There are three types of interviews that researchers can use to conduct studies. The first type of 
interviews is structured interviews, which are rigid and offer very little latitude to participants in 
terms of response freedom and how they can structure their experiences. Semi-structured 
interviews, on the other hand, personify an element of control but provide participants with an 
opportunity to exercise a degree of flexibility in the course of the survey. The final type of 
interviews is unstructured interviews, which are extremely flexible and take a conversational 
approach to the data collection process. While interviews provide researchers with the 
opportunity to ask open-ended questions, it is standard procedure to have predetermined 
questions. In light of this, the researcher developed a set of questions, grouped into five distinct 
segments. Each section of the interview focuses on a unique aspect of the relationship between 
SSBs and the BODs. The first section of the interview contains questions regarding the personal 
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details of the respondent, their professional background and the type of institution where they 
work in. In the second section of the interview questions, the study begins to narrow down on 
the details, asking questions regarding the nature of meetings that the two boards have. The 
essence of this question is to allow the participants to furnish the researcher with information 
regarding pertinent elements of the CG structure such as frequency of meetings, subject of 
meetings and the degree of involvement for both boards. The third section of the interview 
questions is more specific, as the interview questions focus on the role of the boards. This section 
is essential to the study because it allows the researcher to identify points of convergence 
between the two boards when executing their functions. Therefore, the answers that the 
respondents submit in this section will be integral to meeting the objectives of the study (Bazeley 
2009). The fourth section of the interview questions ask questions regarding effective strategic 
decisions. These questions also contribute to gaining a deeper understanding of the relationship 
between the two boards, because they help to reveal how the boards engage in strategic decision 
making, either independently, or working in conjunction with one another. This section also helps 
the study to discern the degree to which the two boards engage in shaping strategy. The final 
section of the interview questions focuses on the degree of collaboration within the boardroom. 
Like in the third section, the interview carries questions that seek to yield direct answers from 
the participants regarding the connection between the two boards. The list below provides a 
highlight of what each of the five sections entails 
Section 1: Personal Questions  
Section 2: A typical board meeting. 
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Section 3: Role on the board. 
Section 4: Effective strategic decisions taken by the two boards. 
Section 5: Perceptions of effective collaboration between the two boards. 
Appendix 1 contains a copy of the interview questions  
The reason for segmenting the interview into these sections is to create an orderly flow to the 
interview. Having sections also helps the researcher to broaden the scope of questions by making 
sure that they do not focus on one or two elements of the relationship between the two boards. 
Consequently, the interview structure also plays an integral role in the realization of the study 
objectives. It is imperative to note the fact that each of interview questions in the study aligns 
with the research objectives by using the objectives as a scope for the nature of the information 
that the researcher seeks from the respondents. To achieve this, the study continuously improves 
the interview questions in order to arrive at a list of questions that are consistent with the 
theoretical foundation of the research. For instance, the data analysis phase, the researcher 
gained more information on ways that they can improve the respondent experience. Based on 
this information, the researcher eliminated a seventh section from the interview, because it 
makes the process too long, while not providing relevant data that will help to meet research 
objectives. Another aspect to note regarding the interview structure is that the researcher 
employs the various segments so that to help during the data analysis process. Each segment of 
the interview contains related questions. Therefore, it will be easier for the researcher to identify 
data that pertains to a particular phenomenon, which reduces the amount of time that the study 
spends on the data analysis phase. 
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While the researcher could take advantage of various forms of interviews and interview 
questions, the study uses a semi-structured interview approach with open-ended questions. This 
gives the researcher control of the interviewing process while ensuring that the respondents 
have the freedom to express their experiences.  
4.6. Data Collection Instrument 
For data collection, the study elects to use personal interviews. However, it integrates the use of 
modern technology in order to save time and reduce research expense. For participants that 
we're unable to schedule face-to-face interviews, the researcher conducted the interviews with 
them via phone. Thus, the study sees two approaches to personal interviews, i.e. where the 
researcher uses face-to-face communication, and where the researcher uses phone-based 
communication. Integrating these two approaches ensures that the study eliminates accessibility 
constraints that would come with having to conduct all the interviews face to face. However, it 
is imperative to note the fact that choosing to conduct phone interviews with some of the 
participants has a number of downsides. For example, this approach does not take full advantage 
of interviews as a data collection method. One of the main incentives of using interviews to 
collect data is that they allow the researcher to read nonverbal cues, mood and even delve 
deeper into the investigation depending on the details that such information submits regarding 
the respondent (Appleton, 1995). However, using a phone does not allow the researcher the 
same level of access to the participant, or the information that they are trying to communicate. 
Therefore, the interviews conducted face to face seem to personify more detail, and the 
researcher feels in control, relative to the interviews that take place via phone. However, the 
differences in the quality of responses that they submit were negligible because all the interview 
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responses contain detailed responses to the questions. The only challenge is that interviews 
conducted in person were longer than those conducted via phone. The study also uses scholarly 
information from current literature to supplement the outcome of the interview survey.  
Moving away from the way that the study structures the interviews, it is imperative to look at 
the various alternatives that the researcher has in terms of data collection instruments across 
both the qualitative and quantitative divide. This assessment is important to establish why 
interviews come out as the optimal data collection method (Flick, 2018). Among the data 
collection techniques that the study could use in the place of interviews is direct observation. 
Direct observation is a data collection instrument that allows the researcher to observe the 
behaviour of the research participants inside the research context. The researcher then records 
actions, interactions and behaviour that falls within the scope of the study, and this constitutes 
the research data. Observations are an invaluable method for collecting primary data because 
they give the researcher unrestricted access to the study context, where they record what they 
see first-hand (Denzin and Lincoln, 2008). This reduces room for participant bias because they 
have less time or the opportunity to manipulate the information that the researcher records 
regarding their behaviour or interaction with the organizational context. Despite these 
advantages, the process is time-consuming, especially in the context of this research, given the 
fact that members of both boards convene at least quarterly. Another downside of this approach 
is that it requires follow-up research to validate the data that the researcher comes up with from 
observing the participants, in order to reduce bias and cover areas of the research context that 
the researcher could not gain access to. In addition, gaining full access to a corporate context to 
conduct adequate observation might be a challenge. This makes the study economically 
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unfeasible, especially in this type of study, as it will mean that the research integrates an 
additional data collection framework on top of direct observation. In addition, some phenomena 
cannot be easily observed. An example of this includes aspects of the relationship between the 
boards, such as personal connections, or in the case of power, foundation power.  
Invalidating the results of observational studies, some researchers use case studies; others use 
interviews to conduct follow-ups to what they record during observation. This means that the 
researcher would need to plan an additional research design that contains a distinct data 
collection method, in order to ensure that the observation data is valid enough. This could be 
time-consuming and unfeasible from the resource perspective, which emphasises the rationale 
for selecting interviews for data collection.  In addition, the process is feasible because itis 
executed only once (Saunders Lewis & Thornhill, 2012). Interviews also provide an optimal data 
collection system for this study because of the way that they are able to work with different 
forms of research. For this particular study, the BODs and the SSBs do not convene often; hence, 
using an observation approach is unrealistic, as there is very little access to the study context and 
the subjects. In addition, the privacy and confidentiality risk are too high, which would prevent 
most companies from allowing research from taking place in such a sensitive area of their 
organization setup.  
Another data collection instrument that the researcher could use for this study is the 
questionnaire. Questionnaires are typical tools for collecting quantitative data. However, since 
this is a qualitative study, they will not be able to supply the data that the researcher requires to 
reach a meaningful conclusion. Among the incentives that questionnaires bring to the table, 
including the fact that they do not consume much time. Unlike interviews, which require the 
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researcher to sit down with participants for a considerable amount of time, questionnaires are 
quick to answer. In addition, the researcher does not need to be there for the participant to 
engage in the survey (Myers, 2013). In fact, modern technology facilitates questionnaire surveys, 
even more, allowing researchers to create online surveys where participants can fill 
questionnaires regardless of their location. Therefore, questionnaires are time efficient and cost-
friendly. Another key incentive of questionnaires is the fact that they provide a chance for the 
researcher to control the nature of responses that the participants submit. Their structured 
nature confines the feedback from participants to a set of parameters, which ensures relevance. 
This is a strength that interviews do not share, especially unstructured interviews, which do not 
impose significant control over the process. However, they are also unable to provide detailed 
responses, given that most questionnaires have close-ended questions (Saunders, Lewis, & 
Thornhill, 2012). Participants get to provide simple answers that the researcher uses to conduct 
statistical analysis to test a phenomenon. Such an approach would not be appropriate and in this 
type of study, because the researcher looks to investigate a complex relationship, one underlined 
by a wide array of variables and potential statistical relationships. Therefore, in this case, 
questionnaires will not be enough to provide the data that will guide the research forward. 
Another aspect that undermines the prospect of deploying questionnaires is that the study looks 
to test subjective phenomenon, including how people relate in a particular context.  
Myers (2013) establishes further incentives of interviews over questionnaires, including the fact 
that they genuinely support research follow up. While a researcher using a questionnaire data 
collection approach could integrate a framework for follow up, it would be difficult to cultivate a 
basis for using this option. This is down to a number of reasons. First, the exact science that 
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underlines questionnaire research requires that researchers strike any responses that do not 
satisfy certain data validity checks. However, Myers (2013) maintains that interviews are about 
independent expression, and when an idea is not clear, a researcher can take advantage of the 
follow-up questions to gather more information from the respondent. This is highly beneficial, 
especially in studies that rely on respondent data to generate theory because it allows the 
researcher to take advantage of every piece of data submitted in the course of the study. 
Marshall and Rossman (2014) support this point of view, adding that support for consistent 
follow up also helps to improve the validity and trustworthiness of data because the researcher 
can take time to confirm data is trustworthy enough. This adds to the reasons why an interview 
study is compatible with the research objectives of this study. Participant data forms the basis of 
the theoretical development framework that the researcher will use; hence, it is crucial to have 
a tool that will enhance the clarity of data.  
Another data collection alternative is using current literature, i.e. scholarly work that is already 
completed in the topic under investigation. This is a research mechanism that allows the 
researcher to dig deep into the literature on the topic under investigation in order to identify 
theoretical patterns that affirm or refute aspects of the phenomenon under investigation. 
Working with available scholarly work also supplies the researcher with comprehensive 
justification for certain theoretical constructs, supplying both qualitative and quantitative data 
(Flick, 2018). The greatest incentive of this approach is that it offers a researcher uncontrolled 
access to a wide pool of data. Such data personifies subjective and descriptive findings from 
diverse sources; hence, providing a chance for the researcher to develop a study whose 
implications span a wider context than interviews, questionnaires or direct observation. In 
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addition, they allow the researcher to extract data from critical documents such as company 
reports and pronouncements, which would be highly invaluable (Baydoun & Willet, 2000). Like 
interviews, they are compatible with this study in that they avail a chance for the researcher to 
interact with expert opinion and experiences regarding the relationship between SSBs and the 
BODs (Denzin & Lincoln, 2008). Unfortunately, scholarly work on the topic under investigation is 
not comprehensive or adequate. Having such a slim pool of literature to work with undermines 
one of the fundamental incentives of utilizing current literature and statistics, which is having a 
data source to mine. In addition, the topic of CG is quite broad; hence, the prospect of wandering 
off to integrate concepts that are unrelated to current research is high, in order to compensate 
for the lack of a strong literature base that specifically targets the topic under investigation. For 
this reason, interviews are the qualitative data collection instrument of choice for the study.  
While the paragraphs above outline the shortcomings of alternative data collection methods, 
which paves the way for selecting interviews, it is imperative to note that interviews also have 
their shortcomings. Interviews can be time-consuming to conduct. However, the study takes 
measures to reduce the implications of this disadvantage to the study by integrating phone 
interviews with face to face interviews. Another mechanism that the study deploys to address 
this shortcoming is to focus on a small sample group containing members that have enough 
credibility to touch on the subject under investigation. This ensures that the process does not 
take a lot of time, but it is still able to gather adequate data for the study. Another downside that 
one could associate with interviews is participant bias (Marshall & Rossman, 2014). There is an 
inherent risk that participants will provide data that will push the study towards their ideological 
standpoint on the issue under investigation. A noticeable upside is that interviews help the 
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researcher to improve the validity and reliability of the data that makes it to the analysis phase 
of the study, which is important for the quality of the overall outcomes of the research.  
Interviews not only provide an optimal data collection method because the researcher is able to 
mitigate their downsides to a notable degree but also because they personify an array of inherent 
advantages. Perhaps the greatest advantage of interviews is that they offer the researcher 
greater access to the participant and their insights. Interview questions do not impose any 
restrictions, and they provide the researcher with the opportunity to ask to follow up questions. 
This way, the researcher is able to conduct a comprehensive data collection phase, where they 
mine all the relevant data from people who have extensive knowledge in the topic under 
investigation (Granot, Brashear & Cesar Motta, 2012). Another advantage of interviews, but 
exclusive to face-to-face interviews, is that interviews provide the researcher with the 
opportunity to read nonverbal cues, which contribute to the quality of the data collection 
process. This incentive manifests greatly in instances where the researcher personifies great skill 
in personal interviews. Apart from these advantages, interviews are also responsive to the 
demands and characteristics of this study in the following ways: 
1. Interviews allow the researcher to investigate a wide array of subjective elements of the 
relationship between SSBs and the BODs 
2. Through interviews, the researcher is able to gather data regarding the interaction and 




3. Interviews provide a chance to dig deeper to unearth concepts that might seem unclear 
regarding the relationship between SSBs and the BODs 
4. The topic under investigation is relatively new; hence, the researcher requires a data 
collection system that will enable the study to influence practice, future research and 
current literature to a notable extent. The exploratory nature of this study underscores 
the value of using interviews to gather data 
It is imperative to note the actuality that interviews yield data that contain personal opinion. In 
quantitative studies, researchers tend to experience a less chaotic analysis because they do not 
deal with subjective data. However, studies that use interviews do not get to enjoy such benefits. 
In fact, data analysis frameworks such as thematic analysis require customization so that they 
can meet the nature of the study. In light of this, the quality of the data analysis phase and the 
outcomes of this study are highly contingent on the skills of the researcher in adopting the data 
to the various data analysis mechanisms and ensuring that they avoid any form of bias.  
4.7. Data Collection Process 
In order to gather as much data as possible and to ensure that the descriptive and qualitative 
data exemplify credibility and reliability, the study conducts one on one interviews, opting against 
group-based interviews. This ensures that the respondents get the chance to respond to 
questions independently, and free of any preconceptions, which could be generated by being 
privy to the response of other participants. Consequently, the researcher takes time to engage 
with individual participants to ensure that they have the freedom to express their views and relay 
their experiences. First, in order to make sure that all participants are comfortable to engage in 
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the survey, the study seeks permission from the relevant institutions, as well as consent from 
individual participants. For this part of the research process, the researcher presented a consent 
letter containing all the details regarding the survey and prospective participants to the financial 
institutions that where be part of the study. The consent form included details regarding the 
survey, ethical considerations and a highlight of prospective implications of the study to the 
overall banking landscape in Saudi Arabia. Taking this approach ensures that the banks can relate 
to the study (McLellan MacQueen, & Neidig 2003). It also gives participants confidence that the 
study is observing all the necessary privacy and confidential safeguards to protect their personal 
data and ideas.  
After completing the sampling process, the researcher contacted the participants who were 
available via phone, where they get additional information regarding the study. During this phone 
call, the participant has the freedom to schedule the interview, as well as select a location. For 
those that were not available for a personal physical interview, the study provides the alternative 
of an interview via the phone. Still, they were given the freedom to provide a time when they are 
available for the interview. While it would have been beneficial to stick to a rigid scheduling 
framework, this is likely to undermine the quality and turnout of the exercise. To eliminate the 
potential for this, the study takes a flexible approach to discerning the schedule, location, and 
mode of personal interview. Such flexibility in building the interview process focuses on 
maximizing the turnout and the quality of the results because it ensures that the participants 
conduct the interview in a context where they are comfortable. In addition, allowing them to 
schedule for the interviews ensures that they have ample time to respond to questions, provide 
additional insights and support any follow-up activity that the researcher may have. Because of 
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this, there is no universal timeframe for an interview nor context (Saunders Lewis & Thornhill, 
2012). Some of the participants choose to conduct the interview at the office, while others select 
a public space, some of the interviews take place in the morning, while others take place in the 
afternoon.  
Perhaps some of the common elements that was notable during all the interviews are the 
enthusiastic nature of the participants. They respond to the interview questions with enough 
detail and dedicate a considerable amount of time to the data collection process. This is reflective 
of the flexible approach to scheduling and the context of the interview. To ensure that there are 
no limitations to the data collection process, and purity of feedback, the researcher records some 
response under a new file. This ensures that the interview is complete, regardless of the time 
that they take. Therefore, the researcher collects each of the answers at the end of the interview 
process, transcribes them, while upholding the anonymity of the respondents. Though the 
researcher intends to keep the data for backup purposes, some of the recordings contain 
personal details of the respondents, which poses privacy and confidentiality risk. As a result, the 
safest step was to ensure anonymity after transcribing the interviews, by listening to the 
recordings and writing the data down. To ensure that everything goes smoothly and that the 
participants contribute their best, the following interview protocol was followed:   
1. Introduced myself to the participant(s). 
2. I presented consent form, go over contents, answer questions and concerns of 
participant(s). 
3. Give the participant(s) copy of consent form. 
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4. Turn on the audio recording device for face to face interviews, with the researcher using 
the phone call record option for interviews conducted via phone  
5. The interview began with question 1; followed through to the final question. 
6. I thank the participant(s) for their part in the study. 
7. Give the participant(s) my contact numbers for follow up questions and concerns from 
the participant(s). 
The protocol above ensures that the interview takes place in a manner that is not invasive and 
upsetting for the respondents. On top of the procedure outlined above, the interviewer uses 
simple language, which ensures that all participants comprehend the interview process. In 
addition, some of the details that the participants provide are not clear at first, so the interviewer 
finds having to ask them to repeat. However, they avoid questions that are not outlined in the 
three sections and not related to the survey. The reason for doing taking this precaution is to 
ensure that the participants comprehend the expectations of the study in delivering the results. 
Each interview context varies, and follow up questions may divert from the original topic, given 
that they are based on the information that the researcher gains from engaging with the 
participants (Saunders Lewis, & Thornhill, 2012). Apart from this restriction, the researcher 
maximises the fundamental incentives of using interviews as a means for data collection. For 
instance, all the participants get the freedom to express their opinions without any time 
limitations. The researcher also takes steps to ensure that they are as comfortable as possible so 
that they get to express themselves without any fear or reservations during the interviews. The 
researcher also uses Arabic as the standard language throughout the interviews.  
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Though the study intends to engage the participants after the interviews conclude, the quality of 
responses and the amount of detail that they include in their feedback does not warrant any 
follow-up. Furthermore, the transcription process is comprehensive to capture all the data from 
the respondents. This, alongside the fact that the respondents committed to the study, 
eliminates the need to do any follow up with the participants of the study, as the details that they 
provide are enough.  Another step that takes place during the study to ensure the quality of 
outcomes studies testing, where the researcher subjected the interview questions, philosophy 
and prospective data analysis method to comprehensive testing to identify potential loopholes. 
This included comparing each question with the research objectives to ensure consistency, early 
communication with participants to determine their take on the survey, and mock-up pilot data 
collection session to determine aspects of the process that may require modification.  
Another critical aspect of the interview process was the translation of the interviews from Arabic 
to English. The respondents’ native language is Arabic, and some of them are not proficient in 
English; hence, the study resorted to conducting the interviews in Arabic. This introduced a 
translation stage after all the interviews were transcribed. To ensure that the translation captures 
the context and practical meaning of the responses that the participants provide, the translation 
process takes a contextualized approach, giving very little emphasis on the lexical representation 
of the responses. The researcher adopted this approach to translation from Chidlow, 
Plakoyiannaki and Welch (2014), who establish that the translation process in business research 
should be perceived as a session of intercultural interaction to generate findings that are relevant 





Table 3: Participant characteristics, financial sector, nationality, and duration of interview sessions. 
 
 
S/N Date Role Edu. Qual Sector  Gender Venue Nationality Duration 













        
Male 
His office Saudi Arabia 53 mins 
3 11-Apr Non-
executive 
PhD Philosophy Financial 
services 















Male His office Saudi Arabia 69 mins 







Saudi Arabia 52 mins 










the bank  
Saudi Arabia 64 mins 







Saudi Arabia 72 mins 
9 3-Apr Chairman Islamic 
Jurisprudence - 
IMSI University  
Financial 
services 








10 10-Apr Member  PhD Shari’ah -
IMSI University  
Financial 
services 
Male Office at 
Saudi royal 
court  
Saudi Arabia 49 mins 
11 12-Apr Member  PhD Islamic 
Jurisprudence- 
IMSI University  
Financial 
services 
Male  Office at 
IMSI 
University  
Saudi Arabia 58 mins 




Fiqh - IMSI 
University    
Financial 
services 
Male Office at 
bank 
Saudi Arabia 42 mins 
13 18-Apr Member  Dr Shari’ah - 
IMSI University    
Financial 
services 
Male His home Saudi Arabia 46 mins 
14 25-Apr Member  Dr Shari’ah - 
IMSI University    
Financial 
services 
Male  Office at 
IMSI 
University  
Saudi Arabia 40 mins 
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Each of the respondents above has experienced at the highest level of IFI’s corporate hierarchy. 
They also select a conducive environment for an interview where they can deliver the best 
possible responses.  Another notable aspect from the respondent cohort above is that all the 
respondents were male. This is attributable to the dominance of male executives and board 
members in Saudi Arabian financial institutions. Table 4 provides details of the banks 
eliminated for anonymity involved in the survey. 
Table 5: Bank details, number of employees, annual revenue, number of interviews, and service type. 







Bank I 13,077 $ 4.2 billion 3 Full Islamic 
Services 
Bank II 2,953 $789M 1 Full Islamic 
Services 
Bank III 2,658 $ 1.2 billion 2 Full Islamic 
Services 
Bank IV 2300 $72 million 3 Full Islamic 
Services 
Bank V 1534 $1 billion 2 Commercial bank 
Bank VI 13,058 $6.3 billion 3 Commercial bank 
 
4.8. Data Analysis Procedure 
The collected data was coded by numbering every transcribed narrative between the interviewer 
and the interviewees. The qualitative data analysis process was achieved using the coding 
approach by Henning, van Resburg and Smit (2004) and Newman (2012): open coding, axial 
coding, and selective coding. First, open coding was used to familiarize with the collected 
qualitative data. At this stage, all the collected information was read and perused through two 
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to three times checking for salient points about board meetings, tasks, and interactions between 
SSBs and BODs. The identified open codes were highlighted using yellow colour.  
Second, axial coding was used where the researcher performed a line-by-line reading of each 
transcript interview data. At this step, the researcher started to create tentative labels for chunks 
of data that summarized what interviewees shared (Newman, 2012) regarding the nature of the 
relationship between the BODs and the SSB, factors that support or undermine the relationship 
SSBs and BODs, and potential areas of convergence in the roles of the BODs and SSBs within the 
IFIs. In the process, the researcher started to identify relationships among the open codes 
(Henning, van Resburg & Smit, 2004). Similar themes were identified and highlighted using blue, 
green, and red colours. 
Third, selective coding was then used to check if the same themes occurred elsewhere in the 
transcript or if other interviewees had mentioned the same themes. Selective coding enabled the 
integration to all themes identified from the data analysis process to create connection across 
themes. For results presentation, the identified themes were organized and presented to answer 
each of the three research questions (Newman, 2012). The interview transcriptions are 
presented in Appendix 2. 
4.9. Thematic Analysis Process 
The data analysis process commences with an analysis of the interview transcripts using line by 
line coding. During this process, the researcher assigns descriptive labels to each line of the 
participants’ response sheet. This ensures that the researcher interacts with each element of the 
data set, not leaving material details out (Tuckett 2005). Going through the interview transcripts 
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line by line also helps to ensure that the researcher is familiar with critical components of the 
research, identifying points that demand strong emphasis in research. This initial phase of the 
study allows the researcher to lift bits of relevant data from all the 14 interviews. The relevant 
data progress to the subsequent stage of the analysis phase. It is imperative to keep in mind that 
the researcher discerns meaningful data from the rest of the datasets by assessing the degree to 
which the data contributes to addressing the research question. Data that does not fall into this 
category do not progress to the next stage (Alhojailan, 2012). Example of responses that do not 
constitute meaningful data include details regarding the career of the respondents, or 
experiences that they have outside the context of their CG responsibilities. While this is 
important in discerning their credibility to engage in the study, some of the presentations of 
theoretical background are long and too descriptive to feature in the theoretical analysis segment 
of the study. As a result, this bit of the responses does not get through to the theoretical and the 
identification segment of the research, as this segment demands that the study deploys 
meaningful data.  
While long description, of personal goals or professional background, due to their irrelevance to 
the study findings, does not make it to the subsequent phase of the data analysis from the initial 
coding, examples of meaning data that goes through to the next stage include descriptions of the 
roles of the various boards. The second stage of the thematic analysis narrows down the data 
analysis process to identify constructs that will be meaningful in making conclusions from the 
research. In this phase, themes and theoretical segments begin to manifest after grouping all the 
meaningful data (Alhojailan, 2012). At this stage, the researcher begins to go back and forth in 
the data to identify meaningful themes that point towards a phenomenon of the relationship 
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between SSBs and the BODs. The study successfully identifies multiple relationships and 
convergence in data regarding the phenomena under investigation, enough to form strong 
themes (Vaismoradi, Turunen, & Bondas 2013). After identifying the theoretical segments and 
themes from the data, the researcher then digs deeper into the data to identify responses that 
present a universal view of the themes. These responses are set aside and serve as the evidence 
that the researcher integrates into the research text to support assertions made in the findings 
chapter (Marshall & Rossman 2014). Thus, the study deploys two data filtering stages. The first 
stage eliminates data that does not have an impact on the thematic and theoretical construction 
of the paper, while the second phase entails identifying responses with an adequate depth that 
they can serve as representatives of the assertions made by the participants, and reflect their 
experience and knowledge in the issue under investigation.  
The theme identification process is crucial to the thematic analysis process; hence, it is essential 
to detail it. After eliminating data that does not have meaningful content, the researcher reads 
the meaningful data again to establish common trends in the responses. Trends get the ‘theme’ 
classification are those that are visible in 12 (rationale explained below) out of the 14 responses, 
the study looks at such a high level of correlation in the respondent pool to ensure consistency. 
Those that manifest to a lower degree, i.e. do not meet the criteria established above, do not get 
this classification, and are discarded from the research process because they do not match the 
correlation benchmarks. The consistency that the respondents show in responding to the 
questions is fascinating, as the researcher does not experience extreme responses, and most of 
the feedback falls within a reasonable scope. After identifying the themes, the researcher created 
an explanatory system for each theme (Vaismoradi, Turunen and Bondas 2013). This allows the 
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researcher to capture the assumptions underlining each theme, and to provide the data that 
supports the assertions that the researcher presents in the findings section of the dissertation. 
The second framework of data filtering is important here because it helps the researcher to 
identify responses that are substantial enough to carry the weight of entire themes (Guest, 
MacQueen, & Namey 2011). While the study attempts to incorporate as much data evidence as 
possible in the findings section, it would be unrealistic to present all the responses here. 
Therefore, it becomes crucial to identify the responses that meet the criteria outlined for this 
segment of the data filtering process. The data analysis process helps the researcher to gain a 
deeper insight into the contribution of the participants into the study.  
While a thematic analysis constitutes an appropriate data analysis framework for this study, a 
number of issues required the attention of the researcher. For instance, the researcher is 
uncertain of the comprehensiveness of the initial coding of data, the second filtering and the 
theme development process. A concern that emerges is that there is a strong chance the 
researcher leaves out crucial data or includes data that is not meaningful in the theme 
development process. In order to address this issue, the researcher goes through the process 
several times, and only data that features in the various subcategories at least four times gets 
consideration. The researcher goes through the data four times in order to ensure that they do 
not miss any details, or they do not include details that fail to match the set criteria. The purpose 
of taking this measure is to diminish the prospect of human error (Vaismoradi, Turunen, & 
Bondas 2013).  
It also helps the researcher to ensure that they integrate all the crucial components of the data 
set in the theme development phase of analysis. Another prospect concern that emerges in the 
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course of the thematic analysis process is that some of the respondents might have issued 
extreme responses or assertions that are not relevant to the study. Going through the data 
analysis phase five times (The reason for electing to comb through the data this many times is to 
ensure that the researcher attached the accurate meaning to the responses provided by 
participants, as well as identify meaningful data that could be missing from the survey) provides 
the researcher with a chance to reduce such responses from the data analysis phase of the study. 
However, at the end of the fifth reading, which is the final reading based on the criteria described 
above, of the interview transcripts, no other themes emerged. Table 3 shows sections of the 
coding tables developed during the data analysis phase.  
Table 6:Excerpt from Member of BODs. 
The last meeting, I attended with members of the 
SC was in November 2017. That meeting was held 
at the Bank's main meeting hall to discuss the 
annual report of the SC. All SC members and 7 
members of the BOD attended this meeting which 
lasted for one and half hour. 
Collaboration between BOD and 
SSB, 
Representation of bank 
management in meetings,  
Duration of meetings 
Duration of meetings. 
Integration 
This bank relies more on the members of the SC to 
give the rulings of Islamic law in all his work and 
his contracts. Therefore, there is a necessity of the 
cooperation and mutual understanding between the 
BODs and the SC. 
Role of SSB,  
Mutual relationship,  
Cooperation. 
Roles 
About a week before the meeting, the board 
secretary asking board members for any items that 
they want to be added to the agenda. The board 
secretary sends the completed agenda out about 
four or five days before the meeting with a request 
for any additions, deletions, or corrections. 
Arranging board meeting,  
Role of board secretary,  
Active participation of members 









Table 7:Excerpt from Chief Executive Officer 
On a personal level, I participate in most social 
events and meet BODs and SSBs out of the bank. 
Participation with BOD and SSB Role 
I believe that the communication between the two 
boards had developed a lot after the participation of 
BOD and CEO in the SC meeting. 
Participation of BOD and CEO 
in SC meetings,  
Communication between boards 
and CEO 
Integration 
I believe that the decision of the participation of a 
member of BOD and CEO in SSB meeting 
contributed to the development of relations between 
the two councils. It is a modern movement that 
applies to Saudi banks, and I wish it will succeed. 
Participation of BOD and CEO 
in SC meetings,  




Table 8:Member of Shari’ah supervisory board 
I can describe the relationship with the BODs as a 
cooperative relationship to achieve the bank's 
objectives, and Muslim clients need. 
Quality relationship,  
Cooperation to achieve bank 
objective and protect client 
interests  
Integration 
The secretary of the SC (a full-time employee at the 
bank) prepares SC’s meeting agenda with all 
information related to the meeting then send it to all 
SC members before the meeting held insufficient 
time. During the meeting of the committee, 
everyone contributes to the debate with their 
opinion and vote on the decision is issued by the 
majority. 
Role and job position of SSB 
secretary,  
A full-time employee of the 
bank, 
Organising meetings,  
Right of active participation 
during meetings  
Policies and 
Procedures 
As for the agenda of meeting with BODs, I have no 
idea who responsible for preparing the agenda. 
Maybe it is prepared by the chairman of the board 
or the CEO!  Usually, we receive the approved 
agenda through the secretary of the SC, and we 
have the right to suggest and add any topic to the 
agenda before the meeting. During the meeting, 
everyone is given the opportunity to participate in 
the debate, and everyone has the right to express an 
opinion on all issues under discussion. As an 
Islamic supervisory committee, it is important for 
us to ensure that all decisions made at the meeting 
are in line with the requirements of Islamic law. 
Joint board meetings between 
SSB and BOD,  
Collaboration with SSB 
secretary in planning and 
communicating joint meetings to 
members,  
Equal right of participation,  






4.10. Ensuring Trustworthiness of the Findings 
All the data collection and analysis procedures have been presented and elaborately discussed 
showing the rigorous process that was used to reduce bias and achieve trustworthiness of the 
final findings. Throughout the data collection and data analysis process, the researcher was 
careful to remain objective when assessing the obtained information because what the 
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researcher hears and sees during the interview sessions can influence the validity and 
trustworthiness of qualitative research. Research into the validity and trustworthiness of findings 
and data shows that transferability, credibility, confirmability, and dependability are integral to 
discerning trustworthiness (Myers, 2013). Among the techniques to affirm transferability and 
credibility is to ensure that those who engage in the interview have the knowledge and 
experience to weigh in on the subject under investigation.  
In this study, the researcher ensures that all the participants meet this criterion by selecting only 
CEOs and board members from SSBs and the BODs. Taking this step affirms the credibility and 
transferability of the study findings. Evidence regarding the expertise and knowledge of the 
participants manifest in excerpts from the interviews that the study places throughout the 
findings section of the study (Marshall & Rossman 2014). This allows the readers to engage with 
the knowledge from the participants, as well as weigh in on their experience in the subject under 
investigation. Among aspects that affirm they have, the credibility to touch on the subject under 
investigation is the way that they outline the procedures, functions and the dynamics that 
surround the operation of the two boards. They also report on points of compliance with the law 
on SSBs’ implementation. Therefore, by focusing on a respondent cohort, that has experience 
and knowledge in the field under investigation helps the study to take the first step towards 
trustworthiness and validity.  
Another crucial component of trustworthiness that the study strives to satisfy is confirmability, 
which refers to consistency with research standards. One of the methods to use to check 
confirmability is the level of researcher bias. Confirmability t is directly proportional to research 
bias; hence, it is imperative to deploy a research approach that increases it. Therefore, the 
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researcher installs safeguards to ensure that this study satisfies this benchmark. For instance, the 
researcher double-checks the output from the respondents, and at the same time ensures that 
they go through the data during the analysis phase plenty of times to ensure that the findings 
section is based on statements from the respondents. The study also promotes confirmability by 
installing ethical safeguards against researcher bias during data collection (Saunders, Lewis, & 
Thornhill, 2012). A risk exists of posing leading questions that will direct the respondents towards 
a response. However, the researcher outlines the interview questions beforehand and avoids 
leading questions. This ensures that the responses provided by the participants mirror their own 
insights on the topic under investigation. Furthermore, the researcher familiarizes themselves 
with the participant intent and the content of their interview transcripts by coding them 
manually, as well as transcribing them. Taking these steps ensures that the study portrays the 
views of the participants on the topic under investigation, while at the same time reducing 
researcher bias. It becomes important for the researcher to take these steps in the data collection 
and preparation phase of the study to smoothen out subsequent segments of the study.  
Moving away from the data analysis phase of the study, the study outlines visible links between 
analysed data and theoretical assertions that the researcher makes in the last stages of the thesis. 
This is attainable through perpetual comparative analysis, which is essential in according 
credibility to the theories that manifest from the data because the researcher will be able to 
pinpoint areas of the data and themes where such phenomenon is present. To further the 
credibility of the study, the researcher ensures that the theoretical assertions have enough 
weight, determined by the amount of data that supports them (Myers 2013). Another aspect that 
ensures credibility in the final segments of the research, as well as the overall strategy that the 
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researcher implements is that the study attains virtual saturation, i.e. there were no further 
identifiable themes in the data after the analysis concludes. This affirms that the data which the 
researcher collects carries is enough and credible enough to make tangible theoretical assertions 
regarding the phenomenon after investigation. Thus, it is conceivable that the study meets all 
the credibility and confirmability requirements for validity and trustworthiness. However, the 
fourth component, transferability, which refers to the ability to rely on data in other studies, does 
not manifest in this study, largely because it is unique. Apart from the topic under investigation 
falling inside the discipline of cooperate governance that is relatively underexplored, the 
researcher takes a distinct approach in developing the theoretical basis for the entire study. In 
addition, literature in this area of study is still developing.  
Transferability is not the only concern that threatens the validity and trustworthiness of the 
study, but also the fact that the researcher resorts to conduct some of the interviews via phone. 
Birks and Milles (2011) establish that a researcher should maximise attention in the course of 
data collection, paying attention to all the essential components of verbal communication and 
attempt to eliminate any obstacles that would cause them to miss nonverbal cues. In deploying 
physical personal interviews, the researcher satisfies this benchmark. However, conducting some 
of the interviews via phone undermines this prospect, because it means there will be no physical 
interaction and visual contact with the respondents. In addition, choosing to integrate phone 
interviews and physical interviews harms consistency in the data collection, as the study does 
not interact with the respondents the same way. The researcher attempts to compensate for 
these concerns by ensuring that they engage the respondents comprehensively, guaranteeing 
that they contribute martially to the outcomes of the study (Marshall and Rossman 2014). The 
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transcripts from the recordings contain all the details from the interviews, apart from the 
personal information of the respondents, or information regarding the organization where they 
work. Eliminating this content ensures that the study does not violate the privacy and 
confidentiality of the respondents. Looking at the assessment of trustworthiness and validity 
above, it is safe to say that the study implements benchmarks that attempt to ensure that there 
are no loopholes in the data collection and analysis process, which help to uphold the required 
level of validity and trustworthiness.  
Apart from building a trustworthy study, the researcher will also pursue consistency by reducing 
potential researcher bias from the study. Unlike the risk of breaching the privacy and 
confidentiality of participants, this particular ethical concern carries greater implications for the 
outcome of the study. Additional safeguards against potential researcher bias are evident in the 
analysis phase of the research. For this phase, the researcher ensures that all the assertions made 
in the findings section have backing from the responses that the participants submit in the course 
of the interview. A comprehensive reference to the answers that they submit is made throughout 
the chapter, which closes potential loopholes to insert personal insights or enforce a particular 
point of view. In terms of participant bias, the study ensures that each participant taking part in 
the study is aware of its significance and the role that they are going to pay in the outcome of the 
research. 
While the use of secondary data would offer the study a wider data pool to use in the analysis 
phase, the research only relies on primary data. The reason for taking this approach is to ensure 
that changes in the operation framework of the IFIs do not render findings obsolete, which is a 
possibility with secondary data, especially data that is developed years ago. In addition, the 
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primary data supplied by respondents is adequate to provide reliable and valid findings on the 
topic under investigation. 
4.11. Ethical Considerations 
Research helps to gain a deeper understanding of the way society works. In business, research is 
particularly important because it helps to make sense of the various complex components of 
organizations. Successful research usually involves people, and whenever people are involved in 
research, the question of ethics follows. As a result, ethics is an integral component of research, 
and researchers have an obligation to ensure that they address these concerns, so as to ensure 
that they do not undermine the quality, reliability and validity of the research outcomes. For this 
particular study, the researcher contends with the following ethical issues  
1. Participant privacy and confidentiality: Each of the participants enjoys privacy and 
confidentiality protections. In addition, the organizations that they work for would like their 
data and information to remain confidential. Therefore, the research always faces the risk 
that they will violate the confidentiality and privacy rights of the various persons involved in 
the study. As a result, the study enacts precautions to guard against any data breaches. The 
first safeguard that the study installs is anonymity – an essential measure that seeks to uphold 
the privacy and confidentiality obligation of the researcher towards the respondents. The 
respondents provided comprehensive data useful for the study, which is all available in the 
thesis, but personal data is redacted for privacy purposes. In addition, when transcribing the 
recordings from the interviews, the researcher anonymized any personal information 
submitted by the respondent, including the name of the bank where they work or other 
professional identifiers. Taking this approach ensures that there are enough confidentiality 
169 
 
safeguards in place. Finally, the research requires the participants to sign a consent form, 
which outlines the privacy and confidentiality safeguards of the survey, before the interviews 
commence.  
2. Informed Consent from Participants and Institutions: Before commencing the data collection 
process, the researcher ensures that all the participants issue a willing and informed consent 
to engage in the study.  The researcher installs two consent safeguards, the first one being 
the institution where they work (see Appendix 3). This ensures that all stakeholders agree to 
the interview while ensuring that the respondents do not feel coerced, which would have 
been the case if the study seeks consent from the banks alone. The essence of the consent 
process is to ensure that the respondents agree to engage in the interview, as well as agree 
the researcher use the data that they submit.   
Apart from observing specific ethical requirements, the researcher also takes some general 
precautions. This makes ethics an integral component of the study. For instance, to ensure 
research quality and honesty, the researcher observes all the procedures outlined in the 
methodology chapter of the study. This helps to promote the validity of the study because the 
research approach that the researcher embraces personifies the highest possible standards of 
research. Other general precautions that the study takes is to ensure that all the participants 
satisfy credentials to be part of the research; hence, the reason the researcher opts to use the 
organizations as the conduit for securing participants. In addition, the move to anonymize all 
material containing personal information ensures that the researcher does not hold on to any 
private or confidential data without the consent of the participants. In fact, the researcher 
notifies the participants that all contents will be erased after the relevant data is transcribed.   
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4.12. Summary and Conclusion 
The chapter above provides a breakdown of the methodology that the researcher employs to 
answer research questions. While there are many research approaches that suit this type of 
study, the researcher elects to work with qualitative research design, using interviews as the 
primary and only form of data collection, as no secondary data was used. Qualitative research is 
appropriate for this study because it is consistent with the objectives of the researcher and the 
phenomenon that the researcher is looking to investigate. A quantitative research design would 
not work well with this subject because it investigates a multifaceted issue affecting the 
corporate community. Choosing to work with a quantitative research design would mean that 
the study only gets to investigate specific relationships, which would not be enough. The 
relationship between SSBs and the BODs is a complex connection that involves multiple 
organization elements, which would be difficult to deconstruct in a quantitative study. Thus, the 
subjective nature of qualitative research ensures that the scope of the focus of research is broad 
enough to enable the researcher to uncover all the necessary elements of this relationship. 
Narrowing down the methodology further, the researcher used interviews as the mode of data 
collection. Interviews make it possible to take advantage of expert knowledge by giving 
participants the freedom to provide assertions that infer their experiences regarding a 
phenomenon. A content analysis presents a strong case for consideration in this study. However, 
the fact that this is a relatively new area of study means that there is no adequate literature to 
support the deployment of a content analysis approach.  
The researcher considers other data collection alternatives such as direct observation, but none 
was compatible with the requirements of the thesis. Furthermore, the researcher finds 
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mechanisms to diminish some of the downsides of using interviews to collect data. In pursuing 
answers for the research questions, the researcher nor only deploys a data collection technique 
that is consistent with the theoretical underpinning of the study, but also installs safeguards to 
ensure that the outcomes of the study are valid and trustworthy. The researcher observes ethical 
vigilance, which ensures that ethical concerns emerging from the study do not have a telling 
impact on the final presentations. In addition, the researcher selects to work with a participant 
cohort that is experienced and has the knowledge to answer the questions in the survey 
interview. This is integral in affirming the credibility, dependability, and transferability of the 
study outcomes. In terms of confirmability, the researcher deploys safeguards to ensure that 
there is little to no researcher bias. Among the standards that the researcher observes in this 
regard include, familiarizing oneself with the intent and perceptions of the respondent by 
comprehensively interacting with the interview data. The researcher also installs safeguards in 
the data collection to ensure that they do not influence the responses that the participants 
provide. Finally, the research process exercises maximum fidelity to the standards outlined in this 
study to avoid validity and reliability concerns  
To guide the whole methodology, the study uses the constructivist approach. By taking this 
approach, the study ensures that it can cultivate theory from data, which is the essence of most 
studies that are investigating a specific phenomenon for the first time. In addition, the researcher 
has access to a cohort of experts in the field under investigation, which means that the data 
available for analysis is credible enough to provide a rationale for theoretical formulation. Taking 
this approach also ensures that the theories, which the researcher constructs, have a maximal 
effect on theory and practice. Also important is the contribution that it will have on future 
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research. Given that this is a relatively new topic developing a strong foundation for new research 
is quite essential. Another crucial aspect that the methodology chapter covers is the data analysis 
approach. To take advantage of the content drawn from experts in the field, the study selects a 
data analysis framework that will incorporate assertions from all participants. By deploying a 
content analysis approach, the researcher can focus the data analysis process in one area, while 
enjoying freedom in data interpretation. Therefore, this technique contributes materially to the 















Chapter 5: Findings 
5.1. Introduction 
This research seeks to analyse the relationship between SSBs and the BODs in IFIs in Saudi 
Arabia. Instead of building on the traditional notions of CG and the BODs’ dominance, this study 
pushes to identify how the CG environment in these financial institutions influences the 
interaction between the two boards, and how the boards relate to each other when discharging 
their duties. In the process, the study looked to identify the role of the BODs and SSB and how 
this affects the relationship between two. It also looked at the developments at the 
institutional level that IFIs make to integrate SSBs to their corporate structure. This chapter 
provides a breakdown of findings of a thematic analysis of semi-structured interviews carried 
out with SSBs, BODs’ members and CEOs; a process detailed in the methodology chapter. 
Through a thematic analysis, data drawn from the interviews are presented in this chapter. The 
chapter comprises of three sections. In the first section, the study reviews the CG structure of 
financial institutions in Saudi Arabia based on information drawn from secondary resources 
such as Iqbal and Mirakhor (2007), Granot, Brashear, and Motta (2012), and Khokhar and 
Bukhari (2014) because this information was not collected during the interview sessions. 
Instead, the information is meant to provide the contextual information within which the 
researcher understood and interpreted the interview data. The second section provides a 
breakdown of the main themes identified in the thematic analysis: the role of SSBs and BODs, 
communication, and information exchange between the two boards, and business processes 




5.2. Islamic Financial Institutions CG Structure 
CG is an integral component of the Saudi Arabia business environment. Like the rest of the world, 
the country maintains a comprehensive set of CG regulations that all organizations must follow. 
Part of the reason for installing CG rules is to safeguard shareholder interests, ensuring that 
managers do not abuse the shareholder resources in pursuit of their own ambitions. Therefore, 
CG rules in Saudi Arabia empower the BODs to execute their mandate as a conduit between the 
internal and the external environment (Granot, Brashear, & Motta, 2012; Iqbal & Mirakhor, 
2007). They also seek to provide a standard for establishing internal controls and strategies to 
continually protect shareholder wealth. Consequently, it is safe to say that CG plays an integral 
role in business in Saudi Arabia, just like in the rest of the world (Khokhar & Bukhari, 2014). This 
is evident in the actuality that IFIs in Saudi Arabia go beyond to develop an additional 
sustainability check to ensure that they attain the highest level of legitimacy, monitor compliance 
with Islamic law and install an additional voice in the strategic decision-making process that 
complements the BODs. 
The development of SSB is discretionary. However, IFIs in Saudi Arabia deploy internal business 
policies that seek to affirm their establishment within the corporate administrative framework 
and therefore tend to have SSB. The corporate frameworks and policies ensure that they have a 
clear mandate, and their freedom is sufficiently protected.  Despite these boards not being a legal 
requirement, it increases the reputation of these financial institutions, as they are able to show 
that they discharge their sustainability responsibilities. This plays an integral role in success in the 
Saudi Arabian market, because of the significant number of consumers that are interested in 
products that are Shari’ah compliant. Therefore, unlike other financial institutions, these 
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institutions have an additional layer of governance. In determining membership, the BODs select 
potential members, who are then elected by the shareholders, based on the policies and 
procedures that the respective banks put in place regarding the deployment of SSBs. The law 
does not stipulate the constitution of the SSBs, but most of the IFIs engaged in the study have a 
board comprising of at least three members. The Shari’ah supervisory sits near the top of the CG 
structure, ensuring that they have enough power and influence to exercise their responsibilities. 
Moving on to the composition of the boards, each of the financial institution engaged in the 
survey has a scholar of Shari’ah law, who operates as chairman of the board, heading the SSB. 
They also have another member who occupies the role of the general secretariat, providing a link 
between the SSB, the BODs and senior management at the organization. This ensures that there 
is smooth communication between the board and other components of the organization’s CG 
structure (Khokhar & Bukhari, 2014). However, it is imperative to note that the lack of a universal 
law guiding and mandating the adoption of SSB means that the banks develop the SSB internally. 
This is achieved through crafting SSB that is congruent with their corporate structure and 
objectives.   
5.3. Emerging Themes from Interview Data 
In this chapter, the main themes which will be discussed include the roles of the SSBs and BODs; 
integration strategies used to effectively embed SSBs to the administrative structure; business 
policies and communication; and collaboration between the SSBs and BODs. Each of the 
responses shared by the 14 interviewees is essential to the understanding of these themes based 
on their personal knowledge and experiences working in the Saudi Arabian IFIs.  
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These themes emerged by identifying keywords from the 14 interview responses which aligned 
with these terms or words: (1) roles, responsibilities, or obligations; (2) information and 
communication; and (3) processes or policies between the SSBs and BODs. Once these keywords 
had been identified from one interview, the researcher then systematically searched the corpus 
of texts from all the rest of the interviews to find all instances of the phrase, term, or word. Each 
time a term, word, or phrase was found from the interview texts, a copy of it was made and its 
immediate context. In the process, the emergence of the relevant themes discussed in the 
subsequent sections was identified by physically sorting the interview feedbacks into piles of 
similar meaning. The sections below provide a detailed breakdown of the contents of each 
theme. 
5.3.1. Role of the SSB and BOD Members 
Granot, Brashear, and Motta (2012) identified three board roles, i.e. monitoring and control, 
service, and strategic role. The three categorizations have a theoretical basis that expounds on 
the practical implications that the board is likely to have on the organization. In this study, each 
of the interviewees indicated a deep understanding of the roles of both the BODs and the SSBs 
in their respective organizations. CEOs, members from the BODs and respondents that were part 
of the SSB clearly underline the position of the two boards, mainly from the perspective of their 
respective organizations.  
An overview of the responses from the participants emphasises on service and strategy for the 
SSB while relating control and monitoring roles with the BODs. As applies to this study, the 
interview participants shared that in terms of monitoring and control, the BODs possess the 
ultimate source of authority in the banking and financial organisations, an aspect that gives rise 
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to responsibilities covered under this cluster of board roles. Further, the respondents maintain 
that it is the responsibility of the BODs to control the direction where the organization is headed 
in terms of strategy, both in the internal and external environment through the implementation 
of strategy and maintaining oversight of the management process. Focusing on the results, most 
of the respondents hold the view that the BODs have roles across all the three categories 
established in the past literature by researchers like Petrovic (2008). According to Al Elsheikh and 
Tanega (2011), the BODs acquire such an influential position, because the board draws its power 
from the shareholders, as custodians of investments that the owners make towards the financial 
institution. Further analysis of the responses indicates that the BODs personifies the highest level 
of authority when it comes to strategy formulation, which they do consistently with the 
objectives of the organization. This is an indication that the BODs play an integral role in steering 
the organization towards financial success through monitoring and controlling and strategy 
development, which are influential contributions towards fiscal success. For instance, BODs’ 
member 3 maintains that;  
The BOD is the highest administrative authority responsible to the General Meeting of 
shareholders in accordance with the Bank's policy. The main roles and functions of the 
Board are to draw up and adopt strategic directives and main objectives of the Bank, 
establish, and follow up the internal control and risk management procedures, ensure 
their efficiency and effectiveness, adopt key budgets and financial policies, follow, and 
monitor the CEO performance. 
The response above positions the BODs as influential in oversight and controlling and strategic 
roles. In that, the BODs serve to oversee financial success, strategy development and internal 
efficiency. These roles mean that the BODs serve as a compass for the financial institution, 
ensuring that the organization has a clear path to follow while having safeguards in place that 
safeguard shareholder equity. Engagement in risk management, a crucial function in 
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contemporary financial institutions, underscores the argument that the BODs serves to protect 
shareholder interests; hence, engaging in crucial activities that will safeguard shareholder wealth 
(SOCPA, 2016). The response above not only speaks to the roles and functions of the BODs but 
also their influence within the corporate space. Nothing personifies this fact more than the 
observation that the board monitors the CEO and their performance. BOD member 1 goes on to 
indicate, “My role in the BODs is complementary to my colleagues’ role. We all work for the 
interest of shareholders, employees and our community.” This underscores the significance of 
the input that the institution makes towards the progression of the organization, as well as its 
conformity to the needs of the shareholders.  
From the response by the BODs’ member 3, it is conceivable that there is a little limitation to 
their responsibility within the organization, from a strategy and monitoring and controlling 
perspective. Most importantly, they serve to ensure that the bank remains answerable to 
shareholders, as evident in the input by BOD 4, and from here, other responsibilities grow. These 
responsibilities include engagement in risk management, performance management and 
development of internal efficiency, which are components of monitoring and control. The wide 
scope of their power and engagement in corporate activities manifests in their decision-making 
role in some of the financial institutions (SOCPA, 2016). The respondents acknowledge that the 
BODs serve as the decision compass at the organization, outlining guidelines for other 
stakeholders to follow, and making decisions that are of significance at the organization. Still, 
their power to make all the critical decisions at the organization derives from the fact that they 
have an inherent responsibility to continue maximizing shareholder value at the organization, as 
BODs’ member 4 explains: 
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The BOD shaves the highest decision-making authority at the Bank. They are responsible 
for leading, supervising and controlling the Bank and is accountable to shareholders for 
achieving sustainable shareholder value by directing and supervising the Bank's business. 
In particular, the Bank's objectives, strategies and policies are established by the Board. 
The Board monitors the performance of the Bank's operations and directs guidance to the 
bank's management and supervises the implementation of these directives. 
In the description of the mandate enjoyed by the BODs provided above, the study recognizes that 
the BODs draw power from the shareholders. It is imperative to note the fact that though the 
BODs in these banks enjoy immense influence in the way of strategy roles and monitoring and 
control, their actions remain within the confines of CG rules in Saudi Arabia. Traditionally, the 
BODs exist to keep the executive directors in check, to ensure that they do not pursue their own 
agenda at the expense of shareholders (Asaad, 2007). This is a responsibility that BOD 4 
acknowledges in his response, and it is an observation that one could maintain is tied to the 
classical view of the BODs, as the pinnacle of CG in organizations. This is an observation that 
speaks to their monitoring and control role, fortifying the views articulated by BODs’ member 3. 
In exercising their monitoring and controlling responsibility, they ensure that they remain within 
the confines of CG guidelines. This is essential to cultivating responsible organizations, given that 
there is an authority that oversees the actions of those in charge of managing the organizations. 
Adherence to CG rules also plays an integral role in ensuring that they follow a predetermined 
legal framework; hence, satisfaction realization of their functions (SOCPA, 2016). It is imperative 
to note the fact that their responsibilities, as outlined under CG laws in Saudi Arabia, that the 
BODs ensure that the management carries out their role effectively. Consequently, in touching 
on the concept of compliance, it is safe to say that the board is doing well to satisfy its role as per 
directives of the law through their commitment to proper CG activities. This is an aspect that 
BODs’ member 5 acknowledges by indicating:  
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CG guide outlines the mechanism of convening meeting, the quorum for attendance, and 
voting mechanisms. The board meets at least once every three months. Unless otherwise 
agreed.  BODs meeting attended by a majority of the members. and during the meeting, 
each member participates in the debate and vote on decisions. The Secretary of board 
prepares the agenda for meeting with SC. During the meeting, everyone participates in 
the discussion and has the right to express his opinions on the issues that are under 
discussion. 
A noticeable aspect from the review of the board of director’s role above shows that most of the 
respondents who were engaged in the power of the BODs focus their responses towards 
monitoring and control (Asaad, 2007). While members of the BODs reiterate that they are the 
ultimate authority in banks. Admissions by members of the SSB in the subsequent segments of 
this section show that the BODs now experience an additional check to their activities, which is 
usually not the case in a CG structure that does not integrate an additional board. Just like board 
members clearly outline the role of the BODs, so does members of the SB with regard to the roles 
of the SSBs. All the respondents that are part of these committees maintain that they have a 
responsibility to ensure that their respective organizations operate within the confines of 
Shari’ah laws. Banks that have a commitment to observe these laws in their operations 
experience aboard that exercises greater power, but their responsibility on paper remains to 
ensure that the financial institution adheres to provisions of Islamic laws. In institutions where 
the committee exercises a greater scope of responsibility, one could see greater engagement in 
undertakings and other core activities in the organization, as SSBs member 2 puts it in the 
response below, an aspect that shows the CG structure is looking at an additional authority that 
has noticeable influence.  
The Shari’ah Group aims to contribute to the Bank strategy by supporting the necessary 
plans and policies to achieve the Bank's commitment to carry out its transactions in 
accordance with Islamic law. To achieve these objectives, the Shari’ah Group undertakes 
the following tasks: Studying the Bank's transactions, activities, and processing for 
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submission to the SSB to issue their fatwa. Monitor the implementation of decisions of the 
SSB in all internal and external operations. Development of formulas, contracts and 
products in light of the provisions of Islamic law. They are promoting awareness of Islamic 
finance inside and outside the bank and developing the information and communications 
necessary to carry out the tasks of the SSB. 
From the response above, one could see that the SSB has a say on the strategic direction that the 
banks take. The respondent shows that the board contributes to the strategic shape of the 
organization by engagement in policy development, specifically in matters relating to Islamic law, 
indicating “Development of formulas, contracts and products in light of the provisions of Islamic 
law.” Given that the financial institutions under investigation are Islamic in nature, it is safe to 
say that Islamic law influences critical components of their business systems. This fact 
underscores the observation that the SSB occupies a strategy role within IFIs, in terms of 
analysing the corporate structure and issuing a strategic direction that is consistent with Shari’ah 
laws. This is essential for consumers because they are looking at products that are consistent 
with their lifestyle and culture. Consequently, the SSB not only plays a strategic role by virtue of 
their position within the organization, but they are also responsible to consumers, who are 
affected by the processes and products that the banks deploy. 
The Shari’ah branch of the CG framework also plays a service role within the corporate 
framework. This manifests in a wide array of ways, including providing the bank with the support 
that it needs to attain legitimacy by ensuring the development of products that are consistent 
with consumer needs. For instance, SSB member 3 indicates that “For example, several months 
ago, members of the SC rejected the board's proposal for a new product.” This is an indication 
that helps to create a legitimate internal environment by subjecting the bank’s activities to 
legitimacy checks that products and processes would not undergo in the absence of the SSB 
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(Asaad, 2007). The Shari’ah arm of the CG framework ensures the realization of legitimacy by 
monitoring compliance, as one of the respondents indicates that they, “Monitor the 
implementation of decisions of the SC in all internal and external operations.” This is an indication 
that they are an integral component of the strategic and service framework of IFIs. They expand 
this role further by supplying information to management on ways that they can continue to 
improve the organization. SSBs member 2 reports on a meeting and in his response, goes on to 
indicate that, “This meeting was followed by a vote on the need of implement annual training 
programs in Islamic finance for the top management team.”  Therefore, as part of their service 
role, they issue advice and resolutions that will intensify the capacity by the banks to become 
more compliant to Shari’ah laws. 
From the responses, one could also see that the board has the potential to expand its service role 
within IFIs. The respondents' point towards the capacity to evolve in the way that they integrate 
with other functions of the organization. For example, one of the respondents indicates that the 
SSB engages in, ‘developing the information and communications necessary to carry out the 
tasks’, an indication that they can continue to grow their position in the internal and external 
environment through facility changes that intensify their effectiveness. The fact that Islamic law 
influences core elements of the organization, such as products and corporate culture, see SC 
becomes essential in the service and strategic role of organizations. However, at the same time, 
they are causing a major disruption to the conventional CG system, initially dominated by the 
BODs. This is largely down to the fact that the board is seeing their decisions become more 
scrutinized. Without the SSB, decisions made by the board would be implemented in IFIs without 
a second thought. Instead, they are now undergoing an additional check, in a bid by the SSB to 
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satisfy their service and strategic roles within the organization. Nothing captures this clearer that 
the response below from SSBs member 3, who indicates that  
All decisions of the SSB, in my opinion, is strategic. For example, several months ago, 
members of the SBBs rejected the board's proposal for a new product. I remember then 
that the BODs tried to pressure the SSB to get approval for the adoption of this product. 
Since all the services of the Bank are compliant with Islamic law, we have the power under 
the bank's policy to ensure that all bank products comply with Shari’ah requirements. We 
studied the product and found that there was suspicion of harm and that customers might 
be deceived. The Commission, therefore, insisted that the product should not be approved. 
At this meeting, all SSB members attended, all Board of Director members, the CEO and 
the products manager. 
The observation above by one of the SSB members taking part in the interview not only 
underlines the strategic and service role of SSBs but also hint at the presence of strong integration 
strategies that banks put in place to ensure that the SSBs have a say in the direction that a 
financial institution takes. Furthermore, the response above captures an aspect of monitoring 
and control in the role of SSBs, indicating “several months ago, members of the SC rejected the 
board's proposal for a new product.” This is an indication that in exercising their role to ensure 
compliance with Islamic law, the SSB gains a responsibility enshrined under the monitoring and 
control component of board responsibilities, as described by Petrovic (2008). From the above, it 
is conceivable that the SSBs roles in IFIs can be categorized under strategy and service role, as 
well as monitoring and control. The contribution of the SSB in these areas is noticeable, which 
means that they are as essential in the CG structure as the BODs. Despite some of the 
respondents recognizing the BODs as the ultimate authority at the organization, this does not 
prevent the SSBs from satisfying their roles, which are visible in the monitoring and controlling, 
strategy and service segments of board roles. With this in mind, it becomes evident that the SSB 
plays an integral role in the CG system of IFIs in Saudi Arabia.   
184 
 
From the above, the roles of the BODs and the SSBs under the categories explained by Petrovic 
(2008) are described. It is vital to look at how these institutions view and conduct themselves 
when other factors are put into consideration. One can see that the setup of the SSB allows 
members to contribute towards attaining legitimacy, checking compliance, and issuing advice on 
how IFIs can offer more lucrative product packages to consumers. Most importantly, they cause 
a disruption in the CG structure of financial institutions, by introducing an additional check to the 
authority of the BODs. In addition, they contribute towards broader checks and balances system 
for the executives through their service and strategy role. While executives acknowledge that 
they occupy an essential unique role within the corporate framework, they also notice growing 
integration between their work and that of the two boards, especially in terms of bringing in SSBs 
as part of the system that is responsible for spearheading success in financial institutions (Asaad, 
2007). Furthermore, this integration is becoming a critical component of the corporate structure 
and culture, a phenomenon attributable to internal policies that the IFIs adopt to promote 
sustainability and community satisfaction, an actuality that board of director member one 
captures well in the response below:  
Board Members and Management team in a cooperative relationship governed by the 
Bank's policy and governance regulations, we are all work to serve the interests of 
shareholders, stakeholders, and community. 
Given that the study investigates the overall CG framework, it is imperative to look at the way 
that the executive directors view their role, which is basically managerial and remains within the 




As a CEO of the Bank. Of course, my duty is important. In general, my duties are: 
Implement business plans, strategies and visions that contribute to the growth of the 
bank's profits and managing a daily business in the bank. and implement the vital and 
important decisions for the bank, which help in applying the long and short-term plans. I 
managed the bank's capital and expenses in a manner consistent with its strategies. And 
Contribute to the development of the annual budget of the bank. 
Integration Strategies. The focus of this section is to look at measures that the two boards have 
taken to make it possible for them to work together. SSB members are not a component of 
conventional CG systems. As a result, their introduction to the corporate administrative space 
among IFIs could be problematic. The essence of this section is to look at how IFIs that have SSBs 
have accommodated them, or attempt to accommodate them, alongside the BODs.  
From the interview responses, one could see that there is a wide array of strategies in place to 
ensure that the SSB is well integrated into the administrative cog of Shari’ah financial institutions. 
The first component of the integration strategies identifiable in the interview survey is the 
presence of internal policies that direct the use of SSBs in a space where the BODs exists. The 
BODs’ member 1 reiterates that “Board Members and Management team in a cooperative 
relationship governed by the Bank's policy and governance regulations” This shows that the bank 
policy outlines a foundation for the integration of the SSB to the administrative framework of 
IFIs. Furthermore, the spirit of integration also ensures that the banks maintain a clear distinction 
between the contribution of the BODs and the SSB. The bank policies ensure that they serve 
highly distinct functions. Furthermore, their demands in terms of staff competency vary a great 
deal. As a result, members of the two boards acknowledge that they work together, but then 
reiterate their difference in functions by indicating that they serve to complement each other 
(Asaad, 2007).  The BODs bring in their administrative expertise, while the Shari’ah committees 
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ensure adequate compliance with Islamic laws. In doing so, they help each other to serve the 
organization better and realize success, as SSB member 1:   
Regarding the relationship with the members of the BODs, it is a complementary 
relationship from my point of view. The board has specific tasks, and we have different 
specific tasks, and we may request a meeting with the board if necessary, as happened at 
the end of the last year 2017. When the SSB requested a meeting with members of the 
BOD to review and discuss the SSB’s annual report. 
A more profound assessment of the response above allows for the consideration of the fact that 
the BODs do not prioritize service, process, and product cultural sustainability, which brings in 
the SSB. The SSB brings in expertise, focus and purpose that is tailored towards ensuring 
compliance with Islamic law, an aspect that makes them integrate with the BODs. For instance, 
SSB member reiterates an instance where they had to come in to oversee a critical transition in 
the business process of the bank in the response below;  
There was a strategic decision taken two years ago and was on the transformation of all 
the Bank's traditional operations to the processes of conformity to Islamic law. In my 
opinion, the SSBs were able to convince the BODs to convert bank operations to full Islamic 
financial services. This decision was made in response to the demands of most 
shareholders and in line with the need of the Saudi society, which is a predominantly 
Muslim society. Therefore, the decision was taken by the consensus of the members of the 
SC and by the consensus of the members of the BODs. 
BODs’ member 5 also supports this view of integration and an integrative relationship between 
the two boards in a response that outlines the focus of SSBs on Shari’ah law, an aspect that the 
BODs does not emphasise on considerably.  
One strategic decision was taken the last year 2017 when SC suggested implementing an 
awareness seminar in Islamic finance for the top management team. the meeting lasted 
for 2 hours and was attended by all SC, all BODs, and the CEO. At the meeting, the 
Chairman of the SC presented the details of their suggestion then we start a discussion, 
and unanimous vote has been taken from BODs with approval to implement this seminar 
every three months. 
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The response above underscores the differences between the two boards in executing their 
administrative duties in IFIs. This variation in priority, stakeholder group focus and expertise 
ensure that banks are able to integrate SSBs and the BODs within the same administrative space. 
Put simply, the boards come together to create a better organization, by sharing elements that 
the other cannot offer. Furthermore, that the respondents show that the SC does have the 
mandate to open discussions with the BODs on manners influencing the organization, an aspect 
that helps to ensure that they are well embedded into the organization’s administrative structure 
(SOCPA, 2016). The distinct contributions of these boards are evident in the monitoring 
compliance service role of SSBs in IFIs. Since banks in Saudi Arabia commit to providing products 
that are consistent with Islamic laws, SSBs take up the role of affirming that they meet the 
benchmarks set out for them.  SSBs member 1 reiterates this function and touches on how the 
banks are opening up the workspace so that they can coexist well with the BODs; 
Certainly, all SC members do an important role in providing Islamic legal opinion and fatwa 
for all bank's operations. On a personal level, I am keen to share my thoughts with the rest 
of the SC members and all BOD members. On a personal level, I am keen to achieve both 
short and long-term objectives. 
From the above, it is conceivable that SSBs go on to touch on crucial matters that involve the 
daily running of banks in Saudi Arabia. Most importantly, they execute this function in 
conjunction with the BODs within a corporate space that is accommodating. For instance, SSB 
member 2 shows that the SSB gets to scrutinize the decisions made by the BODs, a power vested 
in them by the business policies. He indicates that “several months ago, members of the SSBs 
rejected the board's proposal for a new product. I remember then that the BODs tried to pressure 
the SC to get approval for the adoption of this product (Asaad, 2007). Since all the services of the 
Bank are compliant with Islamic law, we have the power under the bank's policy to ensure that 
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all bank products comply with Shari’ah requirements.” These points towards a corporate 
structure that sets a foundation through policy to ensure adequate integration of SSBs (SOCPA, 
2016). Consequently, it is safe to say that the integration strategies outlined by IFIs that have an 
SSB do well to set a solid policy foundation that ensures that the two boards discharge their 
mandates separately, and without any interference from one another. 
In assessing the integration strategies that financial institutions use to bring SSBs to the fold, the 
study identifies that SSBs get the mandate to interact with a wide array of issues pertaining to 
the organization. For instance, they do get a chance to scrutinize strategy and identify problems 
with the way that the organization is run. This actuality manifests in instances where the BODs 
and the SSBs work together towards attaining a particular goal. BODs’ member 1 captures this 
phenomenon clearly is an example of a meeting that he outlines in the response below:  
One of the strategic decisions was taken with the participation of SSB members was in the 
middle of the last year 2017. The meeting was held at the Bank to discuss the appointment 
of (4) Shari’ah coordinators in some bank's departments (Audit - Compliance - Corporate 
Services - Customer Services). The meeting attendance was all SSBs (4) members, (8) 
members from BOD, the CEO, and some top management team. The meeting lasted for 
two hours. I was very pleased with this meeting because it gave me more information 
about the nature of the SC work and their role in making Bank's mission successful. 
Taking time out to consult with members of SSBs on changes that affect them, as well as the 
entire organization, is an indication that stakeholders within the administrative space of IFIs are 
pushing for the integration of SSBs into the administration of the organizations.  
The response above also captures the contribution that executives have towards the realization 
of effective integration. Naturally, the chief executive officer is present in some board meetings. 
However, in the response above, one can see a more complex CG structure, especially for those 
that operate in a corporate environment that does not follow Islamic law. The BODs, an executive 
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and the SC engage in influencing the course of a singular aspect of the organization. Mapping the 
functions that they come together to satisfy to the various functions of the two boards shows 
that the executive branch is also engaging in the process of bringing the SSB comfortably into the 
governance structure of financial institutions. This ensures that the SC is responsible for 
delivering services and a corporate image that is consistent with Islamic law to the external 
environment, without experiencing any difficulties in the form of opposition from the BODs and 
executive directors at the organization (Ramady, 2009). It would be impossible for the IFIs to 
attain successful banking in accordance with Islamic law, without the engagement of the SSBs. 
This is largely due to the actuality that they bring in something different, something that Thebes 
does not bring to the table; hence, the move to build business policies that protect their 
independence and mandate in the organization. While it is important to acknowledge the fact 
that the SSBs are enjoying a wealth of strategies geared towards making sure that they integrate 
well into the internal environment, one could argue that it is a particular component of the 
governance framework of IFIs (Asaad, 2007). Much of this is attributable to the fact that they do 
not exist in other types of financial institutions or organizations. This fact underscores the 
importance of the integration strategies that companies take to ensure that the SSBs carry out 
their tasks well. It becomes a common practice across the corporate space by members of the 
administrative team, as CEO 1 indicates, “Through my recent experience in my duties as CEO of 
this bank, I have already met with all SSB members after two months of my joining this bank. In 
fact, I see that they are very cooperative, especially as this bank offers full Islamic services. From 
my own perspective, SSBs are the key element in the bank's success.” This shows a strong sense 
of willingness to bring the SSBs into the fold in terms of administration. Furthermore, the 
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business policies that formulate these institutions contribute to the creation of a context where 
SSBs are able to bring others to the fold in executing their role, as described in the section above. 
Nothing captures this phenomenon as clearly as SSB member 1, who provides an example of an 
instance where SSB had to work with the board and the executive to resolve an issue pertaining 
to a particular product:  
In my view, all decisions issued by the SC are strategic decisions as it affects the interests 
of shareholders and society. 5 months ago, we made an important decision about a new 
Islamic product. We have taken care to study this product in terms of Islamic law after 
receiving the product's proposal through the CEO. For more information on this product 
and its mechanism, we requested a meeting with BODs. Attendance of this meeting was 
(8) BODS, the CEO, products manager and all SC members. During this meeting, we were 
provided with adequate information that enabled us to make a decision. 
Evidence of integration between the two boards is also provided in the responses from members 
of the BODs. This is an indication that the banks are working well to ensure that the two boards 
work together, by adequately embedding SSBs to the administrative process of the IFIs. The 
response below from BODs’ member 2 shows how they perceive their integration with the SC;  
The last meeting was in February this year to adopt a new product for the 
international markets. Both BODs and SC have worked closely to adopting that new 
product internationally. which in my view, a successful strategic decision made in 
cooperation between BOD and the SC? 
 From the above, it is conceivable that the BODs and other members of the IFIs' 
administrative system have set up a framework to support the integration of SSBs to the process 
of leading these financial institutions. This is built on a set of policies that seek to ensure that the 
SSBs carry out their mandate and that their work does not suffer any interruption. Consequently, 
it is safe to say that SSBs are operating in a corporate environment that supports their strategic 
and service role, as well as their monitoring and control role. This, however, comes under threat 
considering that the BODs are perceived as the ultimate authority, as one of the respondents 
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indicates that the board pressured them to adopt a product that does not comply with Islamic 
law (Ramady, 2009). They manage to maintain their position, as they draw independence and 
mandate from the policies that the banks put in place to support the execution of their duties. 
Looking at this, as well as the fact that the two boards undertake variant roles, one can safely 
argue that they have a complementary relationship, one that is adequately facilitated by the 
integration strategies adopted by Islamic institutions in Saudi Arabia.  
5.3.2. Communication and Information Exchange 
The essence of this section is to capture the way that SSB and the BODs exercise their 
responsibilities, and how this influences how the two boards communicate and exchange 
information with each other. This section is built on the back of the fact that IFIs have 
comprehensive integration policies, and the variant roles between the two boards help the 
creation of an integrative relationship. The findings of the study not only show the level of 
integration between the two bodies, as well as their various roles but also uncover critical 
components of the way that they exchange information and interact with each other. One could 
say that the two boards personify a solid information exchange profile and communication that 
is geared towards cementing integration. This is evident in the fact that they converge on a 
number of occasions to discuss matters that are of significance to the organization, without any 
notable conflict of interest, or show of power struggle. Though the law mandates that Islamic 
banks in Saudi Arabia have SSBs to oversee the development of banking practices that are 
consistent with Islamic law, the implementation of these organizations grows exponentially in 
practice. SSBs have been able to invent themselves in terms of the scope of their responsibility 
and their relationship with other bodies in the organization, the more they explore the banking 
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environment (Asaad, 2007). SSB member 4 maintains, “On the personal level, I do not seek to 
play the most important role than rest of the SC members or BOD members.” This is an indication 
that there is a good balance; hence, the ability to converge and exchange information on how to 
run the organization. In addition, the two boards establish a strong working connection, because 
of the constant engagement that they have with each other, owing to the fact that they need 
each other in order to realize a successful organization. Perpetual engagement between the 
BODs and the SSBs shapes the integrative relationship between the two in practice, which 
contributes to a stronger realization of the responsibilities assigned to the BODs and the SSB. This 
is an aspect observed by CEO 1 in the response below:  
I believe that the decision of the participation of a member of BOD and CEO in SSB meeting 
contributed to the development of relations between the two councils. It is a modern 
movement that applies to Saudi banks, and I wish it will succeed. 
His response shows the way that constant engagement improves the complementary 
relationship between the two boards, as well as the growth avenues available for the relationship 
between the BODs and the SSB. The response also characterizes the integration of SSB into CG 
as a ‘modern move’, an indication that the SSBs are an integral component of the contemporary 
CG system (Al-Shamrani, 2014). This is an aspect that echoes the point in findings that the 
influence that Islamic law has on products and the corporate culture of Saudi banks exalts the 
role of SSBs in the contemporary corporate environment, as they are the custodians of the law 
within the banks. Further engagement with CEO 1 drives out the belief that the executives can 
be influential in the operation of the BODs and SSBs. In one of the responses, he indicates that “I 
believe that the CEO can play mediator role of the relationship between the BODs and the SC.” 
Mediation refers to serving as a connection between the two boards. These points towards an 
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internal capacity within IFIs to strengthen the connection between the BODs and the SSBs, while 
at the same time supporting the position that there is a positive communication and information 
exchange culture across the hierarchy of companies that have an SSBs and the BODs (Ramady, 
2009). The view that the two boards share information and remain in touch is not only evident 
in the input by CEO 1, but also other respondents hold the view that the boards maintain constant 
communication. According to BODs’ member 1, there is a cooperative relationship between the 
SSBs and the BODs, further explaining that “In general, the relationship between BODs is a 
cooperative relationship. As well as the BODs relationship with members of the SC. Consequently, 
one can see that there is a strong theme of integration between the two institutions, especially 
when you put into consideration the fact that there are some responsibilities that the two boards 
share between themselves, as well as the fact that they take time to communicate and share 
information.  
Some of the respondents are of the view that a good level of cooperation between the 
BODs is a necessity as they share the same goal, of driving Islamic banks towards success. 
According to BODs’ member 1, “there is a necessity of the cooperation and mutual understanding 
between the BODs and the SC.” The fact that they cooperate towards common corporate goals 
at the bank supports the idea that their relationship is only growing. Importantly, it supports the 
idea that the modern business environment is supporting the expansion of SC in Saudi banks (Al-
Shamrani, 2014). In fact, some of the respondents acknowledge the involvement of the SSBs in 
activities that may be reserved for the BODs in the conventional CG system, at a capacity that 
sees them extend their role to monitor compliance. Among such activities is engagement with 
shareholders, as one BODs’ member 1 maintains, “Moreover, the relationship with the members 
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of the SC is very good, and some of the BODs participated in the annual meeting of the SC with 
the shareholders.” This is an indication that SSBs have access to information and stakeholders 
that are necessary for them to discharge their mandate, and to become adequately integrated 
into the corporate structure.  
 Respondents, especially BODs in explaining the role of the BODs reiterate its responsibility 
to shareholders, as a body responsible for management oversight. In addition, the study 
establishes that this where they draw their influence from. Since they are to ensure that 
management does not pursue selfish interests through sustainable practices, they get to have a 
say in almost every aspect of the organization. However, the roles section also reveals that the 
SSBs are growing in influence, due to the fact that Islamic laws are now touching on more crucial 
elements of the banks (Al-Shamrani, 2014). In assessing the theme of the mutual relationship 
between the BODs and SSB, the study establishes that SSBs also have a stakeholder group that 
affirms their influence in the organization, i.e. customers. In delivering service to the 
shareholders, the BODs are to ensure that customers are happy. Otherwise, the bank is without 
a source of revenue due to its failure to meet consumer needs. To make this happen, they invoke 
the relationship with SSBs in order to ensure that the organization is able to advance consumer 
demands on a consistent basis. Therefore, in pursuant of their objectives to create a healthy 
organization in the long term, the BODs work closely with the SC, whose responsibility is to 
Muslim clients, as SSB member indicates, “I can describe the relationship with the BODs as a 
cooperative relationship to achieve bank's objectives and Muslim clients need.” Consequently, 
the necessity to corporate draws from the fact that it makes it possible for the organization to 
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meet its goals, as well as satisfy the needs of Muslim clients, being an organization that exists in 
a market dominated by Muslim culture. 
 From the response above, it is conceivable that both boards have a stakeholder group 
that they are responsible for, which plays an integral role in cementing the integrative 
relationship between the two boards. Moving on in the assessment of the communication and 
information flow between the two boards, it is observable that at no point do these two boards 
pursue agendas that are different to the other, or incongruent with the bank’s objectives. 
Instead, they continue working together towards a common objective, regardless of the area of 
the organization where they make their input (Ramady, 2009). This occurs because the Shari’ah 
and the BODs converge to deliver results that have a positive impact on the financial institution. 
This is an observation that SSBs member 4 affirms by describing the relationship between the 
two boards integrative, arguing; 
Through my long experience in membership of SSBs in many IFIs in the Islamic world. I can 
describe relationships between members of SC members and board members as 
"integrative relationship” each team works in harmony and understanding that is 
reflected positively on the decisions taken by the two boards.  
The response above is backed up by an observation by CEO 1, who provides a breakdown 
of the way that the two boards work together in collaboration, and how the executive influences 
this connection. 
I participate in the meetings of SC with BODs, Sometimes I suggest topics for meeting's 
agenda, but I do not interfere in the functions of the BOD Secretary and SC Secretary, who 
usually cooperate in the preparation of the agenda, but I provide all the information 
required for the meeting. The Chairman of the BODs is the one who invites for the meeting. 
The Board usually meets 4-6 meetings annually. But the meetings with SSB members are 
less and may reach 3 meetings annually. During the meeting, each member is allowed to 
participate in the debate and to express his opinions. 
196 
 
Another crucial point that one can pick from the responses above is the reinforcement of the 
idea that the boards collaborate in the decision-making process. The respondent, who is a 
member of an SSB board, concludes by indicating that the decisions taken by the two boards 
integrate the input of the boards. The capacity to work together and to bring in the chief 
executive, a proxy to the management team, is an indication of tangible collaboration between 
the SSB and the BODs.   
It is, therefore, safe to say that the degree of collaboration between the two boards is noticeable. 
However, it is imperative to note that the relationship does not extend beyond the primary 
functions of the two boards. In fact, it is conceivable that the two boards cultivate a 
communication and interaction framework so that they are able to satisfy their primary 
functions. In a professional context, such as the nature of the relationship that one should expect 
between components of the organization structure (Al-Shamrani, 2014). Consequently, one 
could say that the degree of convergence between the two boards is adequate to ensure that 
they satisfactorily discharge their mandates. In addition, it is professional enough to prevent the 
emergence of a conflict of interest or a power struggle, as BOD 4 explains in the response below. 
Here, one can see the procedural commitments between the two boards, as well as the ability to 
exchange information and communicate at a level that makes it possible for them to work 
together well. 
As for the relationship with the members of the SSB is a typical professional relationship. 
We meet with the members of the SSB in periodic meetings of approximately two to three 
meetings annually according to the need of work. I remember that the last meeting with 
the members of the SSBs was in January at the beginning of this year 2018. The aim of 
that meeting was to discuss with SSB members their work plans for 2018. All the members 
of the SSB (3 members) and all the members of the BODs of the Bank (9 members) 
attended the meeting. I think the meeting started at 9 am and lasted for about two hours.  
197 
 
The response above helps to gain an understanding of the setup that the two boards operate 
within, and one could argue that the SSBs have an optimal context for discharging their mandate. 
The response below from CEO 1 reinforces this point further, maintaining: 
I participate in the meetings of SC with BODs, Sometimes I suggest topics for meeting's 
agenda, but I do not interfere in the functions of the BOD Secretary and SC Secretary, who 
usually cooperate in the preparation of the agenda, but I provide all the information 
required for the meeting. The Chairman of the BODs is the one who invites for the meeting. 
The Board usually meets 4-6 meetings annually. But the meetings with SSB members are 
less and may reach 3 meetings annually. During the meeting, each member is allowed to 
participate in the debate and to express his opinions. 
The observations from a board member and CEO above shows that the two boards are able two 
are able to cultivate the necessary connections in order to ensure that they can work well. This 
relationship is not only evident in the engagement between the two boards, but also executives 
at the organization who interact with members from both sides. A CEO from the interview 
indicates that the relationship between the BODs and the SSB is a positive one, allowing them to 
complement each other. He attributes the connection that the two shares as personifying 
confidence and cooperation when carrying activities of the bank. From his position, CEO 2 issues 
the following response to describe the connection that exists between the two boards:  
As a CEO of the bank, I can describe the relationship between members of the BODs and 
SC members as a relationship of cooperation and confidence between the parties. The 
BODs are aware of the functions of the SC in reviewing all bank operations to ensure that 
they comply with Shari’ah. The members of the SC are also aware of the role of the BODs 
and the management team in managing the bank's business and ensuring the interests of 
shareholders. 
First, there is adequate comprehension of their tasks, which opens them up to greater 
effectiveness, as well as responsiveness to the expectations of the other parties that they work 
with. In that, the SSB members understand their functions, while the members of the BODs have 
a grip on their responsibilities. The outcome of this is a CG framework where each of the players 
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serves in a manner that does not undermine the responsibility of the other; hence, the ability by 
the two boards to exchange information and communicate through the established formal 
channels (Ramady, 2009). In addition, it helps them identify areas of convergence, and whenever 
the responsibility of one party is exalted, it is justifiable and does not provide a platform for 
conflict. For instance, members of the Shari’ah community reiterate that they are part of the 
strategic cog of the organization. While traditionally, this is a role reserved for the BODs, the 
mutual understanding and cooperation between the two boards facilitate engagement in crucial 
factors across the board. SSBs member 2 reiterate this situation in the response below: 
All decisions issued by the SC are strategic decisions because they contribute to the Bank's 
commitment to the requirements of Islamic law. The last decision taken was in two 
months ago, it was about conducting the "Islamic Banking Audit program" this training 
course for the top management team. Members of the SC. proposed the program the 
meeting was attended by 4 members of the SC, 10 members form the Board of Director, 
The CEO and training manager. This meeting was followed by a vote on the need to 
implement annual training programs in Islamic finance for the top management team.  
From the above, it is conceivable that a platform exists inside Saudi Arabia’s IFIs that facilitate 
information exchange and communication between the two boards, an aspect that allows them 
to attain the collaboration discussed earlier. This makes the two boards important to each other, 
and calls for a chance to touch on the way that these institutions set up in order to support the 
collaboration, communication and information exchange between the Shari’ah supervisory 
committee and the BODs.   
5.3.3. Business processes and policies 
The IFIs in Saudi Arabia define the SSBs based on business policies that underline their role, 
constitution, and purpose. Throughout the interview, it is evident that reliance on business policy 
helps some of the banking institutions to develop a satisfactory CG structure that can take 
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advantage of the SSBs. This is attributable to the fact that the policy directives are clear regarding 
their formulation and scope of contribution within the corporate space (Morris et al., 2017). For 
instance, most of the banks develop policies that outline the number of SSB members that they 
can have. For instance, all the respondents that outline the formulation and functioning of the 
various SSBs depend on the business policies that their various organizations have in place to 
guide the Shari’ah -based banking system (Granot, Brashear, & Motta, 2012; Iqbal & Mirakhor, 
2007). Thus, the banks satisfy the minimum requirements and even go one better by instituting  
SSBs that comprise of more than one person in some cases, which adds to their effectiveness 
because of the expertise prevalent in the board. Furthermore, the banks ensure that the SSBs 
satisfy their fundamental responsibility, as the business policy in place requires of them. 
According to CEO 1, “The role of the SSB members is to ensure that all the Bank's operations and 
products are in line with the requirements of Islamic law.” This underscores the level of 
compliance in terms of the requirement for the SSB by the internal rules that the financial 
institutions put in place, as they pursue legitimacy through cultural compliance (Al-Shamrani, 
2014). SSBs member 2 takes time to explain the policy and procedures that they put in place in 
the response below, an aspect that captures the value this framework to the SSB integration 
process, as well as the level of commitment that IFIs place towards having successful SSBs.  
The Bank's policy has clarified the role of the SC. The responsibilities and functions of the 
SC are within the limits of banking operations without administrative affairs, and it 
includes the following: Adoption of agreements and contracts related to financial 
operations conducted by the bank with shareholders, investors and others. Giving an 
Islamic opinion on the products that the bank intends to put forward, and issue fatwas on 
the issues that the bank is dealing with. Follow up the bank's operations and review all 
activities in terms of Islamic law and verify the contracts approved by the Commission. To 
provide the Islamic opinion in the financial statements of the bank in the periods 
determined in coordination between the SC and BOD. 
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From his observation, it is safe to say that the policy the businesses put in place plays an integral 
part in defining the scope of responsibility for the boards, as well as their overall effectiveness. 
Most importantly, it helps to distinguish them from the BODs by outlining their constitution and 
how their members interact with the rest of the corporate structure. This signifies the presence 
of comprehensive business processes and policies that cover the deployment of the SSB 
alongside the BODs. Another value of the policies that one can identify through the degree of 
integration signified by IFIs in Saudi Arabia in the development that SSBs undergo overtime 
(Morris et al., 2017). Given the value that Shari’ah products have in Saudi Arabia, SSBs grow to 
support the BODs in the running of IFIs, making them a positive addition to the CG structure of 
these institutions. Much of this is largely down to the effectiveness of internal processes and 
policies that they have put in place to support the integration of SSBs. However, one could argue 
that there are some banks that still have work to do to ensure that the process of integration is 
smoother, as SSBs member 1 indicates:  
As for the agenda of meeting with BODs, I have no idea who responsible for preparing 
agenda, and maybe it is prepared by the chairman of the board or the CEO!  Usually, we 
receive the approved agenda through the secretary of the SSB, and we have the right to 
suggest and add any topic to the agenda before the meeting. During the meeting, 
everyone is given the opportunity to participate in the debate, and everyone has the right 
to express an opinion on all issues under discussion. As an Islamic supervisory committee, 
it is important for us to ensure that all decisions made at the meeting are in line with the 
requirements of Islamic law. 
The response above shows that there is more to be done in terms of processes and policies, as it 
shows that not all the critical stakeholders are on the same page regarding the interaction 
between the Shari’ah supervisory and other components of the bank’s administration (Al-
Shamrani, 2014). Apart from this procedural oversight reported by one of the respondents, the 
application of the SSB and integration to the CG structure of IFIs has been quite positive. An 
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example of a respondent that points to the presence of policy and procedures explains the 
following:  
The agenda of the meeting with the BODs send to Shari’ah Group through the CEO to 
discuss it before send it to the SSB. Supervisory committee members have the right to add 
any subject to the meeting agenda. As a Supervisory Committee, members participate in 
the debate and have the right to express their views and to object to any decision related 
to their duties. 
The response above reinforces the procedural maturity that the banks are pursuing in terms of 
bringing the SSB to the administrative framework of the bank. For instance, the banks ensure 
that all activities that the policies dictate outline for the SBs are carried out accordingly. This 
includes the number of meetings per year, integration with the BODs and the functions that these 
boards are required to serve by the business policy that brings the SSB to being in the respective 
financial institutions. As part of the integration process, the banks allow members of the SSB to 
include new components to the agenda of the meetings with the BODs in order to ensure that 
the Shari’ah supervisory have adequate interaction with the organization and the administration 
to structure in order to be effective (Morris et al., 2017). This also indicates that there is a 
willingness by financial institutions to take advantage of the boards to ensure that the financial 
institutions realize the desired level of success, especially in matters that relate to Islamic banking 
activities and community satisfaction. Another aspect of note from the respondents is that banks 
create a corporate structure that accommodates SSBs as a natural component of their CG system, 
not a foreign object that is embedded and does not identify with the institution (Al-Shamrani, 
2014). For instance, BOD 2 in the response below shows that the Shari’ah supervisory team has 
been part of the bank’s CG thinking and framework from the beginning.  
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An independent SSB has been established since bank establishment. Its membership 
includes a number of scholars. Its composition is approved in General Assembly Meeting 
to ensure that all the bank's operations are subject to the approval from SSB. 
One can, therefore, maintain that there is a noticeable degree of commitment among financial 
institutions when it comes to adopting SSBs, as part of their CG structure, especially after they 
design internal policies and processes that oversee the institutionalization of SSBs. Another 
crucial component of the operation process is the role of the secretary to the SSB, which is 
integral to the functioning of the committee. While the law does not require companies to have 
a secretary to the SSB, nor requires them to have an SSB, the secretary is crucial to the integration 
of the SSBs to the CG framework of the organization. Respondents from banks that have a 
secretary to the SSB show that this is a fulltime position at the bank. The inclusion of a secretary 
to the SSB provides a smooth link between the board, the BODs, and top management at the 
organization, as evident in the response by SSB member 4. Such commitment to institute a 
framework that facilitates the functioning of the SSB points towards a procedural and policy 
commitment towards adequate integration of the SSBs to financial institutions. The response 
below from SSBs member 4 captures some of the processes that their bank follows in engaging 
the SSB:  
Regarding preparing the agenda of the SSB meetings, the secretary of the supervisory 
committee, who is a full-time employee at Bank, usually prepares the meeting agenda. 
one week before the meeting, the secretary sends all information related to meeting to 
the committee members. During the meeting of the Committee, each member allowed to 
participate in the debate and vote on the resolution, and whoever has a reservation we 
recorded that in the meeting report. As for the agenda of the meeting Board of Director 
members, the CEO prepares the agenda and send it to the BODs for approval before 
sending it to the members of the SSB through the secretary of supervisory committee. 
members of the SSB may propose to add any topic for discussion before the meeting is 
held for inclusion in the agenda. During the meeting, each member participates in the 
debate, and everyone has the right to express his opinions on the issues under discussion. 
We are in the SSB keen to express our point of view on all the issues that are discussed. 
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The response not only sheds light on the effective integration of SSBs in banks but also the extent 
to which banks allow the SSBs to influence their activities, including the involvement of a 
secretary, who makes it easier for the board to discharge its mandate. Important to the process 
is the constant involvement of the members in a discussion of issues that are integral to the daily 
running of the financial institution (Al-Shamrani, 2014). In addition, the banks not only show 
promotes the effective application in terms of SSB institution, but also the way that these 
committees’ fuse with the rest of the organization. For instance, most of the respondents 
acknowledge the fact that the committees engage with the BODs to the extent required by the 
policies outlined by the business, especially when it comes to matters of procedure. SSBs member 
2 explains this phenomenon by using the number of meetings between the two boards every 
year.  
Our meeting with BODs is usually done on a regular basis with 3-4 meetings during the 
year as required. The last meeting with the board members was in November 2017. The 
BODs requested that meeting to discuss the chapter of Islamic Services in the annual 
report of the Bank. The meeting was attended by all members of the SSB (6 members) and 
all BODs members (9 members). The meeting was held in the meeting hall of the Bank 
building. The meeting started at 9 am and lasted for two hours. 
Apart from the meetings, the role of the committee is also evident in the day to day running of 
the financial institution through a service role that stems from the policies and procedures that 
the bank puts in place to justify and to take advantage of the SSB. This is a phenomenon 
acknowledged by CEO 3, who maintains:  
Our bank offers some Islamic products which are supervised by the SSB, and these 
products are designed through the product department and presented to the SSB for 
review and give the Islamic ruling. Anyway, the SSB rarely contributes to proposed any 




The response above covers the clarity in the financial institutions in terms of the contribution 
that SSBs make, as a result of the presence of processes and procedures that deconstruct their 
interaction with the BODs.  BODs member 1 reinforces this point of view in his response, which 
indicates:  
This bank relies more on the members of the SSB to give the rulings of Islamic law in all his 
work and his contracts. Therefore, there is a necessity of the cooperation and mutual 
understanding between the BODs and the SSB. 
From their description of the role that the SSBs play, it is safe to say that the effectiveness of 
business policies regarding the establishment of SSBs in Saudi banks is high, both in terms of 
promoting compliance with Islamic laws and in terms of provisions for CG in the banking sector.  
5.4. Research Findings 
The current section summarises the main findings of the empirical research in relation to the 
research questions that were posed in this thesis. Research Question 1 was formulated to address 
a gap in the literature on IFIs, specifically to understand the facets of the existing relationship 
between the BODs and the SSB in IFIs in Saudi Arabia. The results obtained from the study 
revealed six important developments which can help understand the nature of the relationship 
between SSBs and BODs in the Saudi Arabian IFIs. First, the relationship between the two boards 
is evident from the growing strength of the internal processes and policies and the ability by the 
SSB and BODs in the IFIs to supplement each other in terms of acting as a channel between the 
external and internal CG environment (Macey & O’Hara, 2001). In the process, the existing 
collaboration and engagement between the two boards serve to improve the governance 
processes, where the SSB provides domain-specific knowledge and competency that is absent in 
the BODs. Such a relationship was noted to be complementary in nature as the two boards 
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merged their competency to ensure they discharged their mandates effectively (Granot, 
Brashear, & Motta, 2012; Iqbal & Mirakhor, 2007).  
Second, the research also identified that the existing relationship between SSBs and BODs in the 
IFIs largely serve to create a new perspective which continues to facilitate institutional 
development. In line with the institutional theory, the SSB and the BODs serve as an integrated 
structure for Islamic banking institutions (Vogel & Hayes, 2006). The major concept behind the 
observed developments is that both boards follow a pattern of executing their functions which 
are constantly evolving over time, and in the process become legitimised within the banking 
sector and the wider social environment (Boyd et al., 2011) as Shari’ah -compliant. The study 
showed that in Saudi Arabia, the financial institutions continue to evolve, and in the process of 
this dynamic development in the face of globalisation, there is a lack of a definitive classification 
of tasks. The study observed that the continued collaboration between the SSB and the BOD is a 
product of internal policy and process development, as part of embedding SSBs to the CG 
structure of IFIs to achieve organisational goals. Therefore, the nature of the existing relationship 
between the BOD and SSB committees is such that during the development of IFIs in Saudi Arabia, 
there is no universally accepted model but that the processes continue to evolve in efforts to 
have in place tailored Shari’ah compliance. Thus, findings from this study support the application 
of institutional theory by Scott (2005) in understanding the nature of the interaction between 
the SSBs and BODs where there is growing evidence that the more the two committees interact, 
the more they will become effective and influence in executing their duties in the IFIs.  
Third, the study noted that there are continuous developments ongoing in the role of SSBs in 
Saudi Arabia, considering the complexities in the CG structure of the IFIs. When assessing the 
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possibility of the SSB’s effectiveness and their association with the BODs, the results indicate the 
importance of understanding the level to which financial institutions connect the SSBs to their 
corporate structures to enhance monitoring and control. Based on the shared insights from the 
participants, the Saudi banks were found to promote procedures and policies that work to 
support the effective operation and integration of SSBs which are key to checking BOD’s 
compliance, legitimacy of developed products, and issue advice on Shari’a guidelines. Alongside 
the BODs, therefore, the SSBs have been shown to play a fundamental part in the CG framework 
of IFIs in Saudi Arabia. The Saudi banks also recognise the important function of the SSB secretary 
who operates as a liaison between the SSB and the financial institutions. Other than supporting 
a holistic connection between differences of the boards, IFIs in Saudi Arabia have propagated the 
need for SSBs to take part in the service and strategic roles of BODs in the financial institutions. 
As such, it appears that in Saudi Arabia, the SSBs are increasingly becoming more connected to 
the CG processes in the IFIs, taking part in important roles and creating complementary 
association with the BODs, which make it possible for the banks to achieve their mandate in line 
with the interests of the shareholders and other stakeholders as discussed under the agency 
theory.  
The role of the SSBs and their value is further reflected in the interconnected relationship with 
BODs in the IFIs in Saudi Arabia. Even though the role of SSBs is largely limited to the Islamic law, 
the observations from this study reveal that their monitoring and control process promotes the 
legitimate role that the banking sector plays by complying with the Shari’ah rules and principles. 
The integration between SSBs and BODs makes it possible for them to function within the 
financial institutions. Furthermore, they connect the diverse array of issues, which include 
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resources and culture to get meaning and balance to individual focus on promoting financial 
institutions with the Saudi Arabian IFIs. The SSBs in Saudi Arabia also contribute to the 
actualisation of the banks’ objectives when not able to be realised through the BODs alone. There 
are a substantial link and connection between the boards in efforts to promote the financial 
success of their shareholders and other stakeholders. 
Fourth, the study also noted the central role that BODs play to shape CG. Specifically, the data 
from the interview with BOD member 3 indicated that when it comes to formulation, BODs 
personifies the highest level of authority which they do in line with the set organizational 
objectives. The data further reveals that BODs play an important role in steering the financial 
institutions towards fiscal success to advance their roles of monitoring and control. The obtained 
data was evidence based on the insights shared by BOD member 3 when he pointed out that 
“The BOD is the highest administrative authority responsible to the General Meeting of 
shareholders in accordance with the Bank's policy. The main roles and functions of the Board are 
to draw up and adopt strategic directives and main objectives of the Bank.” For example, these 
objectives were identified as establishing and making a follow-up of the internal control and risk 
management procedures, ensuring their effectiveness and efficiency, and following and 
monitoring the CEO’s performance. Therefore, the data captures the influential role of BODs in 
oversight and control. In elaboration, BODs serve to oversee strategy development and internal 
efficiency in their organisation. As earlier pointed out, these roles mean that the BODs serve as a 
compass for the financial institution, ensuring that the organization has a clear path to follow 
while having protections in place that safeguard shareholder equity.  
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Fifth, the study findings further indicated that the BODs have the highest decision-making 
authority at the Bank. That is, the BODs are responsible for leading, supervising and controlling 
the Bank and is accountable to shareholders for achieving sustainable shareholder value by 
directing and supervising the Bank's business. In elaboration, BOD member 4 indicated that “the 
Bank's objectives, strategies and policies are established by the Board. In addition, the BOD 
monitors the performance of the Bank's operations and directs guidance to the bank's 
management and supervises the implementation of these directives. However, this growth in CG 
has not been generated and supported by the law because it is imperative to take note that they 
undertake their operations that remaining within the purview of traditional CG rules. In other 
words, the SSBs work by assisting companies in connecting more effectively with external 
financial institutions. For example, according to SSB member 5, he shared that SSBs not only 
“monitor the implementation of decisions of the Shari'ah Committee in all internal operations, 
but also external operations.” The CEO from one of the Banks who took part in this study further 
confirmed the same value where existing frameworks in the IFIs in Saudi Arabia are being tailored 
to comply with the Islamic laws. The BOD member 1 shared that “the role of the SSBs members 
is to ensure that all the Bank's operations and products are in line with the requirements of 
Islamic law.” 
The central role that developed corporate processes pay does not only emerge with the creation 
of the SSBs in Saudi Arabian IFIs, but it also becomes evident when evaluating their connection 
with the BODs. However, in the IFIs in Saudi Arabia, the SSBs play an important part in supervising 
the executive team as part of their legitimacy and sustainability demands needed by the Islamic 
law on banking and corporate financial management. In this case, it can be noted that the SSB 
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and BOD exist within the same corporate environment although they appear to serve different 
governance functions, do so in a manner that helps in complementing each other in addition to 
working to realise a common goal (Vogel & Hayes, 2006). In all, the IFIs in Saudi Arabia position 
themselves in a manner that enables them to deploy essential resources that work to benefit the 
shareholders and the stakeholders without constraining the functions of the BODs and the SSBs 
within the same organisation.  
Sixth, the final findings on the nature of the SSB and DOB revealed that the boards maintain a 
connection working to fulfil and meet the interests of the stakeholders. Contrary to the focus by 
the Anglo-Saxon and the European model (Becht & Barca, 2001), which focuses on the 
stakeholder interests, the BOD and SSB CG model serves to take into consideration all the 
stakeholder interests. These findings show that SSBs and the BODs have diverse roles and draw 
legitimacy from unique groups of stakeholders such as depositors, shareholders, employees of 
the bank, and the community. On the one hand, SSBs can be shown to draw their legitimacy from 
the community and stakeholders such as depositors and shareholders, since their duty is to 
ensure that the IFIs in Saudi Arabia develop products that are in line with Islamic laws. In some 
financial institutions in Saudi Arabia, SSBs serve the purpose of advancing the expectations of the 
banking financial regulators, which are important stakeholders in the banking sector in the Saudi 
Kingdom (Vogel & Hayes, 2006). On the other hand, the BODs operate to ensure that there is 
adequate governance of the financial sector in Saudi Arabia. In line with stakeholder theory, the 
chairman of SSB in bank noted that “in the SSB, we look at the members of the BODs as 
teamwork. We cooperate with them and in my opinion, they are collaborators and they 
understand the nature of our role and we all strive to achieve the interests of shareholders, 
210 
 
stakeholders and employees of the bank and community.” Thus, close cooperation between 
BODs and SSB ensures shareholder and stakeholder interests are maintained. 
5.4.1. The factors in the CG structure of IFIs in Saudi Arabia that support or undermine the 
deployment of the SSB 
The current study attempted to identify the potential factors in CG of IFIs in Saudi Arabia that 
support or undermine the uptake of SSB (Choudhury & Malik, 1992; Choudury & Hoque, 2004). 
Four key factors were identified as being central to the deployment of the SSBs in Saudi Arabia, 
especially as it applies to the IFIs. Findings from the study revealed that the SSBs continues to 
play a central role in promoting the needs of majority stakeholder groups who are mostly Muslim 
regulators, community members, depositors, and other sectors of the country’s economy with 
direct or indirect interests with the banking industry in Saudi Arabia. In all, these stakeholders all 
hold a positive perception towards the need to create financial institutions which propagate 
positive social and religious practices. When banks take such observations in their operations, 
they are likely to receive support for SSBs, since boards take up a productive role of monitoring 
how financial institutions align to fulfil the Islamic requirements. Today, the IFIs in Saudi Arabia 
already realise their religious obligations thereby making it possible to support the efforts to set 
up SSBs in their daily financial and banking operations to fulfil stakeholder needs according to 
the Shari’ah law and Islamic law. 
Moreover, another factor that has given support to the deployment of the SSB in Saudi Arabia is 
attributed to the changing approaches from the financial sector to CG. Over the last two decades, 
there has been a growing approach to add SBs and include them in the CG structures in all 
organisations, and not only in the IFIs. Specific focus, however, has been anchored in the banking 
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sector where most of the transactions must align with Shari’ah laws in line with the teachings 
drawn from the Quran (Archer & Rifaat, 2006). Importantly, the transformation has remained 
largely positive, in using the bank model as a benchmark to formulate and transform their CG 
structure thereby providing SSBs with a suitable ground to be deployed in various financial 
institutions in Saudi Arabia (Archer & Rifaat, 2006). The policies and processes which have been 
used by banks indicate that it is possible to have a supporting framework for SSBs where these 
SBs will play an important role in supplementing their shortcomings in terms of knowledge, 
information, and skills. By making a shift in the CG structure, companies seek the need to improve 
their level of competency, which becomes a positive aspect that supports the deployment of SBs.  
Furthermore, findings reveal that banks in Saudi Arabia are likely to experience potential hurdles 
in the process of implementing such a structure of CG, but results from this study revealed that 
such a problem could be addressed by establishing SSBs to issue advice to BODs. SSB member 4 
noted that “we are an advisory committee that presents our Islamic opinion on the issues under 
discussion and the Board of Directors of the Bank has the final decision.” Some of the potential 
measures which they can take to facilitate the adoption of the SBSs are to promote trust between 
the boards to enable them to work together. BOD member 3 noted that “the BODs’ relationship 
with the members of the Shari'ah Committee can be described as an ‘Excellent relationship’ we 
are a full Islamic services bank and Shari'ah Committee members have an important role. 
Therefore, the relationship and cooperation between the two boards must be a relationship of 
trust.”  Furthermore, the BODs need to be more willing to accommodate the input desirable from 
the SSBs to make the extensions of Islamic CG structure within their banks, a move that will see 
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these extensions grow, as well as the board themselves, grow to include Shari’ah laws within 
their organisations (Bhatti & Bhatti, 2010).  
As applies to modern banking and financial corporations, legitimacy in existing business 
workplaces emphasises that companies need to show that their operations are successful in 
different areas of Islamic law and not just the finance sector. For instance, there are important 
benchmarks for legitimacy, which are drawn from culturally sensitive areas in Saudi Arabia, such 
as paying the zakah and corporate social responsibilities. In the process, it is possible for 
companies to experience a potential dilemma on ways that they can achieve the right level of 
legitimacy. In Saudi Arabia, the IFIs draw their legitimacy from their capacity to comply with the 
Shari’ah law, or their capacity to build a system of CG that resonates with the Islamic culture 
(Choudhury & Malik, 1992; Choudury & Hoque, 2004). In this process, SSB plays an important 
role in offering advice on how to meet the different Shari’ah demands, a role that makes its 
uptake by companies to be more appreciated. However, it is not only the establishment of SSBs 
that help companies attain legitimacy; rather, their integration into the organisation culture and 
structure in Saudi Arabia.  
Findings from this research further revealed that most banking and financial institutions are 
largely sensitive in terms of the cultural environments in which they currently operate in Saudi 
Arabia. Considering the sensitivity of the matter in this topic, there is a growing focus and demand 
for companies to prove that they have met all the requirements of effective CG, a demand that 
necessitates the deployment and uptake of SBs (Bhatti & Bhatti, 2010). The observation not only 
influences theory but also in practice, in the sense that it underlines the need for IFIs to 
continuously modify their CG structures to attain Islamic and Shari’ah -based legitimacy (Archer 
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& Rifaat, 2006). Although SSBs in Saudi Arabia are currently helping most of these financial 
institutions to solve significant legitimacy challenges, there is a growing commitment to keep 
growing strengthening these SSBs. Having such growth in place is fundamental considering the 
potential possibility that there are possible challenges of legitimacy which continue to evolve in 
the banking sector, thereby indicating the importance of this process is ensuring that the boards 
attain maximum Shari’ah -based evolution in their CG system. 
5.4.3. The areas of convergence in the roles of the BODs and SSBs in Islamic financial 
institutions in Saudi Arabia. 
Research Question 3 was designed to explore the areas of convergence that exist in the roles of 
BODs and SSBs in the IFIs in Saudi Arabia. First, the findings drawn in this study revealed that one 
important area of close collaboration between the SSD and BOD in Saudi Arabia in supplementing 
their operations. The shared insights from the participants indicated that the two boards have an 
important role in the financial sector, which include strategic roles, services, and control and 
monitoring (Granot, Brashear, & Motta, 2012; Iqbal & Mirakhor, 2007). These insights have been 
supported in the literature, and they have theoretical foundations which tend to expand to 
important practical implications in the banking sector. On the one hand, the BODs have a unique 
role in ensuring monitoring and control, while on the other hand, the SSBs play the role of service 
and strategy. Moreover, SSBs serve to check compliance, legitimacy of the BODs’ operations, and 
issue advice on how banks can offer lucrative services to their customers based on Islamic law. 
These findings were revealed during the study where a close interaction with the participants 
further emphasise d that the SSB play important roles in terms of strategy and services, while the 
BODs serves to monitor and control the functions of the banking firms. Thus, the monitoring and 
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control roles denote the points of divergence for the BODs in the IFIs in Saudi Arabia, while 
compared to strategy and service role played by the SSBs in terms of developing formulas for 
financial products or services that align with the Islamic Shari’ah law. Based on these findings, it 
became clear from the insights shared by the participants that the BOD has a role across three 
important categories. For example, when assessing the controlling and monitoring roles that they 
play in the financial sector, the BOD shows ultimate control over the top management in the 
organisation. That is, the board is mandated to steer the direction where the company is headed, 
both by influencing the external and internal environments by promoting the implementation of 
approved strategies and continuous promotion of the oversight role in the management process 
in the company. In Saudi Arabia, under the Shari’ah policies and processes, the BODs draw their 
monitoring and control roles from the shareholders, and they are considered a legitimate arm 
who are custodians of the investments made by the owners in the financial institution. 
However, the board cannot function efficiently as a single entity, and its shortcomings are largely 
supplemented and filled by the SSB. Such an observation is particularly true when considering 
the IFIs in Saudi Arabia, which operate under the majority of Muslim shareholders. In the process, 
the SSBs become integral in the Saudi financial sector, and their existence help creates a mutually 
collaborative relationship with the BODs since they control the services and strategies of the 
companies (Choudhury & Malik, 1992; Choudury & Hoque, 2004). With the SSBs, there is a need 
for strategic resources since such a move help creates an important framework upon which the 
reputation and internal competencies of the banking services can resonate with the needs of the 
Muslim clients. The strategic edge has been supported by the presence of the SSBs, thus stressing 
the importance of the SSBs on the Saudi financial institutions. These observations were 
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supported by the remarks made by the Chairman of SSB in the bank where he pointed out “there 
was a strategic decision taken two years ago and was on the transformation of all the Bank's 
traditional operations to the processes of conformity to Islamic law. In my opinion, the Shari'ah 
Committee was able to convince the BODs to convert bank operations to full Islamic financial 
services.” Based on this revelation, it because clear from the Chairman of SSB in the bank that 
SSB decisions are made in response to the demands of most shareholders and in line with the 
need of the Saudi society, which is a predominantly Muslim society. 
Despite the divergence in the roles played by the SSB and BOD, it can be noted that both bodies 
help the Saudi financial institutions develop legitimate business operations based on the needs 
of the consumers, and those of the environment in which they operate and their communities. 
In both situations, it is important to ensure compliance with the BODs and SBs in the banks to 
align with stakeholder interests under the provisions of the Shari’ah law. Although the approach 
affects the strategies of the banks and the type of products they can offer their target market, it 
also plays an important role in promoting corporate legitimacy. The further assessment also 
revealed that in their capacity as a channel between the external and internal environment, BODs 
also help add legitimacy to the banking sector.  
As such, it can be said that the SSBs and the BODs are distinct entities an important aspect 
because it ensures that the two boards remain independent from each other, they are 
competent, and that no board can dominate over another. According to SSB member 3, “the 
boards are independent and all bank operations are subject to independent approval, this is the 
policy of this bank.” Considering their level of independence, it also became elaborate to note 
that the position of the BOD which is a conventional party in the financial sector does not 
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undermine the position of each other SSB in the Islamic banking industry in Saudi Arabia. From 
the findings, members of the board and members of SSBs outline different roles within the 
corporate hierarchy such as “providing fatwa for all products” according to BOD member 4 and 
in ensuring “bank's practices are compatible with the requirements of Islamic law” according to 
SSB member 2. Additional roles by SSBs according to SSB member 2 include the adoption of 
agreements and contracts related to financial operations conducted by the bank with 
shareholders and investors and giving an Islamic opinion on the products that bank intends to 
put forward in the market. In contrast, BOD member 3 noted that “the main roles and functions 
of the BODs is to draw up and adopt strategic directives and main objectives of the Bank, 
establish, and follow up the internal control and management procedures, ensure their efficiency 
and effectiveness, and monitor the CEO performance.” However, BOD member 1 cautioned that 
the “role of BODs are complementary to the roles of SSBs and this means that competition does 
not exist, but cooperation and trust are the most prominent in the board room and within the 
bank operations.”  Although the two boards work in harmony, it can be noted that they 
understand that they have distinct mandates. Moreover, it would be easy to covet the influence 
attributable to another institution, but this does not materialize under these conditions 
considering that both parties comprehend their roles in satisfying the specific bank requirement 
of staying in touch with the external environment.  
Therefore, the two boards should be viewed collectively when assessing the CG system of Saudi 
Arabian banks. This is evident in the way that they work in harmony, their integrative 
relationship, and seamless ability to incorporate the executive arm to their operation framework. 
Therefore, a breakdown of the study findings reveals that the integrative relationship between 
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the two boards is essential for ensuring a balanced CG structure of the IFIs (Choudhury & Malik, 
1992; Choudury & Hoque, 2004). This is evident in the way that the SSB complements the BODs 
to ensure that the organisation attains legitimacy in a market that highly values Islamic law and 
fundamental Shari’ah practice.   
Second, another important point of convergence and divergence between the SSB and the BOD 
in the IFI sector in Saudi Arabia was evident when assessing the issues related to information 
exchange and communication. The observations from the participant interviews and past 
literature revealed that the BODs and the SSBs have a unique approach to executing their 
mandate.  
Elaborate insights from the study supported claims that the two bodies have a close collaboration 
as noted by BOD member 2, which promotes the sharing of information in addition to 
communication processes which are focused on bolstering their interconnection. BOD member 
2 indicated that “both board of directors and Shari'ah committees have worked closely to 
adopting new product internationally which, in my view, is a successful strategic decision made 
in strengthening cooperation between BODs and SSBs.” Further, the interrelationship which 
exists between the two becomes clearer since the two parties converge on their duties and 
responsibilities on various occasions. One of the areas where the two bodies converge is related 
to efforts to discuss matters of importance to their financial institutions where there are rare 
cases of power struggle or conflict of interest. Even if there is a strong call from the Shari’ah and 
Islamic laws for IFIs in Saudi Arabia to have a functional SSB to verify that the operations of the 
banks comply with the Shari’ah policies, the deployment of these boards are in line with the need 
to supplement the limitations of the BODs. Through communication and close interconnection, 
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the boards have been able to reinvent their operations and enhanced their responsibilities and 
how they related to each other in facilitating positive banking sector workplace.  
In the process, it can be argued out that each board works to serve a unique purpose without 
necessarily hindering the functions of the other body (El-Gamal, 2006). Such an observation 
reveals that there is some great balance between the boards in terms of their interaction and 
communication. Thus, their ability to convene on various occasions to exchange vital financial 
insights on how to ensure the banking and financial sector in Saudi Arabia aligns with the laid 
down laws and policies. Further, it is clear that through such communications and information 
exchange, the two bodies are able to develop a strong working relationship since they have 
constant interaction where they work to supplement the shortcomings of either board so as to 
attain successful organisational outcomes. In other words, it can be noted that continuous 
engagement between the BODs and the Shari’ah committees shapes the integrative affiliation 
between the two boards in practice, a move that is fundamental in its contribution to a stronger 
realization of the responsibilities allocated to the SSBs and also to the BODs in the Saudi financial 
and banking sector.  
Third, the study also identified that another important area of convergence in the roles of the 
BODs and SSBs in IFIs in Saudi Arabia is closely attributed to business policies and processes. In 
Saudi Arabia, the IFIs present the SSB in the light of business frameworks which define their 
purpose, constitution, and roles. Findings extracted from the interview sessions revealed that by 
focusing on business processes and policies, the banking sector is able to create strong CG 
frameworks which align their operations within the confines proposed by the SSBs (El-Gamal, 
2006). The entire process reflects the substantial fact where policy directive formulates the scope 
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of each bank, such as outlining the number of Shari’ah members to the board. In the process, 
banks are able to use the provides policies to satisfy at least the minimum requirements, and 
setting up suitable governance frameworks that add to their effectiveness, considering the expert 
advice which they receive from the board. 
The participants revealed that the specific policies which banks propose in place often play an 
important part in terms of pointing out the duties of the boards, and also works to evaluate the 
level of their effectiveness. Importantly, it can be noted that the policies help in differentiating 
their roles from those of the BODs in terms of constitutional alignment and how the members 
can engage with all corporate structures (El-Gamal, 2006). The process is essential in determining 
the scope of business policies and processes that are pronounced in the SB and how they differ 
from the roles assigned to the BOD. Policies also help when identifying the level of interaction 
between the BOD and the SSB as stipulated in the IFIs operating within Saudi Arabia, with 
emphasis on the progress to be expected in the future. Considering the value which the SB plays, 
the presence of SSBs work to support the BOD in terms of running the IFIs in line with the 
recommended policies in place. The core focus of the entire process is based on how effective 
the internal policies and processes apply to daily operations of the bank regarding the interaction 
between the Shari’ah supervisory and other teams from the bank’s administration, such as the 
BOD members (Choudhury & Malik, 1992; Choudury & Hoque, 2004).  
5.5. Summary and Conclusion 
The findings above base on emergent themes identified in the responses provided by participants 
in the interview survey. The interviews supplied invaluable data on the way that SSBs work with 
the BODs. Each of the 14 respondents contributes significantly to the discourse by raising crucial 
220 
 
points that hold enough substance to influence the findings of the study. Consequently, the study 
will look to use these findings to reinforce literature, as well as extend some of the ideas already 
present in existing scholarly research. The themes identified above will form the basis for the 
discussion chapter, as well as the recommendations for future research that the study will 
provide. In addition, the study takes steps to ensure that the interview responses have a positive 
impact by taking measures to ensure their reliability and validity through procedures that ensure 
each of the components of the findings above carries and true and fair reflection of the 





















Chapter 6: Discussion 
6.1. Introduction 
This chapter provides an assessment of the implications of the findings. It draws substantially on 
current literature to establish points of convergence, as well as identify areas where findings of 
this study help to improve original insights. Each of the theories that the study referenced in this 
chapter help to gain a better understanding of how boards operate and their role in upholding 
corporate sustainability. Combining these theories and findings from experts who have a 
profound understanding of how these boards operate in practice provides a compelling fusion of 
information that will inform current and future research into the deployment of boards in Saudi 
Arabian banks. 
6.2. Understanding the Role of the BODs and SSB 
According to Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) and Hillman et al. (2009), the RDT indicates that no 
institution can exist on its own. Each institution is dependent on other systems around them to 
succeed. According to Haridan, Hassan, and Karbhari (2018), it is only through such dependency 
can they secure the resources necessary for their sustenance. Alhabshi and Bakar (2008) pointed 
out that under provisions of the RDT, the BODs serve as a strategic resource, responsible for 
brokering resources for the organizations from the external environment, which other persons 
in the organization cannot secure for the organization, as observed by Narayan and Phan (2019). 
As a result, Narayan and Phan (2019) noted that the BODs need to constitute people with 
connections as well as the ability to operate in two distinct contexts, i.e. the internal and external 
environment of the business. In doing so, they can secure resources or acquire information from 
the external environment, which they, in turn, bring to the internal environment to help the 
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organization continue with their operations. According to Awad, Norat, and Son (2014), a 
successful BOD can satisfy all these functions in a co-optative role. The co-optation theory sees 
the BODs in this light; hence, positioning them as an institution that can give legitimacy to 
organisations and ensure that institutions have access to the right information, a view shared by 
O’connell and Cramer (2010). However, this is only achievable if the BODs have the requisite skill 
level.  
Findings from the chapter above support the notions of the co-optation theory, as well as the 
RDT. Banks in Saudi Arabia, both foreign and international, require awareness of Islamic law. In 
a quest for local responsiveness, they need to personify aspects of a traditional banking 
institution, but still maintain a culture and structure that is responsive to demands of Islamic laws 
(Mohammed & Muhammed, 2017; Morris et al., 2017). However, Williams and Zinkin (2010) 
caution that it is not possible to achieve this with a BOD that has a traditional constitution, and 
one that focuses on the classical tenets of CG, focusing very little on the specific social demands 
of the consumer base. Having an SSB ensures that these banks can respond to the socio-cultural 
demands of the local market; hence, satisfying the traditional role of the board of serving as a 
conduit between the internal environment and the external environment (Bernard, & Gendron, 
2010; Haridan, Hassan, & Karbhari, 2018). According to Azmat, Skully, and Brown (2015), SSBs 
have comprehensive knowledge of Islamic law, where most of its members have experience 
working in the financial industry in a different capacity, either in the BODs or in the executive 
arm. According to Mullah and Zaman (2015), this gives them the experience, skill, and credibility 
to influence the course that the banks take in terms of Islamic law. Therefore, they have essential 
skills and knowledge that conventional BODs lack, which is necessary for ensuring that the banks 
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have the requisite link with the external environment. Without their input, banks would struggle 
to build the necessary dependencies in the external environment to be successful especially in 
terms of offering services that align with Shari’ah law (Almutairi & Quttainah, 2017). Their vital 
skills, experience, and contributions to Islamic law in the banking sector make SSBs an 
indispensable strategic resource for banks in Saudi Arabia; thus, their success.  
From the above, it is conceivable that the RDT helps to make better sense of the assertions that 
respondents make. A deeper analysis of this relationship by Mollah et al. (2016) revealed that 
these trends are important in informing theory by showing how developments to the BODs could 
contribute towards greater efficiency in CG (Almutairi & Quttainah, 2017; Gözübüyük, Kock, & 
Ünal, 2018). The co-optation theory and RDT help to underscore the role that the BODs play in 
organizations. In the context of banks in Saudi Arabia, they open up an avenue to gain a more 
profound look at how a modification to their CG structure helps to realize the primary function 
of the BODs through the introduction of SSBs (Haridan, Hassan, & Karbhari, 2018). Nothing 
captures this better than the findings on the service role that the SSB plays. As part of their service 
role, the SSB contributes towards attaining legitimacy, monitoring compliance, and informing on 
matters relating to Islamic law (Morris et al., 2017). This is essential because, in Saudi Arabia, 
most of the consumers in the banking sector are Muslims, which makes them an essential group 
to develop a dependable relationship with by being conscious of the sociocultural expectations 
and general lifestyle. Here, organizations need to deploy all the necessary resources that they 
must ensure that Muslim clients support them. However, Scott (1997) maintains that fiscal 
resources alone cannot achieve this. They require strategic resources to contribute to the 
development of internal competencies and a reputation that will resonate with Muslim clients. 
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The SSBs serve to provide such strategic edge; hence, asserting their value to Saudi banks (Morris 
et al., 2017). As applies to this study, this is evident in the way that the respondents show 
confidence when commenting on their role in strategy development. According to the 
participants, they tend to emphasise that all the decisions that they make is strategic, and rightly 
so, because their value as a strategic resource is key to corporate success, as per provisions of 
the RDT.  
The links that SSBs help banks to create with the external environment not only reside in the 
consumer market alone but the community. From the findings above, it is evident that part of 
the compliance framework for banks is to allow SSBs to align the operations of the banking 
institutions with provisions of Shari’ah law. While this ends up having a role in influencing the 
type of products that make it to the market, it also has a role in building corporate legitimacy 
(Hayat & Hassan, 2017; Mejia, Aljabrin, Awad, Norat, & Son, 2014). Hillman, Withers and Collins 
(2009) observant that in their role as a conduit between the internal environment and the 
external environment, boards also contribute towards corporate legitimacy. According to, Judge, 
Douglas and Kutan (2008), corporate legitimacy refers to the image that an enterprise cultivates 
in the external environment. Companies that signify positive corporate citizenship accumulate 
greater legitimacy than those that do not (Pollard & Samers, 2007). Pathan and Faff (2013) also 
show that legitimacy personified in adopting virtues such as gender diversity improve overall 
corporate performance. High corporate citizenship scores draw from participation in social affairs 
or calibration of the corporate structure, culture, and task system to conform to the society’s 
social norms, as per views form Rayman-Bacchus (2006). While the BODs could help companies 
achieve this, in the context of Saudi banks, they are incapable of exercising this function at a 
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similar competency level as SSBs. This could be attributable to their conflict of interest that arises 
from their focus on maximizing shareholder wealth, or lack of adequate skill to execute this 
function (Ghazali, Omar, & Aidit, 2005; My Phan, Daly, & Akhter, 2016). Therefore, the SBs in the 
Saudi IFIs, through their role in calibrating banks to meet Islamic law provisions, help 
organizations to cultivate greater legitimacy, which is an integral component for success. 
According to Almutairi and Quttainah (2017), this is an aspect that explains why they are able to 
maintain their position, as well as personify immense success, despite the BODs being the 
conventional authority in organizations. 
The analysis above of the influence that the SSBs enjoy shows that they are distinct entities to 
the BODs, which ensures that the position of the board does not undermine their position within 
the corporate ranks. Internal business policies direct the application of these institutions to banks 
in Saudi Arabia contemplate the significance of personifying distinct roles and influences in the 
practical environment (Haridan, Hassan, & Karbhari, 2018). From the findings, members of the 
board and members of SSB committees outline different roles within the corporate hierarchy. 
Though they work in harmony, both boards understand that they have distinct mandates. In 
addition, it would be easy to covet the influence attributable to another institution, but this does 
not happen here, given the fact that both parties understand their roles in satisfying the banks’ 
requirement to stay in touch with the external environment (Almutairi & Quttainah, 2017). 
Analysing these observations in the context of RDT, one could argue that the banking sector in 
Saudi Arabia would be unable to strike the requisite CG balance without the deployment of SSBs. 
Through these committees, they ensure that they have a component within their CG structure 
that will satisfy a mandate that the traditional BODs cannot (My Phan, Daly, & Akhter, 2016). 
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Therefore, the two boards should be viewed collectively when assessing the CG system of Saudi 
Arabian banks. Bernard and Gendron (2010) observed that this is evident in the way that they 
work in harmony, their integrative relationship and seamless ability to incorporate the executive 
arm to their operation framework. Therefore, a breakdown of the study findings using the RDT 
reveals that the integrative relationship between the two boards is essential for ensuring a 
balanced CG structure. This is evident in the way that the SSB complements the BODs to ensure 
that the organization attains legitimacy in a market that highly values Islamic law.   
Observations above draw from the actuality that the two boards focus on distinct aspects of the 
CG process. In that, the BODs do not lay much emphasis on sustainability through Islamic law 
compliance. This is where the SBs come in, providing an opportunity for the financial institutions 
to exercise an alternative voice that will ensure they are able to meet the expectations of Islamic 
consumers (Najeeb & Ibrahim, 2014). Thus, having the two boards in IFIs create an optimal 
administrative balance that is necessary for success in the industry.  
6.3. Explaining the Connection between the Two Boards 
From the findings, it is evident that boards maintain an integrative working connection. The 
ideology that underlines the BODs and their ambition for the organization plays an integral role 
in determining the way that they exercise roles in an administrative space where they have an 
additional institution to be concerned about (Feng, Ghosh, & Sirmans, 2005; Pollard & Samers, 
2007). As a result, scholars develop an array of theories that help to understand how the two 
boards will fit within the same organization (Pathan & Faff, 2013). Some of the important theories 
on explaining the connection between the two boards which are used to examine the research 
findings in this study include agency theory and stakeholder theory. 
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6.3.1. Agency Theory 
Agency theory can be used to explain the monitoring and control functions of the BODs and SSBs. 
In the classic agency theory, the BODs have a monitoring and control function where the 
shareholders are the principal and the managers serve as agents. In contrast, the SSBs also serve 
a monitoring and control function in the financial institutions where managers are the agents 
while the principal includes the wider public and to provisions of the Shari’ah law. According to 
Farag, Mallin, and Ow-Yong (2018), a major concern by the BODs in CG is the design of efficient 
corporate control to pressure managers (agents) into acting in the best interest of the 
shareholders (principal). In the Saudi banking sector, the boards are the agents working on behalf 
of the shareholders who are the principals (Pathan & Faff, 2013). Bassens, Derudder, & Witlox, 
(2011) observes that in agency theory, scholars assume that there is no certain market for 
corporate control, thereby contributing to market failures, adverse selection, incomplete 
contracts, asymmetric information, moral hazards, and non-existence markets. On their part, 
Mohammed and Muhammed (2017) noted that the SSBs achieve effective monitoring in the 
banking sector by ensuring that managers and top executives work to promote the best interests 
of the wider public by offering Shari’ah compliant products which are legitimate in line with 
Islamic laws. 
Findings from this study revealed that the separation between control and ownership of financial 
institutions characterizes the existence of an organization. According to Allen and Gale (2001), a 
major concern in finance and CG is the design of efficient corporate control to pressure managers 
into acting in the best interest of the shareholders. In this line of CG, there has been growing 
research interest in agency theory with attempts to create a suitable corporate framework to 
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attain such control. In the Saudi banking sector, the boards are the agents working on behalf of 
the shareholders who are the principles (Pathan & Faff, 2013). Farag, Mallin, and Ow-Yong (2018) 
observes that in agency theory, scholars assume that there is no certain market for corporate 
control, thereby contributing to market failures, adverse selection, incomplete contracts, 
asymmetric information, moral hazards, and non-existence markets (Allen & Gale, 2001; Williams 
& Zinkin, 2010). 
The government has promoted diverse governance mechanisms to achieve effective monitoring 
of the banking sector in the Saudi Kingdom in efforts to achieve prudent market competition, 
eliminate debt, create efficient BODs, executive compensation, and develop markets for 
corporate regulation. Today, creating effective BOD continues to be an important and feasible 
option for enhancing CG mechanisms (Pollard & Samers, 2013). As noted in this study, the main 
functions of the BODs were identified from the information collected from the interview sessions 
including: 
 Planning, 
 Deciding the company’s ethics and purpose, 
 Decide the strategy or direction of the company, 
 Control and monitor managers and other top executives, and 
 Make recommendations and report to their shareholders. 
In all financial institutions, there are growing calls for the need for directors to show 
independence and autonomy and this demands they pursue discriminating questions and obtain 
satisfactory answers beneficial to the company. Besides all other interests, the BODs are 
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mandated to pursue the company’s interests (Nawaz, 2019). The competence and independence 
imagination of the directors plays an important part in running an effective enterprise which will 
determine the success of a company. Managers or agents may not always act in the best interest 
of bank depositors and other shareholders when the control of a company is separated from its 
owner. Even so, shareholder assigns authority to the managers, with anticipation that the agent 
will promote their best interests. 
A financial institution under agency arrangements has been developed by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) who noted that a shareholder (the principals) could assume themselves that the managers 
(agents) will make optimal choices only if they acquire suitable incentives and when the agents 
are effectively monitored. Some of the common incentives include prerequisites, bonuses, and 
stock options, which are directly associated with the results of company performance resulting 
from management decisions that maximise stakeholder interests (Farag, Mallin, & Ow-Yong, 
2018). In Saudi Islamic banks, the process of monitoring by the principal entails undertaking 
systematic reviews of the BOD’s prerequisites, bonding the agent, undertaking financial audits, 
and placing some limits on decisions made by the management. The process also involves costs 
that are inevitable outcomes of the separation between corporate control and corporate 
ownership (Narayan & Phan, 2019). Even so, the costs are not necessarily bad for the 
shareholders, although the most important part is that the monitoring activities, they cover must 
be designed in a way that makes them efficient. 
6.3.2. Stakeholder Theory 
The findings above indicate that SSBs and the BODs personify variant roles and draw their 
legitimacy from distinct stakeholder groups. For the SSBs, they draw their legitimacy from 
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consumers and the community, as their responsibility is to ensure that banks develop products 
that are consistent with the preferences of Islamic consumers. In some banks, they serve to 
uphold the expectations of regulators, which are another stakeholder group in the Saudi Arabian 
banking industry (Cline, & Williamson, 2016). The BODs, on the other hand, exists to ensure 
proper running of the organization by the management team. According to stakeholder theory, 
organizations have a wide array of stakeholder cohorts, and they experience success by being 
able to address the needs of the various stakeholder groups (Mollah et al., 2016; Schäfer, Strauss, 
& Zecher, 2015). Assessing the current state of board deployment in Saudi Arabian banks using 
provisions of the RDT, it is conceivable that the banks would not be able to realize optimal success 
without SBs because the BODs do not have the resource constitution required to meet the 
requirements of Muslim consumers (Obid & Naysary, 2014). In addition, they would struggle to 
meet the requirements of Islamic law, which is an integral component of the banking industry’s 
regulatory framework (Othman & Ameer, 2015; Nawaz, 2017). Therefore, it is safe to say that 
the two boards are integral to the realization of expectations from stakeholder groups, basing on 
arguments from Blair (1996) regarding the role that boards play towards corporate progression. 
Blair and Roe (2010) maintains that boards are essential in creating an enterprise that is able to 
realise the various goals set by different stakeholder groups because of their ability to link the 
internal environment to the external environment. This supplies rationale for the boards having 
distinct roles, points of focus and stakeholder association.  
Stakeholder theory also helps to deconstruct the confined nature of the SB. The BODs are a broad 
institution that focuses on a wide array of elements pertaining to the organization. In the 
traditional sense and constitution of the BODs, it should be able to address all the external 
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interaction needs of Saudi banks, at least based on provisions of the RDT (Othman & Ameer, 
2015; Cline, & Williamson, 2016). However, Islamic law provides creates a unique operational 
context, in terms of culture and structure of Islamic banks (Haridan, Hassan, & Karbhari, 2018). 
As a result, banks require the SBs to complement the BODs to navigate this unique business 
environment. In fact, for banks in the Saudi Arabian market to satisfy the description of the BODs, 
they need to have SSBs (Mullah & Zaman, 2015). As a result, one could argue that the Saudi 
Arabia business context, due to the country’s commitment to Islamic law, experiences additional 
local responsiveness pressure, which creates the need for a CG structure that supports the board 
in responding to the demands of some stakeholder groups (Cline, & Williamson, 2016; Mollah et 
al., 2016).  From the findings, most of the participants, especially those that are part of SSBs, 
acknowledge that the SSBs and the BODs, serve to complement each other. Based on the 
provisions of the stakeholder, such a complementary relationship is integral for the realization of 
corporate success.  
According to Freeman et al. (2010), boards that deploy a stakeholder theory approach tend to 
take an approach where board members openly advocate the needs of their stakeholders. 
However, in the context of Saudi banks, stakeholder theory manifests, but with moderation. In 
that, SSBs ensure that compliance with Islamic laws, while the BODs pursue the interests of 
shareholders, in an environment that exercises a degree of harmony between the two 
stakeholder representatives (Mullah & Zaman, 2015). This is an observation supported by 
Hillman, Keim and Luce (2001), who indicates that stakeholder directors are getting involved in a 
wider scope of responsibilities, and are representing a wider scope of interests as well. From the 
findings above, it is evident that the SB will not hesitate to ensure compliance with provisions of 
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Islamic laws, but at the same time, they have an integrative relationship with the BODs and the 
executive branch of the organization, reinforced through processes and procedures that 
mandate and protect their tenure. This supplies an environment where the two boards are able 
to work together to satisfy their various objectives and responsibilities (Ghazali, Omar, & Aidit, 
2005).  Consequently, stakeholder theory explains their constitution and necessity but does not 
dictate how the various board members exercise their responsibility. As a result, the boards open 
room for other administrative institutions to thrive; hence, a form an integrative relationship that 
is essential for the successful running of the organization (Grassa, 2015; Mollah et al., 2016). This 
is integral for addressing stakeholder expectations, both in the internal and external 
environment. For shareholders, the banks get to ensure that their interests are looked after. 
Consumers, on the other hand, get access to products that meet the requirements of Islamic law. 
For example, the findings revealed that the two boards engage with each other during product 
development and other aspects, such as customer services, auditing, and corporate services.  
A better understanding of the phenomena discussed above can be achieved by viewing the 
argument from a perspective that integrates an additional theory. In this case of the RDT. The 
section that touches on RDT reiterates the balance that IFIs realize by having both the SSB and 
the BODs. Extrapolating this to the realms of stakeholder theory, one could argue that it would 
be difficult for some institutions to satisfy the provisions of the stakeholder theory without 
establishing the board balance manifested by organizations that have a BODs and SSBs (Haridan, 
Hassan, & Karbhari, 2018). Much of this is attributable to the fact that organizations focus on 
variant aspects, with the BODs for cementing a connection with the external environment 
through their knowledge of the business, and their relationship with other stakeholders (Othman 
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& Ameer, 2015). However, their focus is not on sustainability, which makes it essential to look at 
alternatives that will give rise to an administrative structure that is conscious of this 
phenomenon, especially when operating in a market that has strict cultural standards (Grassa, 
2015; Cline, & Williamson, 2016). From this, one could argue that the SSB is a necessary 
modification to the Saudi Arabian banks’ CG to ensure compliance with all the stakeholder 
cohorts. Muslim clients represent a crucial stakeholder group, as the society is predominantly 
Muslim. Consequently, an expectation to deliver an institution that is compliant with Islamic law 
is essential. However, attaining this in an administrative system that does not pay much attention 
towards sustainability is difficult, an aspect that underscores the need for the SSB.   
6.4. Developments in the Role of SSB 
The CG structure in Saudi Arabia is complex, in comparison to other parts of the world, specifically 
for Islamic banks. SSBs are a unique integration into these institutions, given their focus on 
promoting the adoption of Islamic law (Everett, Friesen, Neu, & Rahaman, 2016). In judging the 
scope of the effectiveness of SSBs and their relationship to the BODs, the study analyses the 
degree to which banks integrate these institutions to their corporate structure. The findings 
reveal that the banks maintain policies and procedure that support the integration and effective 
operation of SSBs. SSBs, therefore, serve an integral role in the CG structure of Islamic financial 
institution in Saudi Arabia, alongside the BODs (Ghazali, Omar, & Aidit, 2005; Platonova et al., 
2016). In the spirit of integration, banks also incorporate the function of the SSB secretary, who 
serves as a liaison between the bank and the SSB. Apart from supporting full integration, IFIs have 
been able to allow the SSB to be active in the service and strategic role of boards in organizations, 
making the essential to the administrative process of these financial institutions (Grassa, 2015; 
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Everett et al., 2016). Therefore, SSBs are becoming integral to the CG of Islamic banking, engaging 
in influential roles, and forging a complementary relationship with the BODs that make it possible 
for the banks to advance the interests of stakeholders (Almutairi & Quttainah, 2017).  
The integrative relationship with the BODs and the clarity of their roles reiterates the value of 
SSBs to IFIs. This is true, even though their role focuses on aspects of Islamic law, as they serve 
to promote the legitimacy of the financial institutions through compliance.  Such importance 
shows the reason financial institutions in Saudi Arabia are pushing for policies and processes that 
will ensure their adequate integration to the CG system (Everett et al., 2016; Grassa, 2015). 
Through this integration, it becomes possible for them to work with the BODs. In addition, they 
integrate a wide array of aspects, including culture and resource, to provide meaning and balance 
to their quest to promote financial institutions that comply with Islamic law (Ghazali, Omar, & 
Aidit, 2005). The value that SSBs bring to the table and their complementary relationship with 
the BODs emphasise on the inevitability of change in institutions as captured by the institutional 
theory. Institutions are subject to change, either through artificial means or spontaneously, as 
per observations in Zsidisin, Melnyk and Ragatz (2005) and Shafritz, Ott, and Jang (2015). Such 
transformation is manifesting in SSBs. In their quest to delivering banking services that are 
consistent with the Islamic tradition, they integrate well with the BODs and other components of 
corporate administration, mainly because they have something of value to bring to the table.  
SSBs also contribute to the realization of a goal that banks would not realize through BODs alone. 
Islamic financial institutions tie themselves considerably to the social life of their consumers and 
stakeholders through their commitment to giving legitimate services. To provide ‘meaning and 
stability’ to social life, they need to incorporate institutional components than usual to achieve 
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their goal (Abdelsalam et al. 2014; Ginena, 2014). In this case, they have to evolve from the 
conventional characterization of financial institutions to incorporate SSBs to their CG structure 
(Schäfer, Strauss, & Zecher, 2015; Platonova et al., 2016). Therefore, SSBs are not a foreign 
element in their institution framework, but rather a necessity that grows on them, in their quest 
to realize success in a market that operates. In fact, it is conceivable that the changes witnessed 
in the institutional composition and involvement of SSBs could be attributable to evolution of 
corporate legitimacy demands experienced by IFIs (Almutairi & Quttainah, 2017; Everett et al., 
2016).  The diagram below captures the way that the two boards maintain an integrative 
relationship. 
 
Diagram 1: Integrated theoretical framework on the collaboration between SSBs, BODs, and top management. 
Obid and Naysary (2014) presented a comprehensive theoretical framework which can help to 
understand the complex interrelationship between the two boards and their influence on CEO 
and top management. the main corporate theories are closely interrelated in terms of their focus 
on disclosure, competence, confidentiality, independence, and accountability. Therefore, these 
CG principles can be used in explaining the issue of Shariah governance and how SSBs are 
expected to collaborate with the BODs. As applies to the Islamic banks, the main concepts in 
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Shariah governance include: (1) discharging accountability to stakeholders; (2) ensuring 
independence of main functionaries in Shari’ah governance; (3) ensuring confidentiality during 
information disclosure; (4) using competence of BODs to ensure improved performance of IFIs; 
and (5) increase transparency and disclosure and at the same time the trust and confidence of 
stakeholders. As outlined in the AAOIFI (2005) and IFSB (2010) guidelines, and by other 
researchers such as Hayat and Hassan (2017), Mejia et al. (2014), Mohammed and Muhammed 
(2017), and Ullah, Harwood and Jamali, (2018) these are the five main principles which ensure 
the quality of SSB governance in IFIs. However, despite the overlap and interactions between the 
three parties (SSBs, BODs, and top management), the application of individual CG theories is 
insufficient particularly in the case of Shariah governance. Thus, Diagram 1 depicts the integrated 
theoretical framework developed based on the three most commonly used theories of CG and 
how their interrelated concepts can be explanatory while evaluating Shariah governance within 
IFIs in Saudi Arabia. 
In line with Diagram 1, the concepts of information asymmetry in agency theory and 
accountability in stakeholder theory both call for reporting and transparency on company 
operations. Thus, agency theory and stakeholder theory can be incorporated to explain one main 
aspect of SSB governance which is disclosure and transparency as argued by Obid and Naysary 
(2014). However, both theories concur on the point that disclosure of confidential information 
can face the firm with the threat of competitive risks which refers to the issue of confidentiality 
in Shariah governance. In addition, the altruistic view expressed in stewardship theory and 
stakeholder theory contributes to the concept of accountability to shareholders and stakeholders 
which is a key concern Shari’ah governance as noted by Azmat, Skully, and Brown (2015). 
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According to Farag, Mallin, and Ow-Yong (2018) in agent theory denotes reliance of IFIs on the 
experience and expertise of the agent, which can be integrated with stewardship theory that 
discusses the use of stewards’ skills. Therefore, the theories can be used to explain the issue of 
competence which SSBs contribute towards the Shari’ah governance of IFIs. The theories also 
emphasize that for BODs to perform their duties within the Islamic banks, they need to use the 
SSBs expertise in advancing stakeholder interests and independence of the main functions in 
Shari’ah governance. 
Based on the integrative relationship between the SSB and BODs, this study has shown that SSBs 
have a strong moderating effect on BODs. Considering that risk-taking is largely inevitable in any 
IFIs operations, there is a need by SSBs to put in place adequate measures aimed at ensuring 
BODs and CEOs make financial decisions in their services and products which align with 
stakeholder interests. Therefore, SSBs play a fundamental role in IFIs to ensure BOD and top 
management approaches align with Shari’ah compliance. Further, the study notes that SSBs 
which are composed of Shari’ah scholars make substantial contributions in terms of resources to 
IFIs. While assessing Shari’ah compliance, Shari’ah scholars through SSBs serve to ensure that 
every financial product by the BODs and the CEO aligns with the requirements of the Shari’ah law 
(Gözübüyük, Kock, & Ünal, 2018). Findings from this study, therefore, points out that integrating 
SSBs and BODs is key to building a strong oversight role in the IFIs and regulating risky decisions 
which might be made by top management when offering financial services or products. 
As argued through agency theory, the board needs to be independent of the CEO to curb self-
seeking behaviour of the CEO and the management team. Such an approach helps to ensure that 
CEOs promote the interests of the principals instead of working to fulfil the limiting interests of 
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top IFI management in Saudi Arabia. In summation, based on the AT and RBV theories, it becomes 
clear that the resources which SSBs bring to BODs and the independence established in the 
process heightens oversight roles of the boards enhancing CG in the IFIs, which is beneficial in 
risk control and financial performance of the Saudi Islamic banks. Moreover, insights from the 
study reveal that integrating the RBV and AGT theories in IFIs corporate governance research 
produces more meaningful results in promoting stakeholder interests. 
The results obtained from this research offers various implication for the IFIs literature. First, 
results show that IFIs, regulators, and policymakers in the areas of Shari’ah supervision and CG 
need to align with the roles played by SSBs and BODs. Bernard and Gendron (2010) proposed a 
framework for understanding governance effectiveness by largely focusing on the role of audit 
committees. The comprehensive literature research by Bernard and Gendron (2010) on audit 
committee effectiveness revealed that the association between timely financial reporting and 
audit committees is rarely investigated. Their review revealed that the characteristics of audit 
committees which have the greatest impacts include committee size, number of meetings, 
competence, independence, and existence. In conclusion, Bernard and Gendron (2010) assert 
that the effectiveness of an audit committee varies with environmental factors like exposure to 
lawsuits, enforcement level, and concentration of ownership. However, they caution that firms 
which mimic the best practices from American companies in terms of audit committees may not 
always realise desired outcomes. Thus, practitioners and regulators need to be careful when 
interpreting the results by Bernard and Gendron (2010). From their analyses, they reported that 
70 of the 113 studies (62%) examined focused on US public companies, while most other studies 
rely on data gathered in countries characterized by the Anglo-Saxon model of corporate 
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governance. Their conclusions, therefore, makes it difficult to be replicated to the Shari’ah 
governance framework used in IFIs when assessing the relationship between SSBs and BODs in 
promoting service and strategy or monitoring and control functions, respectively. Different from 
the audit committees in the Anglo-Saxon model, the SSBs focuses on promoting the goal of 
Islamic accounting attainment as outlined under AAOIFI and IFSB guidelines. 
Different from the work by Bernard and Gendron (2010), insights from this study reveals that 
regulators within Islamic banks need to develop suitable policies aimed at ensuring IFIs make use 
of CG models in a more comprehensive manner instead of focusing on SSBs and BODs as isolated 
entities. That is, IFIs regulators and board directors need to ensure that SSBs, CEOS, and BODs 
work in a collaborative manner towards achieving the same goals in the IFIs. Second, 
policymakers or regulators need to appreciate that it is very important to strengthen the SSB 
members’ credentials such as independence, confidentiality, and competency. Specifically, the 
IFIs need to ensure that SSB and BOD members have relevant experience in Shari’ah and Islamic-
related financial practices which influence the decision-making process among the CEOs and 
other top management. Scholars who have better experience in Shari’ah in addition to Islamic 
financial fields are more likely to make meaningful contributions to IFIs in line with the RBV theory 
(education, experience, and innovativeness) thereby helping BODs and CEOs make better 
banking operations.  
Third, findings from the interview sessions provide a reliable reference to BODs to configure CG 
in IFIs across Saudi Arabia. As applies to this study, BODs need to be aware and recognize the 
important role that SSBs play in supervising the operations of IFIs across Saudi Arabia toward 
reducing potential lending risks and advancing stakeholder interests. The collaboration between 
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SSBs and BODs need to be anchored on institutional theory aimed at developing seamless entities 
focusing on executing banking obligations in line with Shari’ah provisions. Fourth, findings 
obtained from this study contribute to the extant literature on IFI, specifically on factors which 
influence their risk-taking approaches. Empirically, there is a paucity of insights about the SSBs 
and BODs in terms of how they influence bank outcomes by regulating and approving decisions 
made by CEOs and top management. The study reveals that integrating AGT that stresses on the 
oversight functions of the SSB, and RBV theory that emphasizes the valuable knowledge SSB 
contributes to IFIs has a positive impact on mitigating potential risks, promoting performance, 
and financial position of its stakeholders in Saudi Arabia. 
6.5. New BODs Construction for Culturally Sensitive Markets 
Islamic banks have a unique business model that stems from hefty cultural demands. Banks offer 
Islamic banking services outside Saudi Arabia and choose to deploy mechanisms that promote 
competency in complying with Shari’ah law (Saeed & Izzeldin, 2016). Such uniqueness is 
attributable to strict cultural demands that intensify the corporate legitimacy burden that these 
institutions experience (Everett et al., 2016; Schäfer, Strauss, & Zecher, 2015). From the 
discussion and findings above, it is conceivable that these financial institutions continue to evolve 
to meet corporate legitimacy demands, and part of this evolution manifests in the emergence of 
a new CG structure (Macey & O’Hara, 2001; Abdelsalam et al. 2014). Current theory and CG policy 
view the BODs in a traditional light, prompting most scholarly work to draw a line between SSBs 
and the BODs. However, this study establishes that they personify a strong relationship, which is 
attributable to the deployment of a cooperative approach to exercising board power. In addition, 
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it finds that they work to complement each other in the realization of common corporate goals, 
despite drawing power from variant stakeholder cohorts.  
The RDT and the co-optation theory position the BODs as the conduit between organizations and 
the external environment. Such a role requires skill and connection (Almutairi & Quttainah, 2017; 
Schäfer, Strauss, & Zecher, 2015). However, in the context of IFIs, the cultural burden that 
financial institutions experience means that the traditional constitution of the BODs is not 
enough to ensure the absolute realization of their responsibility as a strategic resource (Ginena, 
2014; Macey & O’Hara, 2001). Therefore, the SSB complements the traditional BODs in an area 
where it comes up short, i.e. providing corporate legitimacy through cultural compliance. From 
this, it is evident that scholars should stop perceiving the two boards as distinct institutions. 
Rather, position them as components of the administrative structure working together to meet 
stakeholder needs (Everett et al., 2016; Gheeraert & Weill, 2015). This study sheds light on theory 
by showing that scholarly work should now view the two institutions collectively, as they 
complement each other in realizing the primary goal of the BODs, which is to serve as a linkage 
between the organization and the external environment.  
6.6. The Role of Policy in Shaping CG 
In Saud Arabia, IFIs develop internal policies and process that oversee the adoption and 
integration of SSBs to the corporate structure. This is a growth in CG, not contemplated by law. 
It is imperative to note that they do so while remaining within the scope of traditional CG rules, 
i.e. the boards help organizations to interact better with the external environment (Macey & 
O’Hara, 2001). Consequently, it is safe to say that the study helps to gain a deeper understanding 
of how banks can improve their CG systems through developing internal policies and procedure, 
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depending on their business profiles and the needs of their business (Almutairi & Quttainah, 
2017; Iqbal & Mirakhor, 2007). Both members of the BODs and SSBs reiterate the value of having 
a framework that ensures compliance with Islamic law, given that the banks operate in a Muslim 
dominated community. Companies may not contemplate this extension of the CG system for 
banks due to the complexity associated with it (Abdelsalam et al. 2014; Saeed & Izzeldin, 2016). 
In fact, the theory does not provide for the same, and research into the establishment of SSBs 
has been reactive. This shows that good policies play an integral role in promoting CG 
development, especially when it comes to matters relating to the constitution of the CG 
structure. Through SSBs, IFIs in Saudi Arabia has the potential to serve Muslim customers in an 
effective manner.  
The value of policy not only manifests in the establishment of SSBs but also their integration with 
the BODs. Traditional banks have boards to oversee nonexecutive functions and keep the 
management team in check, but Islamic banks in Saudi Arabia incorporate SSBs to this process, 
as part of their path to sustainability and legitimacy requires compliance with Islamic law 
(Schäfer, Strauss, & Zecher, 2015; Saeed & Izzeldin, 2016). Both boards exist within the same 
corporate space, but serve distinct functions, allowing them to complement each other, as well 
as work towards a common goal. The organization is able to deploy its strategic resources to the 
benefit of all stakeholders without causing a strain in relations or resources (Farag, Mallin, & Ow-
Yong, 2014; Iqbal & Mirakhor, 2007). Therefore, this study contributes considerably to 
understanding how policymakers can continue to shape CG. What does this mean for theory? It 
opens up new avenues for researchers to explore the development process for the BODs. It also 
identifies a factor that they can integrate into their analysis of CG structures around the world. 
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This is a great addition to the discourse regarding modelling CG in order to promote effectiveness, 
ensure sustainability and attain ultimate protection of stakeholders. 
6.7. Relationship between Boards 
The implications for the findings outlined above shows that the study sets a new foundation for 
theory by showing that SSBs and the BODs integrate well to promote the realization of 
organizational goals. This is attributable to the strength of internal policies and process and the 
ability by the two boards to supplement each other in serving as a conduit between the internal 
environment and the external environment (Granot, Brashear, & Motta, 2012; Iqbal & Mirakhor, 
2007). As a result, this contributes towards an improvement in CG, because the SSB supplies a 
competency and commitment that is absent in the BODs.  Such an effectual integrative 
relationship creates a foundation for the two boards to discharge their respective roles well 
(Gheeraert & Weill, 2015). Thus, it is conceivable that the study opens up a new way to perceive 
board relationships as a measure of effectiveness. In that, instances of a poor connection 
between the boards responsible for the governance of an institution could be perceived as a CG 
weakness (Farag, Mallin, & Ow-Yong, 2014). Forbes and Milliken (1999) underline ways that 
stakeholders could measure board effectiveness. The observation above builds to the framework 
outlined here, especially in the context of banks that have an SSB. This shows that there are more 
avenues for analysing the way that boards perform, especially by looking at how they hold 
themselves up in the CG structure of an organization.  
6.8. New Perspective in Institution Development 
Institution theory provides an invaluable theoretical model for analysing the way that SSBs 
emerge as components of the CG structure of IFIs (Abdelsalam et al. 2014). The notion that 
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institutions do not have a definitive classification, and continue to evolve depending on their 
circumstances provides a strong model for defining the way that corporate systems work 
(Granot, Brashear, & Motta, 2012; Iqbal & Mirakhor, 2007). Findings from this study were able 
to establish that the evolution of SSBs in Saudi banks is also attributable to the level of interaction 
with other components of the financial institutions, facilitated by policy and process 
development (Iqbal & Mirakhor, 2007). For instance, perpetual interaction with the BODs is a 
product of internal process and policies that seek to embed SSBs to the CG structure of the 
organization, for the benefit of the financial institution (Jabbar, 2009; Kabir et al., 2011). This 
development in the CG structure of IFIs in Saudi Arabia is an indication that institutions cannot 
have a universal designation, and continue to evolve to personify a profile that promotes their 
sustainability (Macey & O’Hara, 2001). This finding is crucial for a theory relating to the corporate 
administrative structure of financial institutions, because it shows that they are institutions that 
continue to evolve, depending on circumstances in the internal and external environment.  
Discussions on CG effectiveness, such as the one by Pathan and Faff (2013), can benefit a great 
deal from this because it adds on ways that institutions can reinvent themselves internally to be 
more effective in CG. This is because; they are able to view one of the components that can aid 
these boards to grow beyond their traditional CG designation (Farag, Mallin, & Ow-Yong, 2014; 
Macey & O’Hara, 2001). For instance, intensifying the interaction of board members with the 
internal environment could help them gain a deeper understanding of the organization; hence, 
increasing their overall effectiveness (Iqbal & Mirakhor, 2007). Taking time to grant the SSB, this 
privilege does yield positive outcomes. The research adds to the application of agency theory in 
the context of corporate boards by showing that the more boards interact with relevant 
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processes and stakeholders, inside and outside the corporate environment, the more they 
become influential and effective in discharging the mandate (Farag, Mallin, & Ow-Yong, 2014). 
This observation partially explains the differing level of effectiveness between BODs, as well as 
the fact that they grow at varying rates. 
6.9. Implications for Practice 
One of the implications for practice is that the results are beneficial to IFIs, regulators, and 
policymakers in the area of Shari’ah supervision and CG. The research provides new insights to 
regulators and policymakers in terms of the needed aspects to formulate suitable policy to ensure 
IFIs make use of CG in a comprehensive manner instead of letting each of the boards work in 
isolation. That is to mean that there is a need by the BODs and banking regulators to ensure that 
SSBs and the BODs work in a collective manner to promote robust risk monitoring in IFIs. 
Second, the Saudi IFIs need to ensure that they have in place mechanisms to strengthen the SSBs 
credentials, specifically, by warranting, there is relevant expertise in Shari’ah and IFIs related 
fields. The approach will be more effective than having Shari’ah scholars whose only role is to 
influence the decision-making process in SSBs. In the process, companies which have SSBs and 
comprehensive exposure to the Shari’ah regulations could make significant contributions to IFIs 
since they can handle practical challenges related to Islamic legal operations. 
Third, the findings stress the need to adopt and implement the existing legal provisions for SBs 
across the Saudi banking and financial sectors. In this case, companies may aspire to put in place 
suitable measures that promote Shari’ah functions such as enhancing their internal audit and 
reporting. In addition, companies need to train their members on the role of SSBs and BODs 
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within the organisation and their respective roles. Such training through regular framework will 
create awareness across financial institutions on the need to integrate SSBs to company 
compliance governance. 
Fourth, the study also provides a reliable reference to BODs on the need to configure their CG 
processes in IFIs. There is a need among banks which have not fully integrated SSBs to be aware 
and recognise the importance of SBs and the experience they add to the company in terms of 
supervising products. Also, the findings bring new insights on finance and banking-related issues 
to the oversight role and internal auditing reporting in IFIs. From this point of view, the 
implications of this study for Saudi IFIs are that they give information on the important elements 
which banks need to take into consideration to attract Muslim investors and customers. 
Finally, the findings drawn from this research would serve to enhance customer confidence in 
IFIs across Saudi Arabia at it gives empirical evidence regarding the extent to which SSBs play a 
central role in promoting the performance of IFIs in Saudi Arabia. Also, having SSBs in the 
organisation is central to providing evidence as to the main pillar, which ensures compliance with 
Shari’ah and Islamic laws. Generally, the results can be used to enhance awareness among IFIs 
shareholders, marketers, and top management on the significance of SSBs in promoting the 
performance of Saudi IFIs. Specifically, the results show that the integration of agency theory 
which emphasizes monitoring and control reveals how the boards work to ensure that principal 
focus on delivering the interests of shareholders and those of the wider public. 
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6.9.1. Greater Support for SSBs 
From an analysis of expert knowledge on the relationship between SSBs and the BODs, the study 
establishes that the two institutions of CG share an integrative relationship that promotes 
corporate success. Furthermore, SBs enjoy a positive space where they can exercise their 
responsibilities (Jabbar, 2009; Kabir et al., 2011; McNulty et al., 2011). Thus, they become an 
essential component of IFIs. Despite such progress and value in their deployment, some banks 
are yet to fortify the policies and process that reinforce their mandate and contribution 
(Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 1996). As a result, it is safe to say that this study reveals the 
true contribution of SSBs in IFIs, and how they link up with the BODs to make these financial 
institutions better (Jabbar, 2009; Kabir et al., 2011; McNulty et al., 2011). This provides a rationale 
for banks to reinforce their integration strategies, policies and processes pertaining to the 
deployment of SSBs, given the practicality of this endeavour, as well as the value that it brings to 
the CG process.  
Apart from unearthing the actual value of SSBs, the study also shows that there are certain 
corporate legitimacy milestones that the BODs cannot achieve, at least in their traditional 
construction. The study reveals that the SSBs serve as an additional component of the board that 
represents other stakeholder groups, namely Muslim clients, regulators, and community 
members that would like to see institutions adhere to positive social practices. According to 
Macey and O’Hara (2001), this is an observation that will increase support for SSBs, as they 
occupy a position in the CG hierarchy that allows them to influence how organizations in the 
country meet claims from other stakeholder groups (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 1996). 
Islamic financial institutions that have SSBs already realize their value to these stakeholders, an 
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observation of the study that ill also influences their perception in practice (Abdelsalam et al. 
2014; Farag, Mallin, & Ow-Yong, 2014). For instance, the respondents acknowledge that 
members of the supervisory committee take part actively in product development, in a function 
that they discharge in collaboration with the BODs. Such cooperation ensures compliance with 
Islamic laws, as well as expectations of other stakeholders in the external environment.  
6.9.2. Changing Approach to CG 
The addition of SBs in the CG structure of IFIs in Saudi Arabia represents a significant change in 
the structure of CG in the banking industry (Farag, Mallin, & Ow-Yong, 2014). However, this 
transformation is a positive one, and IFIs that do not have a supervisory board should use the 
banks in this research as a benchmark for transforming their CG structure, especially those that 
manage to have the right policies and procedures in place (Macey & O’Hara, 2001; Garas, 2012). 
The banks show that it is possible to provide a supporting framework for the BODs to 
complement them in areas where they show inadequate skill, information, or knowledge. Shifting 
the CG structure to improve the level of competency of the enterprise is a positive aspect, as it is 
possible to do so in a way that does not cause a power conflict with legacy systems (Iqbal & 
Mirakhor, 2007; Gheeraert & Weill, 2015). A crucial aspect to note is that the banks have the 
power to bring in SSBs into their CG structure; hence, this is a change that they can manage 
internally. For instance, a multinational institution can establish a cultural diversity division in the 
CG system, whose purpose is to scrutinize operations to determine their compliance with the 
local culture, and take corrective action (Garas, 2012; Garcia-Torea et al., 2016). Establishing this 
department supplies the institution with an additional conduit to the external environment that 
complements the traditional BODs.  
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Companies are likely to experience challenges in their implementation of such a structure, but 
findings from this study also reveal that they can overcome these obstacles to establish a useful 
system. Among measures that they can take to facilitate the adoption of such governance 
structure is to foster trust between the various components of the organization in order to enable 
them to work together (Macey & O’Hara, 2001; Gheeraert, 2014). In addition, the BODs should 
be willing to accommodate the input from these extensions of the CG structure, which will see 
these extensions grow, as well as the board themselves grow (Granot, Brashear, & Motta, 2012; 
Iqbal & Mirakhor, 2007). From this, it is conceivable that the study contributes significantly 
towards practice, especially given the fact that more and more institutions are pushing towards 
new markets. While the BODs help to acclimatize to the external environment, emphasis on 
maximizing shareholder wealth and building commitment from the management group could 
undermine the prospect of them gaining the competencies needed to navigate new markets. It 
is here that the extensions to CG structures come in handy to support their function.  
6.9.3. Contribution towards Realizing Corporate Legitimacy 
Corporate legitimacy in the modern business environment demands companies show success in 
more areas than just finance. The benchmarks for legitimacy in culturally sensitive markets such 
as Saudi Arabia intensifies this burden further, especially for multinational enterprises that are 
coming in from different cultures (Almutairi & Quttainah, 2017). As a result, companies always 
face a dilemma on ways that they can achieve the right level of legitimacy. In the Islamic banking 
sector in Saudi Arabia, legitimacy draws largely from the capacity to comply with Islamic law or 
to build a corporate identity that resonates with the Islamic culture (Frankfort-Nachmias & 
Nachmias, 1996). The essence of SSBs is to help IFIs to become more responsive to the demands 
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of Islamic law (Jabbar, 2009; Kabir et al., 2011; McNulty et al., 2011). While this is straightforward 
support for companies in their quest to attaining legitimacy, the study finds that it is not the 
establishment of SSBs that help companies attain legitimacy; rather, their integration into the 
organization culture and structure (Macey & O’Hara, 2001; Garcia-Torea et al., 2016). Therefore, 
it is arguable that this study provides a sturdy ideological foundation that can guide the 
implementation of these boards in practice so that they can contribute towards the realization 
of corporate legitimacy.  
The study also establishes that such culturally sensitive jurisdictions may require companies to 
provide additional support for the BODs in exercising its function as a conduit to the external 
environment. This observation not only influences theory but also practice, in the sense that it 
underlines the need for IFIs to continuously modify their CG structures to attain legitimacy 
(Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 1996). As noted by Gheeraert and Weill (2015), although SSBs 
are currently helping them solve significant legitimacy challenges, there is a need to keep growing 
them. Such growth is essential given the fact that legitimacy challenges continue to grow or 
evolve; hence, it is important to ensure that the boards evolve as well (Bernard, & Gendron, 2010; 
Garas, 2012). By outlining ways that the SBs grow in IFIs in Saudi Arabia, the study provides 
benchmarks that companies in the industry can observe to ensure that they can grow their 
complementary boards (Jabbar, 2009; Kabir et al., 2011; McNulty et al., 2011). Therefore, in 
revealing that their areas where the BODs could come up short in affirming corporate legitimacy, 
the study makes a positive contribution to practice by providing a rationale for adopting 
additional support systems that would help the BODs promote corporate legitimacy.  
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6.9.4. Effective Management through Compliance 
The study not only identifies the integrative relationship between SBs and BODs but also reports 
compliance among IFIs in their implementation of SSBs, after defining policies and procedures 
that direct their operation (Baydoun & Willet, 2000; Vogel & Hayes, 2006). Staying in the comfort 
zone allows companies to maintain the status quo and control resource outflows. It also ensures 
that those that currently hold a position of power maintain their position (Granot, Brashear, & 
Motta, 2012; Iqbal & Mirakhor, 2007). Establishing SBs disrupts the CG structure of IFIs in Saudi 
Arabia, but most of them ensure proper integration with the rest of the CG system (Abdelsalam 
et al. 2014; Vogel & Hayes, 2006). The incentives of such commitment to Islamic law and SSBs 
are not only evident in the ability to operate without any legitimacy challenges, but also the 
ability to continue growing by taking advantage of the additional systems that the institutions 
embed into their CG structure (Macey & O’Hara, 2001).  
Through the effective application of CG policies on the application of SSBs, the study observes 
that IFIs in Saudi Arabia record a growing complementary relationship between the BODs and 
SSBs. These committees become influential in operation, strategy, and product design, in a CG 
environment that meets the needs of almost all stakeholder groups (Granot, Brashear, & Motta, 
2012; Iqbal & Mirakhor, 2007). This underlines the value of Building organizations that are 
compliant with internal policies and processes that seek to improve the CG structure. These 
developments are taking place against the background of increasing legal and regulation 
enforcement in Saudi Arabia. As such, corporate environment demands the need for integrity 
when undertaking financial business transactions, which are a fundamental Shari’ah requirement 
that promotes diligent management. Effective management determines the long-term success 
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of a company implying that there is a need to nurture a keen culture of law-abidance and integrity 
(Garas, 2012; Garcia-Torea et al., 2016). Compliance and integrity, therefore, are the basis for 
opportunities for successful SBs in the IFIs financial and banking sectors (Macey & O’Hara, 2001). 
By applying bindings values and suitable compliance management, SBs in Saudi Arabia can align 
themselves in a position to promote their independence and integrity, while avoiding potential 
breaches to Shari’ah compliance. Thus, effective and integrity compliance are an unalienable 
element of diligent and reliable SBs based on their independence and focus on advancing 
stakeholder interests. 
6.10. Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter gives meaning to the findings of the study by linking it to theory. It analyses the state 
of the relationship between SSBs and the BODs, mainly by providing the rationale behind the 
relational dynamics between the two boards. From the findings, it is conceivable that the 
relationship between the board and directors and SSBs in IFIs in Saudi Arabia is a good one 
(Granot, Brashear, & Motta, 2012; Iqbal & Mirakhor, 2007). This is evident in the way that they 
work together towards common goals, even though they represent the interests of variant 
stakeholder groups. Much of this is attributable to the fact that both boards have a unique and 
invaluable role to play, as strategic resources of the financial institutions (Macey & O’Hara, 2001). 
Through SBs, the IFIs can realize corporate legitimacy incentives that they cannot achieve by 
having a BOD alone (Vogel & Hayes, 2006). The good relationship between the two boards also 
grows from the fact that there is an optimal board power structure and culture at the banks, 
which enable them to coexist without conflict.  
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Analysis of findings in this chapter not only help to address the research aim, which is to assess 
the relationship between SSBs and the BODs but also has implications for theory and practice. 
These implications ensure that the study can contribute towards the current discourse on the 
deployment of boards across the world. Therefore, this study is important to the overall state of 
financial institutions in Saudi Arabia. This chapter also identifies limitations experienced during 
the study, such as a limited research context, limited literature on the topic under investigation 
and reliance on the assumption to a notable degree. To help alleviate the implications of these 
limitations and to expand research into this area, the study also recommends areas of future 
















Chapter 7: Conclusion and Recommendations 
7.1. Introduction 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the relationship between the SSBs and the BODs 
Saudi Arabian IFIs. As previously pointed out, the motivation to undertake this research was 
informed by an array of factors keys among them the limited number of studies in Saudi Arabia, 
which have been committed to tackling this topic. Specifically, there is currently limited insights 
on how the deployment of SSBs in Saudi Arabia interacts with other corporate administrative 
agencies such as the IFIs where there are BODs. As such, undertaking this research was deemed 
essential because it would be identified as important practices on CG in the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia, and creates a foundation for further research in the future. Besides, the motivation to 
undertake this study was informed by the dynamic nature of the financial and banking industry 
in IFIs, where gaps in the literature continue to persist, further emphasizing the need for the 
current and future studies to address emerging Shari’ah issues in the financial corporations in 
Saudi Arabia.  
Underwriting the above considerations, the purpose of this chapter is to provide a summary of 
the main findings and conclusions drawn from this study. The findings drawn from this research 
are based on the interviews, archive research, and literature assessment that was conducted on 
this topic. The summation of the main findings is presented considering the primary research 
questions which were identified in this study. First, the study presents insights collected from the 
first research question, which attempted to investigate the nature of the relationship between 
the BODs and the SSB in IFIs in Saudi Arabia. Second, the man findings from the study regarding 
the important factors in the CG structure of IFIs in Saudi Arabia either support or undermine the 
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deployment of the SSB. Finally, the third aspect is focused on identifying the areas of convergence 
that exist in the roles of the BODs and SSBs in IFIs in Saudi Arabia. 
7.2. Summary of Main Findings 
The main objective of this research was to explore the nature of the existing relationship between 
the SSBs and BODs in the Saudi IFIs. Primary focus to undertake this study was informed by the 
paucity of studies which have assessed the association between BODs and SSBs, a key aspect 
towards mitigating potential risks in the IFIs because of lending decisions made by top 
management to ensure compliance with Shari’ah law. Research Question1 was formulated to 
investigate the nature of the relationship which exist between SSBs and BODs in the IFI sector in 
Saudi Arabia. Insights obtained from the interview responses revealed that there are six main 
aspects which are critical in comprehending the nature of the existing relationship between SSBs 
and BODs.  
The main contributions of the identified insights serve to fill the existing knowledge gap in the IFI 
literature on the nature of the relationship between the BODs and the SSBs in Saudi Arabia. 
Findings drawn from this study reveal that there is a growing approach towards ensuring the 
boards achieve IFIs objectives. Changing internal policies and processes reveals a growing 
tendency of SSBs and BODs to work together and supplement each other in the CG environment 
(Garas & ElMassah, 2018). Growing collaboration reveals efforts to improve CG in IFIs with SSB 
providing Shari’ah knowledge which is often absent in the BODs when making lending and other 
financial decisions. In the process, close collaboration serves to improve BOD competency in 
decision processes, while addressing potential governance shortcomings in the IFIs. Second, the 
study found that close collaboration between SSBs and BODs serve to enhance IFIs performance. 
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The study showed that in Saudi Arabia, financial institutions continue to evolve to meet global 
competition. In line with the institutional theory, the growing interaction between the SSBs and 
BODs contributes towards a more effective approach towards meeting the duties in the IFIs. 
Third, the research observes that there are continuous efforts by SSBs to streamline the CG 
framework in the Saudi IFIs and align existing complexities.   
Fourth, the nature of the connection between the BODs in Saudi Arabia was observed to have a 
close interconnection with culturally sensitive markets. In Saudi Arabia, the IFIs based their CG 
on the cultural aspects that are in line with the Shari’ah law. The unique connection was closely 
linked to Islamic cultural demands that increase corporate legitimacy that the financial 
institutions encounter. Fifth, the study also noted that the nature of the relation between the 
SSB and BOD serves to shape CG. Study findings further indicated that the IFIs in Saudi Arabia has 
attempted to create processes and policies that connect SSBs to improved CG structures 
anchored on promoting IFIs performance in line with Shari’ah law. Sixth, interview results also 
indicated that the nature of the interaction between SSB and BODs works towards the realization 
of stakeholder interests. Interview findings reveal that the SSB and BOD serve an integral part 
when they collaborate in the financial sector in Saudi Arabia to promote and advance the 
stakeholder expectations by eliminating potential conflict of interest between the principal and 
the agent as discussed under the agency theory. 
The finding also revealed that the two boards play a complementary role in the Islamic banks in 
Saudi Arabia where they help eliminate potential governance weakness which might arise in the 
process and, in the process, establish corporate legitimacy. As applies to this research, the term 
corporate legitimacy was used to reveal how the BOD and the SSB help financial corporations in 
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Saudi Arabia cultivate a positive and trustworthy image to the external environment. When 
financial bodies display positive corporate culture, they tend to command greater legitimacy 
where their authenticity is further strengthened when they execute their operations in line with 
the specifications of the SSBs and the strategic roles pronounced by the BODs. For the BOD and 
the SSB, legitimacy is displayed when the financial corporations in Saudi Arabia adopt the virtues 
of Islamic laws, which is tailored to improving the overall corporate performance. In addition, 
legitimacy is increased when the financial institutions take part in social affairs or collaborate 
with the corporate structure, culture, and task system to conform to society’s social norms. While 
the board might be important in facilitating some functions such as corporate social 
responsibility, in Saudi Arabia, they have limited capacity when applied to IFIs since the SSBs have 
higher competency in executing roles closely tied to religious and moral obligations. In part, the 
BODs are less capable of executing their mandate, perhaps due to what the respondents 
attributed to a potential conflict of interest which may arise from the desire to maximise 
shareholder wealth, in addition to possible lack of important religious and Shari’ah skills to 
execute the function.   
7.3. Limitations 
The study experiences a number of limitations, including a small investigation context. Narrowing 
down the setting of research has its advantages, but it is a limitation when it comes to applying 
the findings of the research. For instance, the context of the study is limited, which could affect 
the application of the research findings outside Saudi Arabia. Though the literature that the 
researcher uses hails from different parts of the world, the participants are exclusively drawn 
from Saudi Arabia. This creates a noticeable application limitation. Some of the readers of the 
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thesis may be looking to apply it internationally, or in another context apart from Saudi Arabia, 
but the fact that the study draws data from participants exclusively based in Saudi Arabia means 
that they may find the findings irrelevant for them. Otherwise, taking this approach ensures that 
the study is focused and supplies an accurate representation of how issues unfold in Saudi Arabia. 
Another limitation worth noting is the fact that this area of study is yet to be explored by scholarly 
research; hence, the study is forced to use broad literature on CG (Azid, Asutay, & Burki, 2007). 
Despite SSBs being an integral component of IFIs in Saudi Arabia that offer Islamic banking 
services, research on ways that they interact with other components of CG is minimal. This is a 
major undoing for the study, given the fact that previous studies help to create a solid foundation 
for any research.  
Choosing to conduct the study in Saudi Arabia undermines the prospect of the study being 
influential in other countries. All the respondents involved in the interviewing process come from 
Saudi Arabia and serve in banks across Saudi Arabia. In fact, most of them reiterate that they 
serve in the country’s banking sector for a considerable period. This is an indication that the 
results and findings from the study largely mirror the situation, Saudi Arabia. While the study 
attempts to alleviate the impact of this limitation by incorporating an array of scholarly research, 
much of its foundational aspects still draw from Saudi Arabia (El-Gamal, 2006). What is more, the 
study focuses on a CG system that is exclusive to Saudi Arabia, which also diminishes the scope 
of application in other contexts. The policy considerations that the study make are for Saudi 
Arabia. Therefore, most of the findings are relevant to the Saudi Arabia policy environment unless 
there are countries that deploy similar policy frameworks. Given that this study personifies a 
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plethora of implications for research and practice, this particular limitation undermines the 
objectives that the study hopes to achieve. 
Another limitation of the study is that it focuses on the relationship between SSBs and the BODs, 
failing to address how SSBs execute their functions. Though the study captures the role of the 
secretary to the SB, frequency of meeting with the BODs and the way that the committee 
influences IFIs, it does not provide for procedural elements of the committee, especially relating 
to the way that the SB executes product, service, and process reviews. While this keeps the focus 
of the study on the relationship between the two boards, it confines its usage to those who have 
a profound understanding of SSBs (El-Gamal, 2006). This is attributable to the fact that the study 
does not take time to explore rudimentary aspects of SBs, including how they inspect services, 
processes, and decisions within the financial institutions. Another downside associated with 
failing to outline the operation procedure of SSBs is that the study misses automatic 
convergences between them and the BODs, e.g. areas of the CG framework where they are 
directly involved together (Dar & Azami, 2010; El-Gamal, 2006). Therefore, the relationships that 
the study captures between the BODs and the SSBs are those that are complex in nature or those 
that the respondents during the interviews do not deem obvious. However, this is out of the 
scope of the study and opens a good place for future studies to begin their work.  
7.4. Recommendations for Future Research 
From the above, it is conceivable that the study contributes towards current theory and practice, 
but it also opens up avenues for future research. The first area that future research should focus 
on is to assess how the relationship between boards can be used to measure their performance. 
While this is one of the implications of the study to theory, it lacks a strong research basis; hence, 
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it is important that future research commence here. Successful research into this phenomenon 
will be integral to ensuring that companies have an alternative approach for measuring the 
success of the board, apart from just liking at general metrics for success, a mark for board 
performance. Another area that future research could focus on is the possibility of integrating 
both boards (Dar & Azami, 2010). From the study, it is apparent that they enjoy a positive working 
relationship. Therefore, future research could focus on ways that policymakers could integrate 
the two boards, with the aim of creating a single board. Among issues that research should focus 
on while investigating this possibility is how it will affect the capacity of experts in Islamic law to 
continue to champion for greater adoption of the culture (Dar & Azami, 2010). Successful 
research would make it possible to discern whether or not it will be possible to leverage the good 
relationship between the two boards further by pushing for a CG structure that brings board 
members from both spectrums together (Archer & Rifaat, 2006). Other incentives for integration 
include the chance to improve efficiency by allowing both boards to operate together.  
Apart from investigating the prospect of merging the two boards, future research should also 
focus on the relationship between SSBs and management (Dar & Azami, 2010). Though findings 
from this study show some essence of convergence, it is not conclusive; hence, future research 
should push to learn how the two parts of the CG structure relate to each other. Taking this 
direction would make it possible to accurately quantify the level of integration of SSBs into the 
CG structure of IFIs in Saudi Arabia (Archer & Rifaat, 2006). In addition, it will help to measure 
the actual level of compliance by assessing the number of corporate elements that the SC touches 
on and whether it meets the threshold that the law establishes for IFIs (Dar & Azami, 2010). 
Future research should also focus on the number of ways that organisations in the financial sector 
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can develop extensions to the BODs. According to the findings of the study and its contribution 
to practice, board extensions provide an invaluable approach for intensifying success in CG. 
However, SBs are not the only definitive approach to extending boards, given that there are 
approaches that companies can modify their CG system, provided they stay within the confines 
of the law (Denzin & Lincoln, 2008). For this reason, future research should focus on identifying 
ways prospective board extensions that policymakers and financial institutions can adopt to 
improve CG (Archer & Rifaat, 2006). Successful research into this phenomenon will see to it that 
the findings of this study have the practical implications that it should, given the fact that it 
identifies the value of board extensions.  
Future research should also focus on ways that companies can improve the relationship between 
SSBs and the BODs. This study establishes that the relationship between the two boards is an 
integrative one, and internal policies and procedures established by companies create a platform 
for SBs to excel (Denzin & Lincoln, 2008). This creates a platform for building future work, as 
scholars still have a lot more work to do in terms of learning if the current relationship between 
SSBs and the BODs can grow any further. It is only through conducting such research will it be 
possible to discern whether or not these relationships have reached their limit. If no, companies 
should have ways that they can continue to maximise the connection between the two boards. 
The five areas above seem a lot for scholars to focus on. However, it is imperative to keep in mind 
that current scholarly work on the relationship between the BODs and SSBs is inadequate. The 
study identifies little literature in this area as one of its main limitations. If the research 
community is to remedy this deficiency, research needs to be broad and comprehensive, covering 
all possible areas related to the functioning of SBs. The successful growth of research in the areas 
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identified in this study will be integral in bridging the gap between research and practice, which 
is currently considering.  
7.5. Summary and Conclusions 
The current research has observed the current relationship between the SSBs and the BODs in 
IFIs in Saudi Arabia. Findings from this study have provided a useful contribution to the existing 
literature on the roles of SSB and BOD in Saudi Arabia. Insights which have been drawn from this 
study indicate that the two boards focus on distinct aspects of the CG process. On one part, the 
BODs in the Saudi IFIs do not appear to lay much emphasis on sustainability through Islamic law 
compliance. On the other part, the SSBs exist to fill this gap by offering potential opportunities 
for the financial institutions to exercise alternative CG in ensuring they are able to adhere to strict 
financial expectations of Islamic consumers. In the process, having both the SSB and BOD in Saudi 
Arabian IFIs helps in generating the optimal CG balance, which is essential for a successful 
banking and financial sector in Saudi Arabia. In addition, based on the obtained results, it can be 
pointed out that the SSB is a critical unit in the modification to the Saudi Arabian banks’ CG in 
ensuring there is compliance with all the stakeholder and shareholder interests (Archer & Rifaat, 
2006). As a predominant group of clients, Muslim depositors, customers, shareholders, and other 
stakeholder represent a crucial interest group as far as the IFIs in Saudi Arabia are concerned 
(Choudhury & Malik, 1992; Choudury & Hoque, 2004). As such, there are optimal expectations 
that the banks and other financial institutions are in place to attain Shari’ah -compliant practices 
in their products and day-to-day operations. Despite the important role played by the SSB, the 
study also revealed that the BOD plays an equally central role in strategy and processes across 
the banking sector (Denzin & Lincoln, 2008). Therefore, there is a need by researchers to cease 
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perceiving the two boards as distinct entities. Instead, the BOD and the SSB are collective units 
which complement each other in realizing the primary goal and interests of the Saudi 
stakeholders, in addition to connecting banks and their external environment, which is to serve 
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Appendix 1: Copy of the interview questions 
 
1. Please describe for me your personal and professional background.  
• How did you become a member of this board?  
• Are you on any other company boards?  
• What is your functional background? Education? 
• Have you been an SSB /BoD / CEO of another company?  
 
2. Take me back to your last “regularly scheduled” board meeting that you feel was indicative 
of a “typical” board meeting and describe the details of that particular meeting for me.  
• When was that meeting?  
• Who attended? Where was the meeting held? When did it start and end?  
• How would you describe the relationships amongst SSB/BoD members? How about with the 
management team?  
• Describe for me what you believe the SSB’s /BoD’s attitude was towards the board.  
• How was the meeting agenda put together?  
• Did each member contribute equally to the board meeting? How would you characterize the 
role that each member played during the meeting?  
• What level of pressure did you feel board members experienced relative to the necessity to 
reach unanimous agreement on strategic decisions?  
• How would you describe the nature of the board discussions and deliberations?  
• Which SSB/BoD emerged as the leaders in the boardroom? Why? Is this consistent on all 
issues or did it vary depending upon the subject matter?  
• How often does this board meet? What communications or interactions do you have outside 
of the regularly scheduled board meetings?  
• How typical was the last meeting relative to your other normally scheduled board meetings? 






3. I’d like to gain a better understanding of your role on the board. How would you describe 
your own personal role on the board?  
• Do you tend to be more hands-on in your board role than other members of the board? Do 
other board members have the same propensity to engage in the details of the company?  
• In your personal board deliberations, what do you think your role is relative to incorporating 
the interests of the various stakeholders? Does your position differ from that of other board 
members?  
• Personally, are you more concerned with short term tactical performance or the long-term 
strategic direction of the company? Does your position differ from that of other board 
members?  
4. I would now like to move to a different area.  Aside from the routine issues that boards 
must deal with – the kinds of things you described as part of your typical board meeting – 
they must sometimes deal with significant strategic issues that impact the long-term 
performance of the organization. Of the significant strategic decisions that the board has had 
to make in the past year or two, can you think of one in which you felt the strategic decision-
making process within the board was particularly effective? What was it and why did you 
think the board handled it effectively?  
• Take me back to the time that decision was made and help me understand how it evolved?  
• What information was provided to the board to assist in the decision?  
• Describe the deliberation process – how much dialogue and debate occurred? Who did/said 
what? “Characterize” each board member and their level of involvement.  
• Was there much discussion outside of the regularly scheduled board meeting? Why? Who 
participated?  
• What role did the SSB/BoD and other members of the TMT play in the process? What was 
their role during the board deliberations?  
• At the time that the final decision was made, would you describe it as a “Successful” decision? 
Why or why not?  How did you feel when the process was completed? Why did you feel this 
strategic decision-making process was particularly effective?  
5. I’d like to gain a better understanding of Perceptions of effective collaboration within the 
bank operations. How would you describe collaboration within the bank operations?  
• . What do you think is an SSB/BoD role in a bank?  
• . Have you had experiences that did not go well with an SSB/BoD? What were they?  
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• . Have the SSB/BoD you've encountered worked well with the other professionals?  
• . Do you see any barriers to effective collaboration between SSB and BoD? And if so what 
things would make collaboration between SSB and BoD more effective?  
• . How is the SSB/BoD viewed by SSB/BoD in general?  
• . What has most influenced your perception of SSB/BoD in the bank?  
• . Have you had any interprofessional training with SSB/BoD? If so what? 
• . In what areas do you think interprofessional training may be helpful? And how?  
• . In what sort of instances would you make a referral to an SSB/BoD?  
• . What is the most common way you communicate with SSB/BoD? Is this method effective?  












































Appendix 4: Interview Transcripts 
Interview with SSB member 4 
Gender: Male 
Occupation: Chairman of SSB in Bank VI 
Location: His Office. Duration: 72 mins. 
- Yes, I am a member of dozens of Islamic financial institutions in the Islamic world. 
- I’m member of the Supreme Council of Saudi Scholars for more than 40 years, and member of 
the Legislative Council of the Organization of Accounting and Auditing for Islamic Financial 
Institutions "AIFI". 
 I hold a master's degree from the Higher Judicial Institute in 1968, I have authored many books 
in the field of Islamic finance. 
Yes, I am a member of dozens of Islamic boards of Islamic financial institutions around the 
world. 
Do you mean the meeting of the members of the Shari'ah Committee, or the meeting of the 
members of the Shari'ah Committee with the members of the Board of Directors of the Bank? 
Researcher: I mean the last meeting of the members of the Shari'ah Committee with the 
members of the Board of Directors of the Bank.  
No problem, can you please tell me about the relationship with the rest of the members of the 
Shari'ah Committee in this bank. 
well, with regard to the relationship with the rest of the members of the Shari'ah Committee it 
can describe it as a relationship of cooperation and understanding due to the short number of 
Shari'ah Committee members in this bank (3 members) and all of them are scholars who are 
known for their professionalism and practical experience in this field.  
We usually study the issues before a vote is taken to make a decision. I do not remember that a 
dispute broke out between the members of the Shari'ah Committee during the discussion of 
the issue in this bank or other banks that I worked and work through during my long experience 
in this field, which exceeded more than 30 years. 
As for the relationship with members of the Board of Directors. Let me start by explaining to 
you the mechanism of holding the meeting between the members of the Shari'ah committees 
and the members of the Board of Directors in this bank.  
Regular meetings are usually held at the rate of two to three times per year, as required. I 
remember that the last meeting with members of the board of directors took place in January 
at the beginning of 2018. The purpose of the meeting was to inform the members of the 
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Shari'ah Committee about the Bank's work plans for the new year and to answer the questions 
of the members of the Shari'ah Committee regarding the nature of their duties in the bank.  
All the members of the Shari'ah Committee (3) members and all the members of the Board of 
Directors of the Bank attended (9) members were attended. The meeting was held at the main 
meeting hall in the Bank's building. The meeting started at 1pm for two hours. 
- Through my long experience in membership of Shari'ah committees in many Islamic financial 
institutions in the Islamic world. I can describe relationships between members of Shari'ah 
committee members and board members as "integrative relationship” each team works in 
harmony and understanding that is reflected positively on the decisions taken by the two 
boards. 
In the Shari'ah Committee, we look at the members of the Board of Directors as a team work as 
I explained to you previously. We cooperate with them and in my opinion, they are 
collaborators and they understand the nature of our role and we all strive to achieve the 
interests of shareholders, stakeholders and employees of the bank and community. 
Regarding preparing the agenda of the Shari'ah Committee meetings, the secretary of the 
Shari'ah Committee, who is a full-time employee at Bank, usually prepares the meeting agenda. 
one week before the meeting, the secretary sends all information related to meeting to the 
committee members. During the meeting of the Committee, each member allowed to 
participate in the debate and vote on the resolution, and whoever has a reservation we 
recorded that in the meeting report. 
As for the agenda of the meeting Board of Director members, the CEO prepares the agenda and 
send it to the Board of Directors for approval before send it to the members of the Shari'ah 
Committee through the secretary of Shari'ah Committee. members of the Shari'ah Committee 
may propose to add any topic for discussion before the meeting is held for inclusion in the 
agenda.  
During the meeting, each member participates in the debate and everyone has the right to 
express his opinions on the issues under discussion. We are in the Shari'ah Committee keen to 
express our point of view on all the issues that are discussed. 
I have a professional relationship with all the members of the Shariah Committee and all 
members of the Board of Directors. Sometimes I discuss the Bank's issues outside bank 
meetings. 
I can describe my role as very important for the Board of Directors to clarify the legal provisions 
of the issues related to the Bank's operations and products. We are in the Sharia Committee 
playing an important religious role in order to match the bank's business with the requirements 
of Islamic law and meet the interest of stakeholders.  
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On the personal level, I do not seek to play the most important role than rest of the Shariah 
Committee members or BoD members, we complement each other and there is no competition 
between us, and I think the rest of the members have the same feeling. On a personal level, I 
am keen to achieve the bank's long-term objectives. 
There was a strategic decision taken two years ago and was on the transformation of all the 
Bank's traditional operations to the processes of conformity to Islamic law. In my opinion, 
Shari'ah Committee were able to convince the Board of Directors to convert bank operations to 
full Islamic financial services. This decision was made in response to the demands of most 
shareholders and in line with the need of the Saudi society, which is a predominantly Muslim 
society. Therefore, the decision was taken by the consensus of the members of the Shari'ah 
Committee and also by the consensus of the members of the Board of Directors.  
In that meeting which lasted for 3 hours, all members of the Shari'ah Committee, all members 
of the Board of Directors and the CEO were attended. 
 The Shari'ah Committee presented a study on the need of convert all bank operations to full 
Islamic financial services, I remember that, some board members Saied it’s difficult to make 
that decision due to the requirements and the cost of the convert process. It was then agreed 
on the estimated timetable for completing of convert to Islamic finance within five years. This 
successful decision made with a cooperation between two boards, especially since the bank is 
one of the oldest conventional banks operating in the Saudi market and one of the largest 
conventional banks in the Middle East. 
well, I can describe cooperation between members of the Shari'ah Committee as cooperation 
relationship. As well as there is a cooperation relationship between the members of the Shariah 
Committee and members of the Board of Directors. 
The role of the Shari'ah Committee to give the Islamic opinions on bank's operations in 
accordance with the requirements of Islamic law. And the role of the Board of Directors is to 
draw up the strategy of the bank and to ensure the achievement of the objectives of 
stakeholders and the interests of shareholders. 
During my long experience working in Islamic financial institutions, there was no disagreement 
with board members, because each team understands the nature of the other's role. In my 
view, the clarity of the respective roles of each party and the commitment of each party to the 
performance of its tasks contribute to strengthening cooperation. 
I have never participated any training course with board members. 
Frequently, some issues referred to the board for clarification, so that we can present the 
Shari'ah decision. 
I think the relationship is very good. 
The relationship can be enhanced through cooperation and trust. 
